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I. INTRODUCTIONT HE second half of the twentieth century has been a period of far-
reaching change in the processes and instrumentalities of finance.
In the last twenty years, the rate of change has accelerated, result-
ing in a thorough redrafting of the landscape of the financial markets.'
1. See Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial In-
novation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1273 (1991) (The 1980s
have spawned a plethora of new financial products as well as a distinctive new process of
financial innovation rooted in the institutionalization of change and the application of ad-
vanced finance theory.); Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innova-
tion and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 334 (1989)
[hereinafter Swaps] ("The past decade has been a golden age for innovation in corporate
and international finance."); Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial
Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1319, 1353 (1991) ("I
would respond that this philosophy [incrementalism] fails to address the ever-accelerating
pace of financial innovation and its overall benefits to the United States economy."); Todd
E. Petzel, Derivatives: Market and Regulatory Dynamics, 21 J. CORP. L. 95 (1995) ("The
derivatives industry has experienced unparalleled growth during the last twenty-five
years."); Peter Tufano, Securities Innovations: A Historical and Functional Perspective, J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1995, at 90 ("The past two decades have produced a remarka-
ble number and variety of seemingly new securities.").
FINANCIAL INNOVATION
As a result of this explosion in financial innovation,2 new products,3 serv-
ices4 and processes, 5 have been developed, refined and diffused through-
out the sector. Financial innovation has generated products that permit
formerly unmanageable business risks to be traded or bargained away. 6
Advances in "financial science ' 7 are now employed to create "derivative
realities."8 These environments are created with financial innovations
and limit the extent to which the exchange rate, interest rate, and infla-
tion risk adversely impact the proverbial bottom line. The terms "finan-
cial engineering,"9 "nuclear finance," 10 or "particle finance,"'" to use
2. Financial innovation is the process by which new methods are created to provide
the fundamental services furnished by the financial sector. See infra text accompanying
notes 40-64.
3. See, e.g., Greg Ip & Aaron Lucchetti, Dow Contracts May Appeal to Individuals,
WALL ST. J., June 6, 1997, at Cl (discussing the initiation of a new futures contract based
on the Dow Jones industrials index).
4. For example, portfolio insurance is a service that attempts to attain a target rate of
return on a portfolio of assets, such as equity securities, by hedging the portfolio with
various risk mediating financial instruments. As the generation of the appropriate strate-
gies frequently required development and use of sophisticated mathematical models, port-
folio insurance became a service provided to portfolio managers by investment bankers
and specialist portfolio insurance providers. See JOHN F. MARSHALL & VIPUL K. BANSAL,
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 637-38 (1992).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 62-65 and 429-33 for a discussion of index
arbitrage.
6. See Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and
Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEX. L. REV. 985 (1995) [hereinafter Derivative
Reality]. "Derivatives [a product of financial innovation] allow corporations to insulate
themselves from, amplify, or otherwise modulate the impact of changes in interest and
exchange rates and commodity, equity, and real estate prices." Id. at 986.
7. Professor Hu characterizes the body of information representing modern finance
theory as "financial science." See id. at 989-90. Professor Hu also uses scientific analogies
in describing what he views as the competing visions of the world after the introduction of
the sophisticated products of contemporary financial innovation, a world run amok as a
result of "Jurassic Park" science, or a world of increased order and stability. See id.
8. "If clever and careful enough, a corporation can avoid the chaos of the real world.
A corporation can enter a private 'derivative reality,' a synthetic world purged of risks it
deems undesirable." Id. at 986.
9. "Financial engineering involves the design, the development, and the implementa-
tion of innovative financial instruments and processes, and the formulation of creative so-
lutions to problems in finance." John D. Finnerty, Financial Engineering in Corporate
Finance: An Overview, in THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 69 (Clifford W.
Smith, Jr. & Charles W. Smithson eds., 1990). The term, "financial engineer," came into
popular usage in London in the mid-1980s to describe the teams of professionals employed
in designing financial solutions to corporate risk management problems. See MARSHALL &
BANSAL, supra note 4, at 6. Although financial engineers may be "deal makers," "idea
generators" or "loophole exploiters," they are all proficient in financial theory and the
applied mathematics necessary to craft their products. The conceptual tools of financial
engineering are valuation theory, portfolio theory, hedging theory, accounting, and taxa-
tion. Their physical tools are the various available securities, futures, options, swaps and
related financial instruments. See id. at 6-8.
10. See GREGORY J. MILLMAN, THE VANDAL'S CROWN 195, 199-200 (1995) (describ-
ing the efforts of one scientist who is "working on a series of mathematical models that will
duplicate the functions of the human brain, but with much greater power, and enable the
firm he serves to anticipate more in the world's financial markets.").
11. See Michael Peltz, Paradigm Lost, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1995, at 39 (dis-
cussing Sanford's comparison of the "revolution in risk management techniques to the
revolution in quantum mechanics at the beginning of the century").
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some of the terms employed to describe this enterprise, have been pro-
moted as potential sources of increased financial and, therefore, eco-
nomic, stability.12 Moreover, it is suggested that the economic
environment we will be able to construct from these innovative financial
techniques will be both exceptionally robust and increasingly efficient.13
However, the practitioners and scholars who focus on the financial sec-
tor appear to have embraced the products of financial innovation without
a searching inquiry into the process that created them. Legal scholarship
has not produced critical examinations of financial innovation as an eco-
nomic process. Nonetheless, the law and legal practitioners remain
deeply involved in important aspects of the design, characterization, and
marketing of financial innovations. The primary reason for the lack of
legal scholarship lies in the apparent belief that there is no need to ex-
amine what we assume we fully understand. Our confidence in our un-
derstanding of financial innovation is based on the assumption that
financial innovation is similar to the process of technological innovation.
Legal scholarship assumes that both processes are the natural result of
bursts of entrepreneurial creativity. It further assumes that these
processes arise in response to consumer demand. 14 Financial innovators,
like the technological innovators of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, are motivated by the prospect of material gain. Therefore,
they develop products and services that present novel solutions to current
problems, or suggest new processes and services to meet unrecognized
needs. 15 The products generated are readily accepted and adjudged
good. We assume they lead toward two of our society's most treasured
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., Peter Tufano, How Financial Engineering Can Advance Corporate Strat-
egy, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 136 (discussing the use of financial derivatives to
solve strategic corporate problems, such as product differentiation and changing the char-
acteristics of holding stock).
14. See, e.g., MERTON H. MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS AND MARKET VOLATIL-
irY (1992). "To say that financial innovations, like innovations generally, are basically un-
forecastable improvements is not to suggest that their emergence is merely a matter of
chance or of artistic creative impulse." Id. at 4.
15. See Mark D. Flood, Two Faces of Financial Innovation, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF ST. Louis REVIEW, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 3, 4. The legal scholarship appears to assume
that the processes of technological innovation and financial innovation have the same ori-
gins and operation. For example, Professor Hu relies on Schumpterian descriptions of
technological innovation to provide a foundation for his discussion of financial innovation.
See Hu, Swaps, supra note 1, at 337 n.8. Although Schumpterian analysis is useful in un-
derstanding the adoption and diffusion of the products of contemporary financial innova-
tion, see infra text accompanying notes 360-62, it is less helpful in understanding the
process of contemporary financial innovation. Schumpeter described innovation in the
context of industrial production, examining, inter alia, the existence of market imperfec-
tions, i.e., monopolistic market structures and the role they play in providing real sector
firms with incentives to innovate. With the possible exception of exchanges, financial mar-
kets are highly competitive, and financial products and processes enjoy limited, if any,
intellectual property protection. Under such markets and under such circumstances,
Schumpterian analysis could be read to suggest that innovation ordinarily, should not oc-




goals, the "new" and the "better." In fact, "consensus reality"'16 has come
to expect the introduction of new technologies that result in an "im-
proved" way of life.17
Entrepreneurial imagination and a general fascination with novelty are
strongly implicated in our belief in the desirability and the inevitability of
progress. They are credited with responsibility for the material amenities
provided by modem society. However, novel manifestations of en-
trepreneurial creativity also have led to social,' 8 environmental 19 and
economic catastrophes 20 when their use caused unanticipated conse-
quences. Some of these adverse consequences could have been avoided
or minimized if we had more information about their real-world opera-
tion before they became widely available. Frequently, useful information
may not be considered if it is not consistent with accepted paradigms or
ideologies.21
The law will increasingly confront innovative financial products and
services, and it will be required to make decisions concerning the charac-
ter, operation and enforceability of these innovations. It also will have a
role in deciding the extent to which these innovations will be able to
restructure the potential risks, benefits and viability of economic activity
structures.22 The assessments of potential costs and benefits will be made
without the ability to foresee the long-term repercussions of such innova-
16. Consensus reality is a shared view of the nature of reality expressed in a paradig-
matic set of assumptions. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS 10-12 (1970). For, example, consensus reality in the West is based, among other
things, on Aristotelian logic, in which "[slomething is either A or not A, but it cannot be
both, at least not simultaneously." Greg K. McCann et al., The Sound of No Students
Clapping: What Zen Can Offer Legal Education, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 313,330 (1995). How-
ever, that view of reality in non Western thought is said to embrace the fallacy of mutual
exclusivity and false dichotomy, precluding a more holistic view of reality. See id. at 330-
31; Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 323, 334 (1997)
("The dichotomous reasoning found in Eurocentric cultures may be contrasted to the di-
unital form of reason prevalent in African and other non-European cultures. Diunital rea-
soning leads to 'both/and' conclusions and permits the consideration of information that is
not neatly categorized or compartmentalized.")
17. Popular culture at times appears to attribute an agency or entity quality to the
process of technological change. See, e.g., Michael H. Shapiro, Illicit Reasons and Means
for Reproduction: On Excessive Choice and Categorical and Technological Imperatives, 47
HASTINGS L. J. 1081, 1092 (1996). See also Nunn, supra note 16, at 362 ("A key part of the
European belief system is faith in the linear notion of 'progress,' the belief that later histor-
ical developments are superior to preceding ones and that the course of human history
flows from worse to better.")
18. See, e.g., Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From
Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH. L. & POL'Y 1
(1996) for a discussion of the sociological and anthropological assumptions that were em-
bodied in eugenics legislation.
19. See, e.g., RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
20. See, e.g., LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE (1991).
21. See KUHN, supra note 16, at 11.
22. An interesting example of such a financial "innovation" is the viatical settlements
market, in which interests in the life insurance policies of terminally ill individuals are
traded at a discount for cash. See, e.g., SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (considering whether such interests should be regulated as securities within the
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933).
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tive products and services. Unfortunately, the law's understanding of fi-
nancial innovations may coalesce without the benefit of doctrinal or
theoretical models, or at best, with only poorly fitting ones.23 It is reason-
able to anticipate that recent financial innovations may have the ability to
reorder our consensus view of the appropriate means and legitimate goals
of finance. In fact, it can be argued that it already has had that effect.
However, financial innovation as an economic process remains unex-
plored territory.
Financial innovation is beginning to be exposed to adversary, legisla-
tive, and political processes. Unfortunately, these inquiries are taking
place as a result of the debacles produced by the inappropriate or unin-
formed use of financial innovations and have been limited in scope.
24
Despite the magnitude of the losses resulting from the use of some finan-
cial innovations, the law and legal scholarship continue to view the pro-
cess of contemporary financial innovation 25 as susceptible to a limited
range of risks. This view results from almost universal acceptance by
legal scholars of the analysis provided by one school of economic
thought. Legal scholarship continues to maintain that most, if not all,
financial processes are adequately explained by mainstream economics,
namely neoclassical economic theory.26 Gradually, some legal scholars
23. Processes such as parental surrogacy, patenting of life forms, and free speech on
the internet have at their extremes, and at even less remote points on their continuum of
potential outcomes, consequences with the potential to reorder our consensus view of so-
cial reality. But we may have reason to believe that we sufficiently understand the
processes of human reproduction, genetic engineering, and mass communications to inter-
pret our legal principles as to elucidate and explicate the relationships, rights, and liabilities
consequent to these new applications. It also may be the case that as a society we believe
these developments and their social consequences to be inevitable, propelled by human
nature, fate, divinity, entropy, or other factors beyond our ability to control. However,
there are arguments and examples from history that suggest that progress toward increas-
ing technological complexity is neither inevitable nor uncontrollable. See CLARENCE E.
AYRES, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS (1994).
24. See, e.g., Brandon Becker & Jennifer Yoon, Derivative Financial Losses, 21 J.
CORP. L. 215, 216-18 (1995), in which the authors list over 100 firms, public institutions,
states and other political subdivisions that experienced financial losses attributed in the
press to financial derivatives. As a consequence of the losses attributed to trading and use
of financial derivatives, Congress explored a number of regulatory strategies to lessen the
likelihood of future dramatic losses. See Derivatives Supervision Act of 1994, H.R. 3748,
103d Cong., 2d Sess., 140 Cong. Rec. H73-01 (1994). This bill would have created a new
agency, the Federal Supervision Commission, consisting of the Chair of the Federal Re-
serve, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Chair of the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the Chair of the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion, and the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision. Id. § 103. This agency would be
responsible for, among other things, the promulgation of uniform accounting and capital
adequacy standards. ld. § 105. See also Brett D. Fromson, Lawmakers Eye More Scrutiny
of Derivatives, Hedge Funds, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1994, at F7; Laurie Lande, Top Securi-
ties Executives Tell Congress Legislation Covering Derivatives Isn't Needed, OIL DAILY,
May 11, 1994, at 1; Kenneth H. Bacon & Gregg Hitt, Derivatives Face New Regulation
From Congress, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1994, at A4; Your Financial Future, Regulation of
Derivatives (Editorial), ECONOMIST, May 14, 1994, at 15.
25. This Article will use the term, "contemporary financial innovation," to refer to the
process and products from the year 1950 forward.
26. Many legal scholars have questioned the wisdom of using the assumptions underly-
ing neoclassical economic theory in determining the efficiency, and therefore, the propriety
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have begun to recall that economics is, ultimately, a theory of behavior,
and that neoclassical economics is not the only theory that explains the
behavioral process generally characterized as economics. Nonetheless,
orthodox theory has continued to provide virtually all the vocabulary and
doctrinal tools with which legal scholars discuss and analyze economic
activity.
Therefore, it becomes important to ask whether orthodox theory pro-
vides legal scholars with a sufficiently complete explanation of the pro-
cess of contemporary financial innovation. If so, then legal scholarship is
adequately positioned to make accurate assessments of the costs and ben-
efits of this process and its consequences. We can engage in fruitful dis-
cussion of policy implications and make useful recommendations
concerning regulatory options. There is, however, reason to question the
adequacy of the orthodox explanations of contemporary financial innova-
tion. Orthodox theory has viewed financial innovation as the interaction
of a set of factors27 which establish incentives 28 to create innovations in
financial instruments, processes, markets, and institutions. 29 However,
such discussions are premised largely on fragmentary anecdotal observa-
tions.30 Orthodoxy also employs models that fail to accurately distin-
guish genuine financial innovation from old products in new packaging. 31
Orthodox economics views contemporary financial innovation almost ex-
clusively through the lens provided by its consequences. This viewpoint
supports the conclusion that contemporary financial innovation as an eco-
nomic process is not worthy of study in its own right.32 This neglect is
understandable. The assumptions on which neoclassical economics is
based obviate the need for an examination of contemporary financial in-
of legal rules. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The
Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1314 (1986) ("the current applica-
tion of economic analysis to law should be regarded as an interim step toward the integra-
tion of law with the behavioral, natural, and social sciences"). However, legal scholarship
concerning financial economics rarely departs from the neoclassical synthesis, and when it
does so, it is for the purpose of achieving better fitting assumptions. See Lawrence A.
Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Effi-
cient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994); Thomas Lee Hazen,
Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?-Derivative Securities and Financial Fu-
tures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 987 (1992);
Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Effi-
ciency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992); Louis Lowenstein, Efficient Market The-
ory: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 925 (1994); Lynn A. Stout,
Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of Uncertainty Can Increase
Risks and Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53 (1995).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 247-50.
28. See Flood, supra note 15, at 4.
29. See T.M. PODOLSKI, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND THE MONEY SUPPLY 106 (1986).
30. See id.
31. See Tufano, supra note 1; infra notes 471-75 and accompanying text.
32. For the most part, orthodox theory's exploration of financial innovation has been
limited to the work of a few monetary economists who perceive contemporary financial
innovation as an obstacle to the maintenance of effective monetary policy, and therefore,
view the process of financial innovation primarily as the creation of money and monetary




novation as a dynamical process.33 However, heterodox economics takes
a very different view of the process of contemporary financial innova-
tion.34 The explanations provided by heterodox theory indicate that the
process of contemporary financial economics may pose serious risks to
the financial sector, and possibly to the economy as a whole.35
This Article examines contemporary financial innovation as an eco-
nomic process as it relates to a category of financial innovations charac-
terized as financial derivatives. 36 It compares the orthodox, or
neoclassical, explanations of the process of contemporary financial inno-
33. Orthodox theory tends to focus on the activities of individual economic actors mo-
tivated by the rationally heuristic and to emphasize equilibrium rather than mechanics. See
generally PODOLSKI, supra note 29. Additionally, it uses a model of economic activity in
which modern financial institutions are not present. See infra notes 212-20 and accompa-
nying text. Financial innovation, therefore, appears comparable to any other en-
trepreneurial activity.
34. A fair reading of the history of modern economics could conclude that economics
has been consistently characterized by a lack of orthodoxy. Rather, heterogeneity, in for-
mulation, methodology, and policy guidance has been the rule. See Warren J. Samuels,
Introduction, HELMUT ARNDT, ECONOMIC THEORY VS. ECONOMIC REALITY 11 (William
A. Kirby trans., 1984). Thus, the concepts of orthodoxy and heterodoxy are necessarily
somewhat fluid, and can be difficult to apply to economists and economic theory because
significant differences of observation and interpretation exist within each school of
thought. Academic economics makes the process somewhat easier by producing journals
that restrict the work published to orthodox or heterodox theory based on the editors'
intradisciplinary allegiances.
35. If our understanding of the process of contemporary financial innovation is incom-
plete, then our assessment of the costs and benefits of this process and its products may be
unreliable. Therefore, policy recommendations based on such an incomplete understand-
ing may be inappropriate, and may fail to protect the financial sector from unrecognized
risks. A discussion of contemporary financial innovation and financial sector behavior
from the perspectives of various economic theories should enrich the legal scholarship in
this area, if for no other reason than to demonstrate why such theories fail, and, therefore,
why our current understanding provides an appropriate platform upon which to construct
policy and law.
36. Generally, financial derivatives are "financial contracts such as options, forward
contracts, swaps, caps, floors, and similar devices that provide value measurements by ref-
erence to movements in debt, interest rate, currency, equity, or commodity markets. While
these financial products derive their value from fluctuations in their referenced markets,
they do not require direct participation in those markets." Steven D. Conlon & Vincent M.
Aquilino, U.S. Tax Considerations for Institutional Investors Acquiring Derivative Products:
A Methodology for Evaluating Tax Risks, in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES AND
SYNTHETICS 761 (Robert A. Klein & Jess Lederman eds., 1994). More technically, a finan-
cial derivative may be defined as:
a financial instrument that by its terms, at inception or upon the occurrence
of a specified event, provides the holder (or writer) with the right (or obliga-
tion) to participate in some or all of the price changes of an underlying (that
is, one or more referenced financial instruments, commodities, or other as-
sets, or other specific items to which a rate, an index of prices, or another
market indicator is applied) and, except as noted below, does not require
that the holder or writer own or deliver the underlying.
A contract that requires ownership or delivery of the underlying is a deriv-
ative financial instrument if (a) the underlying is another derivative, (b) a
mechanism exists in the market (such as an organized exchange) to enter into
a closing contract with only a net cash settlement, or (c) the contract is cus-
tomarily settled with only a net cash payment based on changes in the price
of the underlying.
Philip N. Hablutzel, Foreward: On the Borderlands of Derivatives: Rocket Science for the
Next Millenium, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1996) (quoting COOPERS & LYBRAND,
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vation with the heterodox, or post-Keynesian, explanation of the pro-
cess,37 concluding that orthodoxy fails to fully explain contemporary
financial innovation. Although this Article will recommend ways in
which the law should view the process of contemporary financial innova-
tion, its higher goal is to provoke additional research on the economic
processes that technology is forcing, welcomed or otherwise, into our so-
cial reality and individual lives. 38
Part II of this Article defines the term financial innovation. It then
examines, from a chronological perspective, the process and products of
financial innovation and concludes that the process of contemporary fi-
nancial innovation is not different from earlier processes that resulted in
what we now view as traditional financial products. Part III charts the
development of modern economic theory and the division of economic
theory into its orthodox and heterodox camps. Part IV compares the
neoclassical view of contemporary financial innovation with the view es-
poused by the post-Keynesian theorists. Neoclassical thinkers view it as a
predictable response to regulatory excesses. However, post-Keynesian
theorists conclude that contemporary financial innovation may be coinci-
dent to, if not a consequence of, weaknesses in the financial sector. They
also conclude that the process of contemporary financial innovation may
transform financial fragility into financial crisis. Part V examines legal
scholarship's approach to contemporary financial innovation by examin-
ing its analysis of the risks presented by financial derivatives and criticizes
that analysis using the tools provided by heterodox theory. It then con-
cludes with observations on the implementation of heterodox analysis
and concerns of regulatory policy.39
II. A DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
The term "financial innovation" appears with relative frequency in
legal scholarship, 40 generally without a meaningful effort to define it.
FASB's PROPOSED STANDARD ON ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE AND SIMILAR FINAN-
CIAL INSTRUMENTS AND FOR HEDGING ACTIVITIES 2 (1996)).
37. Post-Keynesian theory represents the uneasy cohabitation of Keynes's colleagues
and disciples, institutionalist economists, and continental marxists under one roof. See A
GUIDE TO POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 4 (Alfred S. Eichner ed., 1979). See also infra
notes 346-47 and accompanying text.
38. Legal scholarship has increasingly recognized the benefits of expanding the range
of discourse around issues of economic theory. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cogni-
tive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347 (1996); Linda A. Schwartzstein, Austrian Economics
and the Current Debate Between Critical Legal Studies and Law and Economics, 20 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 1105 (1992); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1393 (1996).
39. This Article makes no effort to indulge in the mistaken dichotomy of truth versus
falsity, as those concepts may be applied to economic theory and ideology. Rather, it is an
exploratory examination of the intersections of law, contemporary finance, and economic
theory, and it should be viewed as the first step on a journey of indeterminate duration and
destination.
40. See, e.g., Peter Z. Grossman, The Market for Shares of Companies with Unlimited
Liability: The Case of American Express, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 66 (1995) ("At the same
1998]
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Rather, its meaning has been treated as tautological, or self-evident. This
appears to result from the willingness of legal scholars to view financial
innovation as equivalent to the products and processes it has produced.
That focus provides a direct path to discussions of the policy implications
of innovative financial products with respect to corporate governance, 41
taxation,42 and other regulatory considerations.43 This focus also facili-
tates examination of the risks presented by the products of financial inno-
vation to individuals, entities, and the financial sector itself. However, it
is difficult to meaningfully discuss the costs and benefits, as well as the
policy implications of financial innovation, without a working under-
standing of the process' underlying mechanisms.
Legal scholarship's failure to engage in a thorough analysis of financial
innovation stems from the reading of economic processes required by
neoclassical macroeconomics. Neoclassical theory characterizes the econ-
omy as the aggregation of the activities of individual economic actors.44
The activities of all economic actors are motivated by the same factors:
those of utility maximization. Therefore, the cause of financial innovation
is the desire to make money. However, heterodox economic theory ar-
gues that the economy is greatly influenced by the interaction of societal
institutions, including financial institutions, 45  and psychological
processes.46 Therefore, utility maximization cannot provide a sufficient
time, the 1950s represent an era before the modern financial innovations of the 1970s and
1980s."); Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive Com-
pensation, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 301, 323 (1995) ("Financial innovation, as evidenced by the
new breed of stock options, can be used to fine-tune the tools of executive compensa-
tion."); Mark D. Young & William L. Stein, Swap Transactions under the Commodity Ex-
change Act: Is Congressional Action Needed?, 76 GEO. L.J. 1917, 1940 (1988) ("The
development of financial futures and options under the CEA rightfully can be called one of
the most significant financial innovations of the past decade."); Carrie Stradley Lavargna,
Government Sponsored Enterprises Are "Too Big to Fail:" Balancing Public and Private
Interests, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 998 n.27 (1993) ("The growth in asset securitization is
deemed to be one of the most significant financial innovations of the last twenty years.");
Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L.
211, 218 (1997) ("Swaps were, without a doubt, one of the major financial innovations of
the 1980s."); Gary W. Glisson, United States Regulation of Foreign Currency Futures and
Options Trading: Hedging for Business Competitiveness, 8 J. INTL. L. Bus. 405, 434 (1987)
("The controlling regulatory scheme, however, should provide enough flexibility to accom-
modate financial innovation in both markets."); Helen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Finan-
cial Risks, and Diversified Banks: An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L.
REV. 314, 324 (1990) ("As banks faced serious competition from nonbank providers of
financial services and customers began to demand new and better financial products, the
effect of restrictive regulation on financial innovation became an issue for the first time in
forty years.")
41. See, e.g., Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Fi-
nance or the Dance into the Abyss, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1083 (1994).
42. See, e.g., Scott Marc Kolbrenner, Derivatives Design and Taxation, 15 VA. TAX
REV. 211 (1995).
43. See, e.g., Steven McGinity, Derivatives-Related Bank Activities as Authorized by
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board, 71 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1195 (1996).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 212-15.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 347-50.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 354-67.
[Vol. 51
FINANCIAL INNOVATION
explanation of contemporary financial innovation as an economic pro-
cess. Moreover, the question of which confluence of factors and
processes will result in financial innovation cannot be deemed self-evi-
dent, but a legitimate topic for scholarly discourse.47 This inquiry begins
by defining basic terms.
A. THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION
Finance is the work of the financial sector.48 The financial sector of the
economy provides three primary services: (1) a system of exchange (cur-
rency and other forms of money) and a payments system (checks, drafts,
credit cards, etc.); (2) methods of intermediation in which savings are
channelled into investments (commercial banking, thrifts, securities mar-
kets); and (3) opportunities to mediate various risks associated with, or
flowing from, business, commercial or other economic activities (insur-
ance, derivatives markets). 49 Thus, our initial focus will be consequential-
ist, examining financial innovation as the creation of "new" or "better"
instruments, institutions and markets, to augment, if not replace, the in-
struments, institutions and markets previously found in this sector. How-
ever, this definition is inadequate. 50 The terms "new" or "better" are not
47. See infra text accompanying notes 408-425.
48. A financial sector exists within a financial system. The financial system consists of
all "the financial instruments, financial institutions, and financial markets operating in a
given place at a given time .... " RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH, PREMODERN FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS: A HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 1 (1987).
49. William L. Silber, Innovation in the Financial Sector, in FINANCIAL INNOVATION 1
(William L. Silber ed., 1975). There are, of course, varying ways of characterizing the work
of the financial sector. For example, Niehans characterizes the three essential functions of
the financial sector as "the exchange of present money against future money.., the bring-
ing together of borrowers and lenders ... [and] the execution of payments on behalf of
customers." JUrg Niehans, Financial Innovation, Multinational Banking, and Monetary
Policy, 3 J. BANKING & FIN. 537 (1983). Podolski views the principle functions of the
financial "system" as "monetization and the payments mechanism, intermediation, and as-
set transmutation." PODOLSKI, supra note 29, at 38. Podolski's view of asset transmutation
embraces aspects of both savings intermediation and risk intermediation, in that it is con-
cerned with the way various financial assets and claims can be changed to better serve the
interests of their holders. See id. at 41-43. The Global Financial System Project of the
Harvard Business School characterizes the functions of the financial systems as clearing
and settling payments; pooling resources; transferring economic resources both in space
and time; risk management; proving price information; and managing agency risk and in-
formational asymmetries. See DWIGHT B. CRANE ET AL., GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
PROJECT, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE viii (1995). The
six functions isolated by the Global Financial System Project readily collapse into the three
generally recognized functions of the financial sector.
50. This definition, of course, removes financial innovation from the realm of moder-
nity and contemporary achievement, and suggests that financial innovation is as least as old
as civilization, if not older. Thus, with respect to the exchange function of the financial
sector, financial innovation is the process that brought human societies from barter, to
commodity money or specie, to commodity-indexed money and then to fiat money. Each
of these developments lowered transaction costs and permitted increasing commercial so-
phistication. See PODOLSKI, supra note 29, at 39. Moreover, when we apply the generally
accepted definition of a financial derivative as a product whose value is derived from the
value of another product, financial function or relation, it becomes clear that commodity-
indexed money is a financial derivative. Each of the aforementioned innovations changed
not only the process of financial exchange, but also reflected and precipitated changes in
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congruent with the innovative. 51 It remains important to separate the
"plain improvement" from the true innovation.52
A genuine financial innovation has been analogized to the unantici-
pated breaks that will occur in listing of data organized by time se-
quence.53  Therefore, innovations are "surprises," events whose
occurrence could not be extrapolated from trends or past practices or
current structures.54 However, merely being unanticipated does not dis-
tinguish the "improvement" from the "innovation." Rather, it simply
demonstrates inconsistency. In examining "new" products or processes in
the financial sector, distinguishing between the merely different and the
truly innovative requires a qualitative assessment of the character of the
new product or process. The fact that something "new" has been ob-
served does not indicate that an innovation has occurred. Instead, it must
be demonstrated that this unanticipated process or product departs from
expectations in ways that change the available opportunity set for the
participants in the financial sector. 55
It has been argued that innovation can be distinguished from the
merely "new" by focusing on whether the new product or process
changes the relevant opportunity set. Those new products or processes
that reconfigure the opportunity set are "true," as opposed to merely
"adaptive" innovation. 56 Adaptive innovations are new ways of "bun-
dling" and unbundling the basic services provided by the financial sec-
the societies in which these innovations were developed. They gained popular acceptance
by changing the set of risks and opportunities presented to economic actors. The same is
true of the contemporary process and products of financial innovation.
51. Attempts have been made to apply the distinctions between "inventions" and "in-
novations" appearing in the literature of technological innovation to the process of finan-
cial innovation. For example, with respect to technology,
[An] invention is a new concept, discovery, or device and ... [i]t has value
only if it is put into use by society as either a building block for further devel-
opment or as a new product or process. [An innovation is] a complex series
of activities . . . when the original idea is conceived; proceding through a
succession of interwoven steps of research, development, and management
decision making.., culminating.., when a product, which may actually be a
thing, a technique, or a process, is accepted in the marketplace.
BETSY ANCKER-JOHNSON, INVENTIONS, INNOVATIONS AND INCENTIVES, THE PUBLIC
NEED AND THE ROLE OF THE INVENTOR 6 (1976), quoted in R. Stephen Parker et al., The
New Independent Inventor: Implications for Corporate Policy, REV. Bus., Spring 1996, at 7,
8.
52. See MILLER, supra note 14, at 4.
53. Miller describes the introduction of innovation by reference to time-series analysis.
Time-series analysts break into two parts the change over time in the value of
any series such as the gross national product or consumer prices. One part is
the change that could, in principle at least, have been forecast by extrapolat-
ing known past information. The other part is thus the unanticipated, un-
forecastable change-the "surprise,".... It is these surprises that have been
aptly dubbed the "innovations" in the time series.
Id. at 4.
54. See id.




tor.57 For example, adding negotiability to a previously non-negotiable
instrument is an adaptive, as opposed to a true, innovation.58 Adding
negotiability simply rebundles the characteristics of an existing instru-
ment. "True" innovations are changes in instruments, institutions, mar-
kets and processes that make markets more efficient (in the sense of
lowering transaction costs), make markets more complete, or provide
both changes. 59 This argument furthers our understanding of financial
innovation, but does not provide a completely satisfactory definition.
There are "innovations" that consist of the "mere" rebundling of finan-
cial components, which nonetheless result in lowered transaction costs,
the essential indicia of innovation under the "true" versus "adaptive in-
novation" definition.60 The "adaptive" versus "true" distinction, though
helpful, appears more apparent than real. Nonetheless, these definitional
candidates point the way toward a qualitative definition that focuses on
the role the innovation plays upon introduction into the market. There-
fore, we can begin the process by defining a financial innovation less re-
strictively, as a "new" or "better" way of providing the fundamental
services of the financial sector, which increases the opportunity set of sec-
tor participants and lowers transaction costs.
This definition would enable us to distinguish many mere improve-
ments from genuine innovations, but it still results in an appreciable gray
area. For example, the development of index arbitrage program trading
has been characterized as a financial innovation.61 Index arbitrage pro-
gram trading combines traditional arbitrage principles with mathematical
models, computer-based decision-making and electronic order process-
ing.62 Computer programs generate orders to buy or sell the cash asset
(such as equity securities) while selling or buying the derivative product
(such as equity index futures or options).63 Our current definition of a
financial innovation places index arbitrage program trading in a gray
area. We must determine whether index arbitrage program trading con-
57. Niehans suggests that adaptive innovations are only "entrepreneurial adaptations
to changing market conditions," which should fall into disuse if the underlying conditions
that prompted their adoption disappear. Id. Niehans acknowledges that adaptive innova-
tions may not be entirely reversible, characterizing their persistence as a consequence of a
hysteresis effect. See id. It is likely, however, that a set of conditions different from those
that prompted creation of an adaptive innovation may contribute to its persistence. See
ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 38.
58. See Silber, supra note 49, at 63-64.
59. See Niehans, supra note 49, at 539-40; see also James C. Van Home, Of Financial
Innovations and Excesses, 40 J. FIN. 621, 621-22 (1985). Niehans's focus was on the "tech-
nological" innovations that reduced transaction costs in banking transactions. Van Home
recognized that transaction costs may also be reduced by new instruments, markets and
processes, not only by technological changes.
60. For example, the securitization of pools of loans in essence repackages loan com-
ponents, which lowers transaction costs for some investors by allowing them to invest in
these loans without having to assume the costs of qualifying the borrowers. See infra notes
165-71 and accompanying text.
61. See MARSHALL & BANSAL, supra note 4, at 31-32.
62. Arbitrage strategies permit traders to profit by capitalizing on price differentials
between cash and derivative markets. See id. at 3.
63. See id. at 3-4.
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stitutes a new and better way of providing a fundamental function of the
financial sector, or whether it is only a tool in the performance of a funda-
mental function of the financial sector. First, it can be argued that pro-
gram trading, or any type of trading, is not one of the functions of the
financial sector. Instead, it is a tool used by the capital markets in the
performance of their basic function: intermediation. As a tool, it can take
a wide variety of forms, 64 but the financial service or function involved is
intermediation, for which trading is an instrumentality. Therefore, the
evolution from traditional arbitrage trading to index arbitrage program
trading should be viewed as utilization of improved technology, not as a
financial innovation. However, although index arbitrage program trading
can be characterized as a tool, its use in a market does significantly
change the opportunity set. Index arbitrage program trading lowers
transaction costs for some participants, and alters market dynamics for all
investors. A market within which index arbitrage program trading occurs
may not be a new and better market, but it is a market that provides
elements of its basic intermediation function in ways that create new
costs, benefits and risks for market participants.
The gray area produced by products like index arbitrage program trad-
ing indicates the need for a more inclusive definition. Therefore, a finan-
cial innovation will be defined as: (1) "new" or "better" way of providing
the fundamental services of the financial sector, which increases the op-
portunity set of the sector participants and lowers transaction costs; and
(2) as new instrumentalities and processes that facilitate the delivery of
the fundamental services of the financial sector. Therefore, financial in-
novation as an economic process will be viewed as the confluence of fac-
tors that result in the creation and adoption of what we have defined as
financial innovations. An examination of the chronology of financial in-
novation will be the next step in identifying some of the factors that give
rise to financial innovation as an economic process.
64. For example, trading can be accomplished by, among other methods, open outcry
and computer matching. Trading by open outcry involves a
broker with an order ... indicat[ing] his position at the pit by shouting and
gesticulating with standardized hand signals. Someone willing to enter the
contract responds across the pit in similar fashion, and the deal is made. Ob-
servers on raised pulpits alongside the pit record the transaction and feed the
information into a communications system, publicizing it to other traders
who, in any event, had an opportunity to witness the transaction in the pit.
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub. nom., Merrill Lynch v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353 (1982). In-a computer matching system of trading, traders enter their offers to
buy or sell into an interactive computer system. When the system observes the entry of off-
setting offers, it notifies the traders that their orders have been executed and generates the
necessary documentation to complete the transactions. See Board of Trade of Chicago v.
S.E.C., 923 F.2d 1270, 1271-73 (7th Cir. 1991) (considering whether a computer-based trad-
ing system was an "exchange" within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1934).
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B. A CHRONOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
1. Traditional Financial Innovation
The origins of financial innovation are necessarily shrouded in the
midst of obscurity. It cannot be determined when the first matriarch de-
cided to lend another kinship group her family's excess maize with the
understanding that the debt would be repaid in as of yet unborn livestock.
However, the earliest documents memorializing commercial transactions
are associated with the Mesopotamian civilizations and date from approx-
imately 3500 B.C.E.65 Written records from that period indicate that
temple and royal treasuries were used for deposits and loans of grain and
silver.66 During this period, at least two banking firms were operating,
and the use of drafts "drawn on one place and payable in another" were
fairly commonplace. 67 By 1800 B.C.E., the Babylonian Code of Hammu-
rabi provided for interest rate ceilings, creditors' rights, and chattel
mortgages. 68
The theoretical underpinnings of forward 69 and futures70 transactions
were in use in China as early as 2000 B.C.E.7 1 Contracts that resemble
modern futures transactions were in use in what is now Bahrain Island at
65. See MICHAEL CHATFIELD, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING THOUGHT 5 (photo. re-
print 1979) (1977). This Article uses the designations, "B.C.E.," before the common era,
and "C.E.," common era, instead of "B.C." and "A.D."
66. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 48, at 13. Originally, the loans made by the temples
were interest free. They generally became interest bearing in the second millennium. See
id. at 14.
67. See CHATFIELD, supra note 65, at 5. Whether one agrees that these firms were
really banks in the modern usage of the term depends, of course, on what is in essence a
bank. Goldsmith complains that it is inappropriate to call these firms banks because they
did not engage in intermediation, in that loans were made from the "bankers"' own funds,
and deposits were not commingled and were not repayable on demand. See GOLDSMITH,
supra note 48, at 14. Davies, however, focusing on the safekeeping and lending activities,
has no trouble in calling them banks. See GLYN DAVIES, A HISTORY OF MONEY: FROM
ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 49-50 (1994).
68. See JONATHAN BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FI-
NANCE 313 (1997). The Code of Hammurabi fixed maximum interest rates of 20% on
loans of silver and 33.3% on grain loans, formalized lending procedures, requiring, inter
alia, that loan agreements be witnessed by an official witness, and permitted the pledge of
land, building, slaves, wives, and children to secured loans. See id. at 314. See generally
C.H.W. JOHNS, BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN LAWS, CONTRACTS, AND LETTERS 44-68
(1904) (providing a detailed study of the Code of Hammurabi).
69. A forward contract is a buy and sell agreement for the future delivery of a com-
modity at a prespecified price. Unlike futures contracts, forward contracts are generally
not traded on regulated exchanges and are not marked to market; for example, profit and
loss on the contract is not calculated each day, as it is with exchange traded futures con-
tracts. See T. Craig Tapley, Mathematics of Finance: Money and Time, in THE WG&L
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 180-81 (Dennis E. Logue ed., 1995).
70. "The term 'futures' is an abbreviation of the phrase 'contract for future delivery,'
and refers to executory contracts requiring the delivery or receipt of a standardized quality
and quantity of a commodity to a specific location, by a date certain, and for a stated
price." Charles R.P. Pouncy, The Scienter Requirement and Wash Trading in Commodity
Futures: The Knowledge Lost in Knowing, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1625, 1628 (1995).
71. See id. at 1628 n.14.
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about the same time.72 The Chinese, during the Chao Dynasty (1122-256
B.C.E.) introduced coined money as a medium of exchange and estab-
lished a governmental authority, which performed functions comparable
to those of central banks.73 The Greeks began coining gold and silver
around 630 B.C.E,74 and, in the fifth century B.C.E., Athenian temples
were performing banking intermediation, accepting deposits and making
loans. 75 Although installment loans76 and real estate mortgages77 were
used in Rome early in the Common Era, there is little evidence of further
financial innovation after the fall of Rome. 78 In twelfth century Europe,
instruments similar to futures contracts were reintroduced, first appearing
at medieval trade fairs. 79 Bank deposits and bankers' acceptances 80 were
reintroduced in the city states of northern Italy in the thirteenth
century. 81
The fundamental distinction between traditional financial innovations
occurring during the period 3500 B.C.E. to 1200 C.E., and the changes
that would follow in the modern period, may be attributed to the devel-
opment and use of double-entry bookkeeping in the late thirteenth and
early fourteenth centuries. 82 In double entry accounting, each transac-
tion was recorded both as a debit and a credit; total debits had to equal
total credits; all accounts were recorded using the same monetary unit;
72. See Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds," "General Custer," and the Regula-
tion of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 5 n.12 (1994) (citing
FUTURES INDUSTRY ASS'N, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FUTURES MARKETS 2 (1984)).
73. See CHATFIELD, supra note 65 at 8. Chinese coins, whether shaped round as are
modern coins, or cast as spades, hoes and adzes, were made of base metals. As such, large
quantities were needed to engage in the smallest transactions and they were easy to coun-
terfeit. See DAVIES, supra note 67 at 54-55.
74. See CHATFIELD, supra note 65, at 10; DAVIES, supra note 67, at 62.
75. See CHATFIELD, supra note 65, at 10; GOLDSMITH, supra note 48, at 27.
76. See CHATFIELD, supra note 65, at 13.
77. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 48, at 43.
78. An interesting legal development, the wakf, appears to haye developed in the Ab-
basid Caliphate, whose heartland was present day Iran and Iraq, during the seventh or
eight centuries C.E. The wakf is analogous to a trust, in which property is segregated and
its income used for a philanthropic purpose or to provide for the family members. See id.
at 68-69.
79. See Ed Jones & John F. Cook, II, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act of 1974, 5 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 457, 458 (1975).
80. Bank acceptances were first developed in ancient Greece. See ALLEN & GALE,
supra note 15, at 11.
81. See id. The Medici bank, for example, was organized in Florence in 1397. At one
point it had as many as nine branches in European cities and corresponding relationships
in several others. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 48, at 157-58. International banking was well
established in the early fifteenth century with approximately 72 international banking firms
operating in 1422. See id.
82. There is some controversy as to whether double-entry bookkeeping was an in-
dependent development in accounting theory in the West, or the adoption of Islamic re-
cording technology by the West. Chatfield takes the view that double-entry bookkeeping
was fundamentally different from anything that preceded it. See CHATFIELD, supra note
65, at 34. However, it is doubtful that any system of accounts would have gained wide-
spread usage without the adoption of Arabic numerals, which were in general usage in
Italy in the thirteenth century. See id. Double-entry bookkeeping did not arrive in Eng-
land until the middle of the fifteenth century. See id. at 58.
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and real and nominal accounts were treated alike.83 By 1581, accounting
was professionalized and monopolized in Italy with the formation of the
first society of accountants in Venice. 84 The formalization of accounting
principles and practices permitted the type of thinking about financial
transactions that would encourage the creation and use of new financial
products. 85
2. Modern Financial Innovation
The first modern equity instruments 86 originated with the European
mercantile exploits of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 87 Prior to
this period, business organizations for the most part were structured as
sole proprietorships or as one of a variety of forms of general and limited
partnership. 88 However, all of the prerequisites for the creation of a
modern corporation were in place. After the grant of the principal indi-
cia of incorporation (such as limited liability and perpetual existence to
towns and guilds by the fourteenth century), it would be just a matter of
time until these attributes were granted to business entities as well.
89
The modern period saw the introduction of many new devices to per-
mit intermediated investment. The Muscovy Company, which was
founded in 1553, is believed to have issued the first modern equity instru-
ment.90 It was followed by the East India Company in 160091 and the
83. See id. at 34.
84. See id. at 33.
85. See generally BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 68, at 50-58.
86. Equity instruments represent the stock of a holding company that has been divided
into shares, equal units to which attach contingent interests in the current assets and future
earnings of the company and a right to participate in the company's governance. See Ju-
LIAN WALMSLEY, THE NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 59 (1988).
87. See id. at 3.
88. See BASKIN & MI1ANTI, supra note 68, at 47-50. Partnerships existed in antiquity
but generally required extremely high levels of confidence in potential partners as bank-
rupts could be imprisoned or sold into slavery. See id. at 38. In twelfth century Italy,
traditional partnerships, societas, were gradually supplanted by the compagnia, which per-
mitted a more flexible capital structure in which partners contributions were fixed. See id.
Later, commeda partnerships were developed, which limited a non-participating investors
liability to the amount of her investment. See CHATFIELD, supra note 65, at 77-78. In 1673,
the French Code Savary permitted the establishment of limited partnerships, a develop-
ment which was delayed in England and whose unavailability may have encouraged the
development of equity-like interests in companies. See id.
89. In return for substantial amounts, the sovereign granted guilds the exclusive right
to practice a particular trade or craft in specified locations. See BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra
note 68, at 58. Trade guilds began incorporating as early as 1314. See CHATFIELD, supra
note 65, at 79.
90. The Muscovy or Russia Company combined a state-granted monopoly on timber
trade routes to Archangel with the sale of transferable shares. See ALLEN & GALE, supra
note 15, at 11; BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 68, at 60; CHATFIELD, supra note 65, at 78.
91. The gestation and birth of what would become the modern corporation can be
observed in the history of the East India Company. The early voyages of the East India
Company were treated as individual ventures in which investors subscribed, and, if the
voyage was profitable, received their principal and profit upon the voyage's conclusion.
This process would soon become unwieldy as it became increasingly difficult to strictly
segregate the accounts attributable to each individual voyage, so in 1613, the East India
Company stopped selling shares in individual voyages, but sold four-year subscriptions.
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first permanent joint-stock company, the Dutch East India Company, in
1602.92 What is believed to have been the first negotiable bond,93 the
"Grand Parti," was issued by the French government in 1555. 94 Unlike
earlier bond-like instruments, the Grand Parti could be purchased by al-
most anyone, not just the large banking houses. 95 Secondary trading of
securities was formalized with the opening of the Amsterdam Bourse in
1611,96 and the negotiation of options97 and futures contracts were con-
ducted soon thereafter. 98 The first stock exchange in London specifically
built for that purpose was opened in 1802.99 However, in the United
States, stock trading transactions were conducted literally on the streets
of New York City prior to the creation of the New York Stock Exchange
in 1817.100 Convertible securities' 01 and preferred stock 10 2 were devel-
oped and popularized in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Instruments that improved opportunities to mediate business risks be-
came increasingly important in the modern period. "To arrive" contracts,
or forward contracts, were used in Liverpool in the cotton trade in the
1780s,10 3 and contracts for the future delivery of rice were traded in Japan
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 10 4 However, what has come
to be considered the first modern futures transaction is reported to have
occurred in Chicago at the Chicago Board of Trade in 1865.105
Although private markets and firms are thought to be the primary in-
Permanent capital stock was established in 1657. Shares became freely transferable at
prices periodically established by the company. In 1661, the company began distributing
dividends rather than divisions of profits and assets. See BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note
68, at 69; CHATFIELD, supra note 65, at 79-80.
92. See WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 3. Joint-stock companies are generally viewed as
partnerships into which few corporate features are grafted, such as transferable shares. See
BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 68, at 56; CHATFIELD, supra note 65, at 79.
93. Bonds are notable for their relative predictability. The traditional bond bears a
fixed interest rate and matures on a date certain. See WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 61.
94. See id. at 3.
95. Earlier bond-like instruments, for example, the French rente of the sixteenth cen-
tury, were not characterized as loans but as the purchase and sale of streams of payments,
in order to avoid church-imposed usury limitations. See id.
96. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 13.
97. An option contract provides its holder with the right, but not the obligation, to
purchase or sell a certain asset or commodity, on or before a stated date for a predeter-
mined price. See Thomas E. Copeland & Hans R. Stroll, Trading Markets, in THE WG&L
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 314-17 (Dennis E. Logue ed., 1995).
98. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 13-14.
99. See id. at 13.
100. See id.
101. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 12. If preferred shares can be viewed as
debt-like equity, then convertible bonds can be seen as equity-like debt. Generally, the
holder a convertible bond may, at her option, exchange it for a predetermined amount of
common stock. See WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 65.
102. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 12.
103. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND
ITS REGULATION 3 (1987).
104. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 15.
105. See Pouncy, supra note 70, at 1629 n.17. See id. at 1628-29 (outlining a brief history
of trading in commodity futures contracts in the United States).
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novators, governments played a major role as well.1°6 The period 1739
through 1815 in European history is notable for the virtual constancy of
warfare, 10 7 which precipitated large increases in government borrow-
ing.108 The need to encourage participation in the government debt mar-
kets contributed to the development of innovative financial
instruments.10 9
The implementation of nineteenth century technology also contributed
to the development of financial innovations. Income bonds, which paid
interest only if earnings exceeded a stated sum, were issued by the Chesa-
peake and Ohio Canal Company in 1848.110 Railroad expansion was fi-
nanced in part by car trust certificates, which were similar to modern
equipment leases"' - in exchange for an extension of credit to the rail-
road company, the purchaser received title of railroad cars and a stream
of payments. 112 The development of commercial paper and warrants in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries essentially completed
the range of basic financial instruments.1 3 Additionally, the increased
specialization and professionalization of the bar also promoted financial
innovation. Corporate lawyers used the products of traditional and mod-
106. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 14. The English government also developed
the tontine, which had features of a bond and an annuity enabling a group of purchasers, or
a purchaser and his nominees, to receive a proportion of the instrument's return, the rela-
tive proportion increasing to each nominee with the death of co-nominees and the state's
obligation ending with the death of the last survivor. See id. at 13.
107. See id. at 14. See also CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
WESTERN EUROPE 9 (1984).
108. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 14.
109. See generally MARKHAM, supra note 103. To pay its troops during the Revolution-
ary War, Massachusetts issued each of them
a two year note for three hundred seventy pounds at six percent to be paid in
currency "in a greater or less Sum, according as Five Bushels of CORN for,
Sixty-eight Pounds and four-seventh Parts of a Pound of BEEF, Ten Pounds
of SHEEPS WOOL, and Sixteen Pounds of SOLE LEATHER shall then
cost, more or less than One Hundred and Thirty Pounds current Money, at
the then current Prices of said Articles."
Markham, supra note 72, at 6 n.14 (quoting WILLIAM G. ANDERSON, THE PRICE OF LIB-
ERTY: THE PUBLIC DEBT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 135 (1983)). The effect of this
note was to guarantee a set payment despite high levels of inflation. See id. at 5. Professor
Markham characterizes the "Erlanger Bond," issued in Europe by Emile Erlanger and J.
Henry Schroder & Co. for the Confederate States of America as "a derivative instrument
whose complexity and financial elegance matches anything that exists today on Wall
Street .... The Erlanger bond was a tri-valued derivative instrument. One such bond
provided for payment at maturity of 100 pounds sterling, 2500 French francs, or 4000
pounds of cotton, at the purchaser's option." Id. at 7.
110. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 15.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Modern financial instruments for the most part were issued by firms and financial
institutions such as banks and exchanges and governments. Instruments issued by firms
include: equity (equity holders are the owners of the firm and are responsible for con-
ducting its affairs); bonds (a long-term obligation by the firm to make a series of fixed
payments); convertibles (a bond that can be swapped for equity at a prespecified ratio or
vice versa); preferred stock (a hybrid security that combines features of debt and equity);
commercial paper (a short-term debt security issued by firms that can be easily traded);
and warrants (a long-term call option on a firm's stock issued by the firm). See id. at 16.
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ern financial innovation as components in the assembly of new
instruments. 114
3. Contemporary Financial Innovation
The second half of the twentieth century was ushered in by a period of
significant geopolitical transformation and international coordination,
which, in combination with other factors, effectively recreated the inter-
national financial arena. It is against this backdrop that the contempo-
rary process of financial innovation developed and continues to
operate.115
a. The Euromarkets
The birth of the euromarkets was influenced by post World War II geo-
politics. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, China, the Soviet Union and
East European nations had accumulated large U.S. dollar amounts,
which, to avoid political risks, they chose not to keep in U.S. banks.'1 6
When Britain banned the use of the pound to finance certain interna-
114. See generally Tufano, supra note 1. During the period 1830-1930, U.S. corpora-
tions introduced what Tufano characterizes as 23 major innovations in securities design,
and a very large number of variations on such new basic themes. However, most of these
"innovations" were essentially recombinations of the basic building blocks of corporate
capital structure: equity, debt, preference, security, conversion and redemption. As such,
they do not represent substantial departures from the first equity and debts issues 200 to
300 years earlier.
115. The 1940s and 1950s are not noted for the introduction of new financial products;
however, this period marked the intensive use of traditional forms of business organization
in novel ways. The use of holding companies and interlocking corporate structures was
expanded into conglomerations. Conglomerations represented a new way of viewing the
process of corporate management. Managers began to recognize that earnings could be
bought. In theory, performance could be maximized and risk reduced by uniting many
ostensibly heterogenous activities into one corporation. See BASKIN & MIRANT, supra
note 68, at 318. The result would be highly effective diversification as most business activi-
ties within the conglomerate bore entirely different risk profiles from each other. Addi-
tionally, such combinations were thought to permit the conglomerate to achieve the
benefits of synergy, i.e., the efficiencies derived from: applying modern "management sci-
ence;" keeping research and development applications, no matter how wide-ranging, in-
house; creating tax and accounting advantages; and lowering capital costs. See id. at 275-
76. It has been argued that conglomerates were built on two faulty premises. First, the
anticipated benefits of management science did not materialize because firms were not
prepared to commit the resources necessary to develop managerial staffs adequately
versed in all aspects of the conglomerate businesses. Second, the primary exploitable syn-
ergy turned out to be that increased size enhanced the bargaining position conglomerates
enjoyed in negotiating the credit markets. See id. at 279-80. However, it also is true that
tax policy effectively retarded development of managerial synergies by the requirement
that the net operating losses of an acquired firm could be used in the conglomerate's con-
solidated tax return only if the acquired firm retained business and managerial continuity.
See id. at 280. Although conglomeration does not meet our definition of a financial inno-
vation, it is important to the current discussion because it demonstrates the role that fi-
nance theory has played in the evolution of corporate forms. It is also important as a
precursor to the mergers and acquisition frenzy during which finance was directed toward
the speculative trading or corporate assets rather than the development of enterprise.
116. See BRIAN S. QUINN, THE NEw EUROMARKETS 35 (1975). See also George H.
Windecker, Jr., Note, The Eurodollar Deposit Market: Strategies for Regulation, 9 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & PoL'v 357, 361 (1993).
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tional third-party transactions, the dollars held by these governments in
European banks, "eurodollars," became a new currency. Eurodollars
were traded to meet the demand of British merchant banks for an alter-
native to the British pound, which could be used to finance international
third-party transactions. 117 The eurodollar market was strengthened by
U.S. regulatory developments. In the United States, changes to tax policy
designed to alleviate an unfavorable balance of payments positions made
it difficult to use U.S. dollars to purchase foreign securities. 118 Federal
Reserve policy also operated to stem foreign investment by limiting the
amount of foreign loans that could be made by U.S. banks and the inter-
est rates banks could pay on loans.1" 9 As a result of these regulatory
policies, U.S. banks began borrowing eurodollars to finance foreign
transactions.1 20
During the 1960s, European banks also were able to attract domestic
U.S. depositors because European banks were able to pay higher interest
on deposits than U.S. banks. 12' In the U.S., the Federal Reserve's Regu-
lation Q limited the interest rates that could be paid on time deposits and
prevented any interest from being paid on deposits of less than thirty
days.122 The benefits the eurodollar provided eventually would lead to
the development of "euro" currencies for all of the world's major domes-
tic currencies. 123
The eurodollar and other eurocurrencies are financial innovations be-
cause they are new ways of providing one of the fundamental functions of
the financial sector, mediums of exchange. Eurocurrencies, however, are
national currencies detached from the system of monetary regulation and
117. "Euro" is attached to the name of a currency to differentiate between the currency
circulating within its country of issue and the same currency circulating on deposit or on
loan in a foreign market. See QUINN, supra note 116, at 34. See also Peter S. Smedresman
& Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, Multinational Banks, and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 733, 743-47 (1989).
118. See infra notes 283-88 and accompanying text. The 1964 Interest Equalization Tax,
Pub. L. No. 88-563, § 4911(a), 78 Stat. 809 (1964), imposed a tax upon the purchase of
foreign securities in an effort to stem an outflow of U.S. currency abroad. See Virginia K.
Troia, An Overview of the Eurobond Market, 12 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 330, 330-31
(1987).
119. In 1965, the Federal Reserve "requested" that U.S. banks observe a ceiling on the
amounts of loans made to foreign borrowers and to U.S. companies for the purpose of
foreign investment. See id. at 332.
120. The eurodollar market was also supported by foreign exchange rates and controls,
tax concerns, and interest rate differentials, which made it advantageous for foreign firms
to maintain U.S. dollars in European banks. See QUINN, supra note 116, at 35.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 36. Additionally, The Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(6), does
not require banks to maintain reserves for deposits that are negotiated outside of the U.S.
Before the promulgation of this requirement, the same result was achieved by means of a
Federal Reserve Interpretation. See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 117, at 744
n.31.
123. See QUINN, supra note 116, at 36. The practice of banks accepting deposits in non-
domestic currencies was not new, and had been engaged in by European banks during the
50 years preceding the escalation of this practice in the 1960s. However, the development
of a wholesale market for such deposits represented an innovative practice in the process
of financing international transactions using non-domestic currencies. See id.
19981
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currency control implemented by their nations of origin. Therefore, the
development of eurocurrencies eroded national sovereignty. Decisions
concerning a nation's money supply were no longer subject to the exclu-
sive control of a nation's central banker. The activities of international
currency traders would have to be factored into a nation's monetary
policy.
By 1963, the eurobond market was also operational. 2 4 Bond issues
generally are underwritten by domestic issuers, and are subject to the reg-
ulatory structure in place in the country of issue. Eurobonds generally
are underwritten by non-domestic issuers, and are not subject to regula-
tion by the country in whose currency the bonds are denominated.125
Eurobonds permitted U.S. firms access to the capital markets without
having to comply with the regulatory requirements imposed by the Secur-
ities Exchange Commission with respect to domestic issues.126 The cost
of floating a bond in the eurobond market, therefore, could be signifi-
cantly lower than the costs incurred in the U.S. market.'2 7
Floating-rate notes (FRNs) were a further innovation of the
Euromarkets. Generally, they are viewed as a hybrid instrument with the
features of debt and the transferability of currency.' 2 8 FRNs are issued
by firms, state and local governments, as securities that pay interest at a
rate tied to a standard floating interest rate such as LIBOR, 12 9 or U.S.
Treasury securities rates, 30 i.e., rates that vary in response to changing
market conditions.' 3 ' They have been issued in various currencies, fre-
quently with convertibility features that permit the holder to switch the
124. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 17; QUINN, supra note 116, at 27-30, 32-33.
125. See QUINN, supra note 116, at 27-30, 32-33.
126. See Finnerty, supra note 9, at 10.
127. See id.; WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 39. The practice of issuing foreign currency
denominated bonds in domestic markets was also not new. See Finnerty, supra note 9, at
18-29 for the origins of the eurobond market. However, earlier examples involved the
participation of a limited number of participants and currencies. See id. at 18. For exam-
ple, the floating of the 100 million French francs, baring indemnity loan in 1817, involved
the non-domestic issue of a bond denominated in a foreign currency, but in essence consti-
tuted a loan from France to Russia. See id. Contemporary eurobonds were the first such
instruments traded on a truly multinational market involving a large number of partici-
pants from a wide variety of jurisdictions. See id. at 18-19. The issuance of U.S. dollar
denominated bonds by foreign syndicates for sale in non-U.S. markets represented a sharp
departure from prior practice and a distinct market innovation. See id. However, as the
eurobond market has developed, it has become increasing difficult to distinguish between
non-domestic foreign bond issues and eurobonds, particularly as U.S corporations began to
use the market as a source of capital, and changes in tax treatment made foreign issued
U.S. dollar denominated bonds more attractive to U.S. residents. See QUINN, supra note
116, at 32-33.
128. See id. at 93.
129. "LIBOR" is an acronym for the London Interbank Offered Rate, based on the
average three-month time deposit interest rate offered by a random selection of 12 of the
top 20 banks in the London eurodollar market. See Thomas Schneeweis & Jot Yau, Finan-
cial Futures Markets, in THE WG&L HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 383 (Dennis E.
Logue ed., 1995).
130. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 19; QuINN, supra note 116, at 93.
131. See Timothy W. Koch, Municipal Securities, in THE WG&L HANDBOOK OF FINAN-
CIAL MARKETS 236 (Dennis E. Logue ed., 1995)
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coupon payment from one currency to another.1 32 Others have been is-
sued that permit the holder to choose from a menu of redemption
currencies. 133
Eurobonds and floating-rate notes are financial innovations because
they facilitate the intermediation function of the international capital
markets. They also created a new system of exchange. Investors can use
these instruments to convert one currency to another, again in ways that
avoid the national regulatory structure of the currencies involved.
b. Swaps
In the 1960s, the international currency markets also witnessed the de-
velopment of parallel loans, 34 back-to-back loans, 135 and their descen-
dant, the currency swap. 136 As firms' operations became increasingly
international, their foreign exchange requirements created new sets of
problems and opportunities. 137 International banks were called upon to
accommodate their customers' need to engage in increasingly sophisti-
cated transactions involving foreign exchange. A significant concern was
the ability of parent corporations to provide financial support to foreign
subsidiaries. This need was often complicated by national government
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. The currency-collateralized
loan was an existing method of meeting this need.' 38 First, a firm placed
its domestic currency on deposit in a domestic bank. That amount would
then be used to collateralize a loan to the firm's foreign subsidiary made
by the domestic bank's foreign branch in that branch's local currency.139
These loans permitted firms to transfer surplus liquidity while simultane-
ously converting it from one currency to another, without violating do-
mestic foreign exchange controls.14° However, currency-collateralized
loans subjected the international bank to foreign-exchange risk. Banks,
therefore, had to hedge this foreign exchange exposure with counter-
vailing transactions in their loan portfolios. 141 U.K. merchant banks rec-
ognized it could be profitable and less complicated to remove themselves
as participants in these transactions. Instead, they could broker such
deals directly between firms with complementary foreign exchange re-
quirements without the need for intervening banks. 142 When the U.K.
government imposed the dollar premium 43 on foreign exchange transac-
132. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 19; QtnNN, supra note 116, at 66-74.
133. See WALmSLEY, supra note 86, at 237-39.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 145-50.
135. See idL
136. See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
137. The following discussion generally follows ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 17.
138. See CARL R. BEiDLEMAN, FINANCIAL SWAPS 13 (1985).
139. See id
140. See id at 13-14.
141. See idt at 13.
142. See JOHN A.M. PRICE & SCHUYLER K. HENDERSON, CURRENCY AND INTEREST
RArE SwAPs 1-2 (1984).
143. The dollar premium was introduced by the U.K. government to protect foreign
exchange reserves by discouraging foreign investment. See id. at 1.
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tions, bankers were provided with an additional incentive to develop the
market for what would be characterized as parallel loans and back-to-
back loans.'"
The parallel loan consists of two mirror-image loans between two par-
ent firms in different countries to each others' foreign subsidiaries. 145 For
example, a U.S. firm would lend dollars to a French firm's U.S. subsidi-
ary, and a French firm would lend francs to a U.S. firm's French subsidi-
ary. As a result of this transaction, each firm is able to transmute excess
domestic currency into a desired foreign currency. A back-to-back loan
could be used to accomplish the same foreign exchange objective be-
tween the principals directly. In a back-to-back loan, two firms make off-
setting loans to each other using different currencies. 146
The utility of parallel loans and back-to-back loans was limited by the
credit 1 47 and legal risks148 they created. Parallel and back-to-back loans
were created with documents that established two independent debtor-
creditor relationships. Although the lawyers responsible for drafting
these documents tried to ensure that they would create secured interests
in the relevant jurisdictions, they were not always successful. Thus, if the
laws of a jurisdiction prevented a party from perfecting its right to set-off
upon the bankruptcy of its counterparty, the solvent party would still be
obligated to perform. However, the solvent party could not expect
counter-performance, and would be treated as an unsecured creditor with
respect to its claims against the bankrupt party. 49 As a result, such trans-
144. The following is an example of the costs imposed on foreign exchange transactions
by the dollar premium.
[I]f a U.K. company wanted to invest [sterling] 1,000,000 in the U.S. equity
market, it had to buy the dollars necessary by selling pounds sterling for dol-
lars in what was known as the dollar premium market. This meant that, if the
premium was 20%, it would cost [sterling] 1,200,000 to invest the equivalent
of [sterling] 1,000,000 in the U.S. equity market. Upon selling the securities
acquired, only 75% of the proceeds of sale could be sold through the dollar
premium market for pounds sterling, the remaining 25% having to be sold
through the spot market, i.e., at the free market exchange rate prevailing on
the day of sale for selling dollars for pounds sterling. Having initially to pay
more for the U.S. investments and then having to surrender 25% of the pre-
mium (effectively a tax) acted as a disincentive for foreign investment.
Id. This provided a significant incentive to borrow funds to be invested abroad in the
country where they were to be invested, which enhanced the value of the parallel loan
market. See id.
145. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 24; BEIDLEMAN, supra note 138, at 14;
WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 141; PRICE & HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 9.
146. See PRICE & HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 9. Although parallel loans and back-
to-back loans could be used to accomplish the similar financial objectives, they did differ
with respect to certain technical features, e.g., the right of offset. See BEIDLEMAN, supra
note 138, at 19.
147. Credit risk is the risk of counterparty default. See Romano, infra note 152, at 21.
148. Legal risk refers to the possibility that a party to a transaction may attempt to
avoid her obligations by finding a law that excuses her from performance. See id. at 52.
See, for example, Hazell v. Hammersmith, and Fulham London Borough Council, 2 App.
Ca. 1, 37 (1992), where the court ruled that municipalities lacked the legal capacity to enter
into swap contracts, thereby voiding the municipalities obligations under a swap contract.




actions would only be engaged in with counterparties with the highest
possible credit ratings. The existence of this legal uncertainty and the
complicated documentation required to ameliorate such risks, coupled
with the limited number of potential counterparties, limited the useful-
ness of these instruments.150
Swaps were developed to achieve the financial goals of parallel loans
and back-to-back loans in currency transactions more simply, with less
credit and legal risk, and with more favorable accounting options.151
Swaps lessened counterparty credit risk by changing the nature of the
transaction from two independent agreements to loan different currencies
to one agreement to buy and sell different currencies. Swaps also condi-
tioned performance on counterparty performance.' 52 Therefore, legal
risk was minimized and a wider range of counterparties became available.
There is some debate about the appearance of the first swap transac-
tion.153 As the first swaps were created as proprietary instruments, pub-
licizing information sufficient to document their existence as a new
species of transaction would enhance their replicability. 154 It is therefore
understandable that the engineers of the first swaps were hesitant to pub-
licize the event. 55 However, in 1977, the market did learn of a
425,000,000 U.S. dollar/pound sterling swap, 156 and the 1981 currency
swap between the World Bank and IBM brought this device out of the
150. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 24; BEIDLEMAN, supra note 138, at 15; PRICE
& HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 2.
151. See BEIDLEMAN, supra note 138, at 21; PRICE & HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 2.
In earlier times, a swap took place with "a local trader paying the local debts of a foreign
trader, in return for that foreign trader paying the local trader's debts in the foreign
trader's home country." Id. at 1.
152. See PRICE & HENDERSON, supra note 142; WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 142;
Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55
MD. L. REV. 1, 50 (1996).
153. Walmsley reports "[t]he swap market began in the 1960s, with the introduction of
currency swaps." WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 25. Price and Henderson state,
"[a]ccording to market sources, the first genuine swap was arranged in August 1976 ......
PRICE & HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 3. Smith and Smithson argue for a later date, "a
market for swaps did not exist in any meaningful sense until the 1980s." Finnerty, supra
note 9, at 198. Marshall and Bansal conclude that "[t]he first currency swap was engi-
neered in London in 1979." MARSHALL & BANSAL, supra note 4, at 316. Much of the
disagreement appears to be a consequence of semantics, i.e., what constitutes a "true"
swap.
154. Generally, an idea is not entitled to protection as intellectual property, although
the author's expression of that idea may be entitled to such protection. So, for example,
once the idea underlying a swap transaction has been made public, competitors may offer
products based on the same idea, although the competitor will not be able to copy or
create documents that are essentially derivative of copyrighted documents that created and
memorialized the first transactions. See Peter K. Trzyna, Legal Protections for Innovative
Financial Products and Services, in FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 687 (John F. Marshall &
Vipul K. Bansal eds., 1992).
155. See PRICE & HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 3. See infra notes 157-63 and accom-
panying text. As swaps were designed to circumvent foreign exchange controls, publicizing
their arrival would only accelerate potential regulatory reactions as predicted by the regu-
latory dialectic.
156. In April 1977, a financial "tombstone" appeared for the transaction, which was
arranged by Continental Illinois Limited (now First Interstate Limited) on behalf of Con-
solidated Goldfields Limited. See PRICE & HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 3.
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realm of obscurity. The example provided by IBM and the World Bank
stimulated the market and encouraged potential users to explore the ben-
efits of this device. 157 The swap market developed rapidly, particularly
when bankers changed their role in engineering swaps from broker to
dealer, serving as their customers' counterparties and hedging their expo-
sures in the rapidly developing markets for financial futures and
options.158
Commodity swaps followed in 1986. They were used by commodity-
producing entities to hedge their market risk on medium- to long-term
contracts of precious metals, industrial metals and energy products.' 59
Swaps based on commodity interests raised regulatory concerns for the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 160 The regulatory un-
certainty created while the CFTC examined the jurisdictional question
encouraged U.S. swap dealer operations to move off-shore.16'
Equity swaps were introduced in 1989.162 In an equity swap, parties
exchange an interest component based on a stated notional amount, for a
stream of cash flows equivalent to the dividend payments on a number of
157. By the late 1970s, the World Bank was borrowing approximately $8 billion annu-
ally to finance development projects in developing economies, using funds raised in various
international bond issues. See MILLMAN, supra note 10, at 179. At the time, interest rates
were approximately 8% in Switzerland, 12% in Germany and 17% in the United States.
Although the World Bank would have preferred to borrow in Switzerland and Germany,
its borrowing in those jurisdictions had reached the limits permitted by Swiss and German
Law. IBM was then holding borrowed Swiss francs and German marks whose values, due
to interest rate changes and the appreciation of the U.S. dollar, were much greater than
IBM's basis in them. See PRICE & HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 4. In a transaction
arranged by Solomon Brothers, IBM and the World Bank agreed to swap these obliga-
tions. See id. The World Bank would borrow in the U.S. market at 17%. IBM would
service this debt and, in exchange, the World Bank would service IBM's Swiss franc and
Deutsche mark debt. The result was that the World Bank was able to borrow in the U.S.
markets, but pay interest at the rate charged in the Swiss and German markets, while IBM
was able to recognize the profit it had earned on its Swiss franc and Deutsche mark hold-
ings, and eliminate the risk of loss on these holdings should the exchange rates change.
Because of its need for very large amounts of capital, the World Bank's adoption of swap
financing has been very important in popularizing the device. See PRICE & HENDERSON,
supra note 142, at 7. The World Bank reported that, in 1983, swaps enabled it to cut its
overall cost of borrowing from approximately 10% to about 8.9%. See WALMSLEY, supra
note 86, at 125. In 1981, the currency swap model was adapted to convert the character of
adjustable and fixed-interest loans. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 25; MARSHALL
& BANSAL, supra note 4, at 316. The Student Loan Marketing Association ("Sallie Mae")
was an early user of interest rate swaps to convert the interest rate character of its credit
obligations. See id.; see also ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 25; MARSHALL & BANSAL,
supra note 4, at 316; PRICE & HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 4; WALMSLEY, supra note 86,
at 125.
158. See MARSHALL & BANSAL, supra note 4, at 316-17; MILLMAN, supra note 10, at
179-80.
159. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 26; MARSHALL & BANSAL, supra note 4, at
317.
160. See infra note 173. After the CFTC suggested that commodity swaps might be
within its jurisdiction, much of the industry moved off-shore. The CFTC's swap exemption
created a safe harbor, removing certain swap transactions from CFrC regulatory oversight.
See id.
161. See MARSHALL & BANSAL, supra note 4, at 317.




shares of a stated corporation. The value of the shares is equal to the
notional amount on which the interest payments are based. The party
responsible for making the interest-based payments would also make
payments to the counterparty, should the shares fall in value. The party
responsible for making the dividend-based payments would also make
payments to the counterparty, should the shares appreciate in value. Eq-
uity swaps permitted the counterparties to assume the positions of a
leveraged purchaser of equity and the seller of equity, who has also fi-
nanced the transaction, without buying any stock.163
Swaps are used for their ability to convert one currency into another
and, therefore, function as substitutes for money and credit. Swaps also
have the ability to mediate a wide range of financial risks. Their use in
the financial sector and financial firms has encouraged international
transactions and changed the way in which risks are perceived by
managers.
c. Securitization
Securitized instruments were designed to create a new market. By
pooling federal government insured mortgages, the Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae) 164 was able to cre-
ate a new security165 representing partial interests in such pools.1 66 The
ability to transform illiquid assets into securities that would be traded on
secondary markets brought new capital resources to the underlying mar-
kets from which such new securities were derived.1 67 The securitization
of federally insured mortgages was designed to increase the supply of
funds available to finance home purchases. The ability to securitize and
163. See id. The swap market has continued to develop to include, among other things,
the use of swaps as components in the engineering of complex derivative instruments as
risk management and financing solutions. See id. at 118-19. Swaps can be designed to
contain "caps," an agreement under which the purchaser buys the right to payment, should
a referenced rate exceed the "capped" rate; "floors," where the purchaser receives pay-
ment if the referenced rate falls below the "floor;" and both cap and floor, known as a
"collar." Options on swaps can also be negotiated and provide a party with the option to
enter into a specified swap at a predetermined future date. See Romano, supra note 152, at
47-48.
164. Congress authorized GMNA in 1968 as a governmental instrumentality within the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. See 12 U.S.C. § 1717(a) (1994).
165. Such securitized interests are characterized as "pass-through" or "pay-through"
interests. The underlying assets supporting pass through securities are held by a non-taxed
trust. The trust's tax liabilities and the payment stream on the assets pass through to the
securities' holders. Pay-though securities are debt issues collateralized by the underlying
assets. In the pay-through situation, the pool is divided to support a number of securities
with different risk characteristics. See WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 227-29; ALLEN &
GALE, supra note 15, at 29.
166. See SHENKER & COLLETrA at 1386 (source on file with author); WALMSLEY, supra
note 86, at 231-32. The securitization process did not begin with GNMA. Shenker and
Colletta report that mortgage-backed bonds were sold to the public prior to the turn of the
century, and mortgage participation contracts secured by pooled mortgages were sold in
the 1920s. See generally SHENKER & COLLETrA, supra. However, it appears that GNMA's
mass securitization of consumer dept represented a significant departure from earlier
practice.
167. See id. at 1383-84; WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 22.
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sell interests in mortgages permitted money from the conventional capital
markets to return funds to lenders, enabling them to make more mort-
gage loans and encourage housing finance. 168 Eventually, mortgage-
backed securities would be "stripped," or segregated into "tranches."
Each tranch, consisting of distinct principal and interest instruments,
could be traded separately of each other.169 Ultimately, many different
types of loans, including automobile loans and credit card receipts170
would be securitized. Banks and other depository institutions would
come to rely on securitization to offset the rising disintermediation exper-
ienced in the 1970s and 1980s.171
Securitization has established new markets in which formerly illiquid
assets are traded for cash. It has created a new type of intermediated
investment and a new venue for intermediation. It also represents the
ability of the government to create financial innovations that support pol-
icy initiatives.
d. Financial Futures 72 and Options
In 1972, futures on foreign exchange began trading on a division of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME),173 the International Monetary
Market (IMM). 1 74 In 1973, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) created
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) to trade standardized op-
168. See SHENKER & COLLETrA, supra note 166, at 1380-81.
169. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 30. This change followed the enactment of
the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
170. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 30; SHENKER & COLLETrA, supra note 166,
at 1369-73; WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 241-45.
171. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 30; SHENKER & COLLE-rrA, supra note 166,
at 1388-91.
172. Financial futures contracts are generally contracts to deliver or take delivery of a
financial instrument on a certain future date. More abstract financial futures, such as
futures on equity indices do not, of course, envision a delivery component. Rather, they
are settled in cash. See WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 99. It is noteworthy, that the
traditional distinction between a futures contract and a gambling contract was that the
gambling contract ordinarily was settled in cash. See MILLER, supra note 14, at 10.
173. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") is responsible for the reg-
ulation of all commodities and interests in commodities, including commodity futures,
commodity options and options on commodity futures. Generally, with respect to ex-
change traded financial derivatives, the CFTC is authorized to designate contract markets,
including exchanges, approve new contracts, regulate speculation by imposing speculative
limits, register firms and individuals, and investigate and prosecute fraud, anti-competitive
practices, and manipulation. See Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) § 2, 7 U.S.C. § 2
(1992); CEA § 4, 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1992); CEA § 5, 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1992). A number of entities
and individuals are required to be registered with the CFTC in order to function the com-
modity futures industry. They include futures commission merchants, floor traders and
floor brokers, commodity trading advisors and commodity pool operators, and associates
of futures commission merchants, commodity pool operators, and commodity trading advi-
sors. See CEA § 4, 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1992).
174. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 17; WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 99.
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tions175 on securities.176 Interest rate financial futures were created in
1975, with a contract on Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed certificates traded
on the CBOT.177 The IMM introduced a futures contract on the ninety-
one-day Treasury bill in 1976,178 followed by a futures contract on the
Treasury bond traded on the Chicago Board of Trade in 1977.179 The
1980s saw the introduction of new financial futures based on stock market
indices, three of which were introduced in 1982. The Kansas City Board
of Trade created a contract based on the Value Line Stock Index.180 The
CME introduced a contract based on the S&P 500, and the New York
Futures Exchange began trading a contract based on the New York Stock
175. Although options on equity securities and on other financial instruments were not
a new development, earlier options were individually negotiated and constructed contracts.
As such, there was no formal market on which options on financial instruments could be
traded. The Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) created options with standard
prices and expirations, thereby facilitating the development of a secondary market for
these contracts. See WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 149.
176. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 17. The CBOT initially applied for permis-
sion to trade options in 1969, but permission was not granted by the Securities Exchange
Commission until 1973. See MILLER, supra note 14, at 11. Options trading on the CBOE
began with a limited number of call options, but options initially were not available. The
CBOE was soon joined in trading options by the American Stock Exchange (1973) and the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange (1975). See Joseph S. Rizzello, The Development and Evolu-
tion of Derivative Products, in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES & SYNTHETICS 4 (1994).
The SEC regulates options on equity securities and equity index options. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1994). Currency options are regulated by both
the CFTC and SEC, depending on the regulator responsible for the exchange on which
such options are traded. See Romano, supra note 152. However, a turf battle ensued when
the CBOE sought to trade options on securitized instruments, GNMA certificates, see
supra notes 164-171 and accompanying text, pursuant to authorization from the SEC. See
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026
(1982). Despite a 1982 agreement between John Shad, then Chairman of the SEC, and
Philip Johnson, then Chairman of the CFTC, which was ratified by Congress in the Futures
Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(i), (ii)
and (iv) (1994)), conflict arose when the SEC sought to authorize trading of index partici-
pation contracts, derivatives with the characteristics of both securities and commodities,
that were ultimately held to be within the jurisdiction of the CFTC. See Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 548 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990).
Ultimately, index participation contracts would be traded in Toronto. See Christopher C.
Culp, Stock Index Futures and Financial Market Reform: Regulatory Failure or Regulatory
Imperialism?, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 517, 581 (1991). The CFTC-SEC accord resolved
these jurisdictional questions by maintaining the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over all fu-
tures contracts and extending such jurisdiction to options on futures contracts, while
preventing the development of futures contracts on individual securities. The accord pro-
vided the SEC with exclusive jurisdiction over options on securities and options on stock
indices. The accord also permitted the CFTC to regulate futures on stock indices subject to
limitations and required it to consult with the SEC prior to designating any new contract
market (i.e., for the trading of futures contracts on stock indices). The CFTC-SEC accord
was enacted into law by the Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-546, 106
Stat. 3606, 3628 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1994)). See Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa
Viniguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New
Product Development, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1457-58 (1991).
177. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 17.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.; WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 118-19.
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Exchange Composite Index.' 8 ' Off-shore, the London International Fi-
nancial Futures Exchange began operation in 1982 with the trading of
futures contracts on the eurodollar and the pound sterling, and additional
futures and options contracts shortly thereafter.' 82 The 1980s also saw
the propagation of exchanges throughout the world's developed and
emerging financial centers. There are currently more than fifty-four or-
ganized futures and options exchanges.' 8 3
The availability of exchange-traded financial futures and options con-
tracts created new opportunities for risk intermediation and made those
services available to the general public. These instruments increased the
perception that all financial risks were manageable and decreased the
fear of risk-taking. They also created new opportunities for speculation
and for speculation disguised as hedging.
d. Money Market Instruments
Although various management techniques have been characterized as
the products of financial innovation,' 84 it is fairly clear that the desire to
achieve optimal utilization of idle or excess cash was instrumental in the
creation of innovative money market instruments and practices.' 85 The
development of money market instruments 186 began in the 1950s. It ac-
celerated in 1961 with the establishment of a secondary market for large
denomination certificates of deposit (CDs), and in 1966 with the issuance
of retail market CDs.187 Money market mutual funds permitted the in-
vestment of small amounts by retail customers (generally $1,000 or more)
in short-term money market instruments. 8 8 These instruments func-
tioned as money substitutes, changing the structure of the market for de-
posits. They encouraged banking and thrift disintermediation and
resulted in new regulatory policy for those industries.
This discussion of contemporary financial innovation examines a few of
the innovations that have occurred in the second half of this century.
However, it provides sufficient information to place the products of con-
181. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 15, at 17; WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 100.
Within a year of their introduction, combined trading on the Kansas City Value Line con-
tract, the S&P 500 contract, and the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index contract
significantly exceeded the volume of trade on the New York Stock Exchange. See id. at
119.
182. Some of the additional financial futures contracts included foreign exchange con-
tracts introduced on the IMM in 1972; gold contracts introduced on Comex and the IMM
in 1974; GNMA contracts introduced on the CBOT in 1975; treasury bill contracts intro-
duced on the IMM in 1976; treasury bond contracts and 90-day commercial paper contracts
introduced on the CBOT in 1977; treasury bill contracts introduced on the IMM in 1978;
30-day commercial paper contracts introduced on the CBOT in 1979; Australian dollar
contracts introduced on the IMM in 1980. See WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 100.
183. See Rizzello, supra note 176, at 4.
184. See PODOLSKI, supra note 29, at 129.
185. See id.
186. The "money market" generally refers to wholesale borrowing and lending by fi-
nancial institutions and major corporations. See id. at 119.
187. See WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 3.
188. See PODOLSKI, supra note 29, at 123.
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temporary financial innovation in proper context.189 Each of the con-
temporary financial innovations discussed above can be understood as
providing one of the fundamental services of the financial sector.190 Each
also has been identified as contributing to the number and magnitude of
risks present in the contemporary financial sector. In particular, the fi-
nancial derivatives discussed above are perceived as raising significant
risks to sellers, users and the financial sector as a whole.
C. THE PROCESSES OF TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY
FINANCIAL INNOVATION
Financial innovation occurs within financial systems. Financial systems
are environments circumscribed by the character of the financial transac-
tions occurring within them. They are also greatly influenced by social
structures and systems and historic events. Therefore, financial innova-
tions result from interactions of commercial needs, political realities,
demographics (including income and resource distribution), technological
capabilities, and ideological constraints. 91 Traditional financial innova-
tion occurred in a financial system geared to meet the commercial needs
of agrarian- and trade-based economies. These were systems in which
the state and religious organizations served as the primary financial insti-
tutions and, therefore, very few individuals or entities were concerned
with finance. Most transactions were bilateral exchange or barter trans-
actions and the need for a medium of exchange was rare.192 These sys-
tems also required only the rudiments of investment and risk
intermediation as few individuals or entities had surplus capital re-
sources.193 Financial innovation occurred in traditional financial systems
when social, technological, political or ideological change encouraged the
development of new types of commercial transactions and business rela-
189. One scholar, speaking only as of 1990, was able to list approximately one hundred
different contemporary financial innovations. See Finnerty, supra note 9, at 74-75.
190. The following chart lists contemporary financial innovations and the primary fi-
nancial service each provides.
Contemporary Financial Innovation Fundamental Financial Service Provided
Euromarkets Medium of Exchange
Swaps Risk Intermediation
Securitized Instruments Intermediated Investment
Financial Futures and Option Risk Intermediation
Money Market Instruments Intermediated Investment
191. Financial innovation occurs within a given economic system, and although some
features associated with innovation (e.g., the general frequency of innovation) may be ger-
mane across a variety of economic systems, the extent and character of innovation tends to
be limited by the ideological underpinnings of the relevant economic system. See John T.
Harvey, Circular Causation and the Veblenian Dichotomy in the General Theory: An Intro-
duction to Institutionalist Method, 17 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMIcs 69, 73-74 (1994) (ar-
guing that the frequency of technological innovations is inversely related to the extent to
which allocation of resources is based on ideology).




tionships. For example, political reconfigurations (i.e., the rise and fall of
nation states and empires) were able to encourage or impede financial
innovation. Trade became easier when public works projects improved
the roads. Trade also became easier when empires enforced uniform sys-
tems of weights and measures and introduced uniform currencies. War as
a function of expansion or defense made transportation more difficult,
but the need for supplies it produced could make trade more profitable.
Political reconfigurations also increased or decreased political stability.
Perceptions of political stability could promote or deter savings, which in
turn impacted investment and the tendency towards intermediation. 194
The processes that resulted in more or less complexity in societies were
also among the forces that created incentives for the development and
use of financial innovations. 195 For example, urbanization and popula-
tion growth encouraged financial innovation. In antiquity, as in the pres-
ent day, urbanization leads to greater party insecurity in financial
transactions, as such transactions increasingly occur between and among
strangers. 196 Loans secured by chattel mortgages became popular be-
cause they lessened concerns about dealing with strangers. 197 The devel-
opment of chattel mortgages also limited the lender's transaction costs.
The lender need only determine that the value of the pledged property,
upon default, would compensate her for both lost principal and interest.
It was therefore less important to expend resources to determine the
farmer's agricultural track record, the fertility of her land, the health of
her livestock, and the efficacy of her gods. Financial innovations also
have a tendency to encourage further innovations. The introduction and
use of the Roman monetary system in the first century B.C. enlarged the
pool of potential trading partners by minimizing exchange and liquidity
mismatch.' 98 This promoted the expansion of the merchant and trading
classes, which increased the number of people with surplus resources, for
whom questions of finance would become significant. The further broad-
ening of the financial elite would only increase the demands upon, and
194. Public works and military projects also increased the amount of financial innova-
tion as direct taxation of citizens became necessary to finance some state activities. See id.
at 32-33.
195. Complexity theory examines the dynamic processes of social systems and their ten-
dency to develop increasingly complex structures to manage system change. See J.B. Ruhl
& Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Com-
plexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of
Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 411 (1997). Although complexity theory
has been proposed as a theoretical construct to explain dynamical processes in the law, see
id., I use the term to evoke the basic teaching of complexity theory (i.e., as the number of
variables in a system increases, the variables, at least initially, interact in ways that support
the systems primary functions by creating increasingly complex structures to substitute for
system components that can no longer perform necessary roles due to the systems' in-
creased complexity). See generally DAVID WARSH, THE IDEA OF ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY
4, 24-26 (1984).
196. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 48, at 231.
197. See id.
198. See generally id. at 36-42.
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participation in, an increasingly complex financial system. 199
The modern period saw even greater financial complexity as banking
became international. Computational methods and record keeping be-
came standardized. Wealth, or at least financial prosperity, became more
widely distributed, as did literacy, leisure and investment opportunities.
Many financial innovations were designed to meet increasing popular in-
terest in investing. Some of these innovations included new methods of
organizing commercial activities to be financed by intermediated invest-
ment. Thus, an expanded interest in intermediated investment interacted
with a uniform system of records and accounts and with more sophisti-
cated thinking about finance and financial transactions made possible by
accounting. The result was the debt and equity instruments typically as-
sociated with corporate finance. These instruments were tailored to pro-
vide an assortment of rights and liabilities. They grew in importance as
the capital requirements of the industrial revolution began to drive the
development of financial innovation.
The industrial revolution, accelerated the traditional prerequisites for
innovation: population growth, urbanization, education, and faster and
more reliable methods of communication and transportation. These de-
velopments, in turn, increased the need for capital, which was needed to
more fully implement the new technological achievements. It also in-
creased the need to mediate the risks associated with larger scale agricul-
tural and commercial production. All of the participants in the financial
sector, firms, financial institutions, markets and governments, began to
rely more extensively on the public capital markets. This, in turn, led to
the crafting of investment and risk intermediation vehicles to more
closely meet the preferences of the investing public. As a result, by the
end of the nineteenth century, corporate lawyers were able to use the
standard tools of capitalization to produce new securities adapted to the
investment opportunities resulting from new industrial technologies. 2°°
Ultimately, traditional and modern financial innovation represent
points on a continuum. In the West, societies gradually became more
complex. They became larger, more specialized, more diverse, more
prosperous, more technologically dependent, and less controlled by ideo-
logical authorities. Their financial systems responded to the same
changes, becoming more sophisticated and complex. Nonetheless, the
products of traditional and modern financial innovation only were new
ways of meeting the basic functions of the financial sector. Therefore, the
debt, equity, and risk-intermediation instruments created in the modern
period remained largely understandable, if not recognizable, to the Meso-
potamian merchant or the Athenian banker.
It has been argued, however, that the process of contemporary finan-
cial innovation represents a break in this continuum. This break or
change in the process of financial innovation has been attributed to the
199. See generally id. at. 36-59.
200. Tufano, supra note 1, at 94-95.
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introduction and use of "financial science," or, more accurately, finance
theory.201
Finance theory owes its existence to the development of mathematical
and economic concepts, which were unavailable until the twentieth cen-
tury. Products based on the sophisticated quantitative methodologies
made possible by finance theory supposedly make the products of con-
temporary financial innovation incomprehensible to the financial innova-
tors of yesteryear. This argument rings untrue. The merchants of
antiquity and early modern times would find the documents and mathe-
matical models that represent contemporary financial innovations diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to understand. However, a deconstruction of such
products into the fundamental services provided by the financial sector
would reveal financial processes with which they are familiar or could
understand with basic explanation.
It may be true that the products of contemporary financial innovation
appear very different from their antecedents. Nonetheless, the process of
contemporary financial innovation is, in essence, a financial system re-
sponding to a vastly expanded set of inputs. The contemporary financial
system, unlike its predecessors, has expanded to truly global dimensions.
Business organizations have grown larger and engage in a wide range of
activities. They also have grown across national boundaries and time
zones to operate continuously around the world. As a consequence, mul-
tinational firms experienced the need for new methods of accommodating
their internal and external foreign exchange requirements. Firms and
speculators sought to mediate the increasingly complex risks found in this
new financial environment. Governments used the capital markets to im-
plement various policies.
The products created to meet these needs reflect the complex organiza-
tional forms, capital requirements, and risks present in the contemporary
financial system. They also reflect the resources provided by improved
communications, transportation, and education. In this regard, the pro-
cess of contemporary financial innovation is no different than its anteced-
ents. Finance theory, as we shall see, does play a role in the acceptance
and direction of the process of contemporary financial innovation. The
role it plays, however, is similar to that played by the development of
accounting theory early in the modern period. It creates a uniform vo-
cabulary: the language of financial mathematics. It also inspires new
ways of thinking about finance and financial relationships. However, it
does not explain the perceived acceleration in the process of contempo-
rary financial innovation. Rather, our complex contemporary financial
environment generates new dynamical processes and new risks. In the
next section, we shall see that heterodox economics examines the rela-
tionship between contemporary financial innovation and sectoral dynam-
ics, and that orthodox economics does not.
201. See supra notes 7-8.
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III. ECONOMIC THEORY
Before economics became a "science," 20 2 it was philosophy, concerned
with questions of "the good" for the individual and the nation.20 3 The
Enlightenment reiterated classical concerns with individual worth, rights
and freedoms. The filtering of enlightenment values,204 through the sieve
of moral and economic philosophy, resulted in a school of thought that
would conceptualize and analyze economic issues from the perspective of
the individual actor.205 Issues of commerce and finance were separated
from questions of theology, permitting the discussion of "the good," with-
out the palliative influences of Christian charity or neighborly responsi-
bility. The values congealing from this new economic thinking would
have their source not in the language of moral responsibility, but in the
argot of the marketplace.
The existence of differences within the community of economic
thought is longstanding. By the end of the seventeenth century, some
philosophers and mathematicians were seeking the "natural laws" of eco-
nomics. They searched for mathematical constructs like Newtonian
mechanics, which, once implemented, operated naturally, oblivious to all
human activity save observation. 20 6 Some believed that human interfer-
ence in such natural systems by means of government regulation would
only impair the operation of a naturally self-regulatory order. However,
other early economists were more concerned with the immediate and
readily observable impact that gold stores, access to raw materials and
foreign trade had on national well-being. They argued for state interven-
tion in economic affairs to insure that policies which promoted the na-
202. The term "science" can be used in at least two different ways. First, the term is
used by Kuhn to describe an overarching paradigm at whose center is a set of generally
held core concepts to which most practitioners subscribe and that establishes the parame-
ters of the "natural science" they investigate. See KUHN, supra note 16, at 10-12; see also E.
Ray Canterberry & Robert J. Burkhardt, What Do We Mean By Asking Whether Econom-
ics is a Science?, in WHY ECONOMICS IS NOT YET A SCIENCE 15-22 (Alfred S. Eichner ed.,
1983); see generally ALFRED S. EICHNER, WHY ECONOMICS is NOT YET A SCIENCE 4
(1983). The term "science" also can be used in the logical-positivist sense of "knowledge-
claims being tested against experience, of the various propositions not yet falsified consti-
tuting a logically coherent whole, and of the theory's explanatory power steadily increasing
over time." EICHNER, supra, at 4. See Canterberry & Burkhardt, supra, at 17-22, for dis-
cussion of their conclusion that economics is a science in the Kuhnian sense, but is not a
science in the logical-positivist sense.
203. See RICHARD R. WILK, ECONOMIES AND CULTURES 44-45 (1996).
204. See id. at 46-48.
205. See id. The Enlightenment was:
[a] loose, informal, wholly unorganized coalition of cultural critics, religious
skeptics, and political reformers ... but what is striking is their general har-
mony, not their occasional discord. The men of the Enlightenment united on
a vastly ambitious program, a program of secularism, humanity, cosmopoli-
tanism, and freedom, above all, freedom in its many forms-freedom from
arbitrary power, freedom of speech, freedom of trade, freedom to realize
one's talents, freedom of aesthetic response, freedom, in a word, of moral
man to make his own way in the world.
Peter Gay, The Enlightenment, in THE FREUD READER 3-4 (Peter Gay ed., 1966).
206. See WILK, supra note 203, at 44-45.
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tional welfare were advanced. 20 7 Eventually, a new paradigm based on
the pursuit of individual self-interest with a minimum of governmental
interference would emerge from the work of Adam Smith,20 8 David Ri-
cardo,20 9 and their intellectual progeny.210 Their theories would come to
be commonly referred to as "neoclassical economics."'211
Neoclassical economics describes the economy as a state of equilib-
rium, in which the forces of supply and demand interact to achieve opti-
mal allocation of society's resources.212  The focus of neoclassical
economics is on the decision-making activity of entrepreneurs, house-
holds and firms. 213 It assumes that economic decision-making is volun-
tary, informed and rational (i.e., utility maximizing). 214 The models used
207. See id.
208. Adam Smith argued that labor is the basic measure of value, which is determined
by its supply and by disutility, and that individuals trade their labor in the market to
achieve the highest price possible. The market will adjust prices to reflect value, resulting
in prices for labor that adequately compensate the worker while generating the wealth that
is the hallmark of national well-being and power. In Smith's view, the universal exercise of
individualistic self-interest free of politics, corruption, labor guilds, corporations and or-
ganized religion, would result in the best interests of the nation being achieved. See id. at
46-48; JtORG NIEHANS, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY 66-67, 69 (1990).
209. Ricardo emphasized the concept of equilibrium as the natural state of an economy
free from interference. See WILK, supra note 203, at 48. Ricardo may be best remembered
for the theory of comparative advantage which holds that, as a consequence of the general
immobility of labor, nations that specialize in the production of goods for which it has a
competitive advantage, i.e., the products it can produce most efficiently, trade will be mu-
tually profitable and real wages will increase. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 673 (1973).
210. Samuelson traces the intellectual lineage of neoclassical economics from Adam
Smith (1723-1790) to David Ricardo (1772-1823), to John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), to Leon
Walras (1834-1910) and Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), to John Maynard Keynes (1883-
1946). See id.
211. The term "classical economists" was created by Marx to encompass Smith, Ri-
cardo, Mills and their predecessors. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THE-
ORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 3 n.1 (1965). The classical economists,
including Marx, focused on the macroeconomy. The heirs to this tradition, in what came to
be known as the marginalist period, focused on the microeconomy viewing the well-being
of the nation-state as a consequence of the individual economic decision-making of entre-
preneurs, households and firms. See NIEHANS, supra note 208, at 161. The term "neoclassi-
cal economics" reportedly was coined at the turn of the twentieth century by Thorstein
Veblen, one of the founders of what became known as institutional economics. Veblen
used the term to distinguish economists who advocated doctrinal continuity from those
who did not. See id. at 163.
212. See E. RAY CANTERBERRY, THE MAKING OF ECONOMICS 92-95 (1976).
213. In neoclassical theory, the role of the consumer is of central importance in explain-
ing price behavior. See STANLEY BOBER, MODERN MACROECONOMICS ix, 2 (1988). The
road that led from classical economics to neoclassical economics required a change in track
after the 1830s, from the macroeconomics of Smith and Ricardo, who were concerned with
national economies, to a microeconomics that would make macro assumptions based on
models of the behavior of individuals, households and firms. See NIEHANS, supra note 208,
at 161.
214. The seed of the concept of the rational economic actor and how her actions drive
the national economy is summarized by Smith as follows:
[E]very individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the
society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote
the publick [sic] interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it[, but] by
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
effectively than when he really intends to promote it.
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in neoclassical economics are based on transactions occurring in exchange
(i.e., barter) markets, in which perfect competition prevails.215 In these
markets, goods are exchanged for goods, with money serving only as a
neutral intermediary in the exchange.2 16 Economic models based on ex-
change markets also assume gross substitution effects. The axiom of
gross substitution states that the demand for good A will change only in
response to a pricing differential between good A and a substitute prod-
uct.217 Exchange transactions also are envisioned as being costlessly re-
versible,218 and as occurring in an ergodic environment,2 19 in which there
are no financial institutions. 220 The market becomes the instrument of
allocation, and individual self-interested economic decisions collectively
achieve an optimal societal equilibrium.
Exchange-based market principles bear only a limited resemblance to
contemporary financial transactions. Nonetheless, neoclassical theory ar-
gues that they adequately represent more complex economies. 221 Neo-
classical economic models are not viewed as depictions of consensus
reality, but as systems of generalizations. 222 Such a system describes the
relationships among a range of stated variables. Therefore, analysis of
changes in one or more of the variables can be used to predict changes in
the other variables present in the system.223 Thus, neoclassical econo-
mists argue that orthodox economics should be judged "by the precision,
scope and conformity with experience of the predictions it yields" and not
by its models' objective similarity to the real world.224 However, the dif-
NIEHANS, supra note 208, at 69, (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE GLASGOW EDITION OF THE
WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMITH 2:454 (1976)).
215. Leon Walras redacted the economy into a primitive barter economy to demon-
strate the existence of general equilibrium. The model used by Walras lacked capital-in-
tensive production, capital assets and financial institutions, but under these assumptions he
was able to demonstrate, using mathematical exposition, that a decentralized market econ-
omy should achieve equilibrium. See NIEHANS, supra note 208, at 211-13; HYMAN P. MIN-
SKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 103 (1986). In 1954, Arrow and Debreu would
create the proof of the existence of a competitive equilibrium for a Walrasian general equi-
librium model, using mathematics so sophisticated that, thereafter, mathematical econom-
ics would require the ability of professional mathematicians. See NIEHANS, supra note 208,
at 490-92.
216. See PAUL DAVIDSON, POST KEYNESIAN MACROECONOMIC THEORY 14 (1994).
217. Of course, the axiom of gross substitution does makes it difficult to explain in-
creased demand across the range of substitute products (e.g., economic growth). See id. at
17; EICHNER, supra note 37, at 168-69; MINSKY, supra note 215, at 106.
218. For example, it is assumed that capital assets have perfect or near perfect resale
markets, which makes the decision to invest in a capital asset as risk free and as reversible
as an employment decision. See James R. Crotty, Neoclassical and Keynesian Approaches
to the Theory of Investment, 14 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 483, 490-91 (1992).
219. In an ergodic environment, it is assumed that future market events can be pre-
dicted by analysis of past market events. See DAVIDSON, supra note 216, at 1.
220. See MINSKY, supra note 215, at 103.
221. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 14 (1971).
222. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 4 (1953).
223. See id.
224. Id. Friedman's views concerning the relationship of economic models to reality is
not held by all neoclassical economists. See, e.g., CANTERBERRY, supra note 212, at 152.
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ferences between the assumptions of neoclassical economics and the real
world are difficult to ignore.
Models of economic equilibrium find analogies in Newtonian mechan-
ics. However, economic equilibrium, as an instrument of orthodox eco-
nomics, was freed from many of the complications associated with
observations of equilibria in physical systems. Orthodoxy also endows
equilibrium with certain normative values that physics does not. Neoclas-
sical economists tend to equate economic equilibrium with optimality, a
correlation not assumed in the physical sciences.225 Additionally, the
physical sciences recognize two types of equilibria, static and dynamic.
Equilibrium is static if the object, function or system in equilibrium is
stationary. It is dynamic if the object, function or system in equilibrium is
in motion.2 26 Neoclassical economics focuses on the maintenance of
static equilibrium (i.e., a system at rest unless forced to respond to some
exogenous shock), after which it achieves a new equilibrium, a new rest-
ing point.227 Dynamic equilibrium presumes the system moves over his-
toric time along a path that is a predictable function of the relevant
variables. 228 Therefore, dynamic equilibrium is a more reliable represen-
tation of real processes. It also is more difficult to model.2 29 However,
neoclassical economics increasingly came to value elegance of mathemat-
ical exposition despite the unrealistic assumptions such models required.
Equilibrium's tendency towards a balance from which there is no further
endogenous tendency to change became axiomatic. 230 For many econo-
mists, the weaknesses inherent in these assumptions were brought into
sharp focus by the persistent unemployment Britain encountered follow-
ing World War I.
Although the 1920s were deemed to have "roared" in the United States
as a period of prosperity and low unemployment, the experience in Brit-
ain was very different. During that period, Britain had an unemployment
rate in excess of ten percent. 231 The problem of persistent unemployment
challenged the neoclassical assumption of market equilibrium. Accord-
ing to orthodox theory, demand is adjusted by market forces to meet
available supply, i.e., achieving full employment. Neoclassical economists
argued that unemployment was a temporary problem of supply and
would end when the market adjusted wages and prices to accommodate
225. See id. at 95-96.
226. See id. at 92.
227. See EICHNER, supra note 37, at 8.
228. See CANTERBERRY, supra note 212, at 92.
229. Legal scholars also have employed the concept of equilibrium in their attempts to
achieve a stable and coherent jurisprudential construct of law and legal decision-making.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 26 (1994). See also Raj Bhala, Equilibrium Theory, the FICAS Model, and Interna-
tional Banking Law, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1997) (Professor Bhala attempts to apply
equilibrium theory to the law of international banking).
230. See Basil J. Moore, Monetary Factors, in A GUIDE TO POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOM-
ics 121 (Alfred S. Eichner ed., 1979). Of course, not all neoclassical economists accept
general equilibrium, preferring Marshall's partial equilibrium framework. See id.
231. See DAVIDSON, supra note 216, at 4-5.
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increased labor supply.232 Thus, in a labor market tending toward equi-
librium, absent any wage or price inflexibility,2 33 in the long run, the
wages paid for labor should come to rest at a point sufficiently low to
guarantee full employment.234
John Maynard Keynes argued that the assumptions implicit in the neo-
classical theory were impediments to a better understanding of how the
economy worked. He argued that orthodox theory was unable to explain
how the persistent unemployment experienced in the 1920s and 1930s
came about or how it could be alleviated.2 35 Keynes, unlike the neoclas-
sical thinkers, saw persistent unemployment, not as a problem of supply,
but as a problem of demand that called into question the neoclassical
axioms of gross substitution, neutrality of money, and equilibrium. 236
The neoclassical explanations for persistent unemployment relied on
the assumptions that the future (with respect to prices) is ergodic. There-
fore, absent any exogenous shocks, it can be reliably predicted using past
market data. Money and other non-producible financial assets behaved
in the same way as any other "good. ' ' 237 Consequently, economic actors
(e.g., employers) could reliably predict their future earnings based on
past market experience. With that information they could determine
their ability to make current investment decisions (the hiring of labor and
the purchase of capital assets). The fact that current decisions yielded
future financial consequences was not important. Additionally, money
and other goods were perfectly substitutable. Therefore, economic actors
were indifferent as to whether they held goods or money. Thus, neoclas-
sical theory maintained that there was a wage at which full employment
could occur. The wage would be determined by the market and employ-
ers could have confidence that future profits would be available to pay
such wages. 238
Keynes's theories suggested that economic actors do not live in an
ergodic world, but rather a world in which the future is entirely uncer-
tain.239 In such a world, economic actors are hesitant to commit all of
their "future earnings" to present investments. They recognize that pre-
232. See id. at 8.
233. For example, union-negotiated labor contracts were claimed to have introduced
wage inflexibility by demanding the wage rate be set at a rate too high to sustain full
employment. See id. at 27.
234. See id. at 4-5.
235. See id. at 6-7. Although Keynes did not state the specific neoclassical assumptions
his view displaced, the differences between his analysis and that which preceded him
clearly indicates which assumptions were being called into question. See id.
236. See id. at 27.
237. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTER-
EST AND MONEY 173-74 (1936).
238. The neoclassical explanation for unemployment during the 1920s and 1930s was
based on Say's Law, which in essence holds that producers and manufacturers will always
be able to find sufficient demand for any output produced by workers. Therefore, as sup-
ply creates its own demand; there is no impediment preventing very low unemployment.
See DAVIDSON, supra note 216, at 14-15.
239. See KEYNES, supra note 237, at 148-49.
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dictions of both future earnings and future liabilities are unreliable.240
Faced with the unknowability of the future, economic actors view money
differently from the way they view other goods. Money is a liquid store
of value that can be used to satisfy contractual commitments if earnings
fail to meet, or liabilities exceed predictions. 241 Therefore, economic ac-
tors will use money and other non-producible financial assets to obtain
the security that comes from liquidity. However, the assets used to main-
tain liquidity will not be available for investment in non-liquid capital or
labor. Thus, uncertainty and the fact that money is not neutral can result,
irrespective of the flexibility of wages and prices, in endogenous involun-
tary unemployment. 242
Some economists viewed Keynes's theories as a sharp departure from
neoclassical economics presenting a new general explanation of employ-
ment, interest and money. Some of the former would follow Keynes's
lead toward a new heterodox economics.243 Others viewed Keynes as
merely suggesting a special case model of the short-run consequences of
rigid wages.244 A somewhat less extreme view acknowledged that Keyne-
sian insights represented a significant refinement of neoclassical princi-
ples. These economists would incorporate their reading or misreading of
Keynes into the neoclassical tradition, creating what has come to be
known as the neoclassical synthesis,245 or the new orthodoxy.246 The
neoclassical synthesis, with its emphasis on extrapolation from
microeconomics processes, would come to view the process of contempo-
rary financial innovation very differently than post-Keynesian theory,
with its focus on real world dynamics.
240. See DAVIDSON, supra note 216, at 20-22; KEYNES, supra note 237, at 168-69.
241. See id.
242. See DAVIDSON, supra note 216, at 27-29.
243. A few of those who gravitated towards the new heterodox economics include:
Joan Robinson, Sidney Weintraub, Nicholas Kaldor, Alfred Eichner, Hyman Minsky,
Richard Kahn, Athanasios Asimakopulos, Michal Kalecki, Paul Davidson, Victoria Chick,
Sheila Dow, and Philip Arestis.
244. See NIEHANS, supra note 208, at 355. Niehans goes so far as to claim, "[b]y and
large, mainstream economics, fifty years after the General Theory, is probably not much
different from what it would have been if Keynes had not insisted on becoming a famous
theorist." Id. at 356.
245. Samuelson is thought to have been instrumental in the development of the neo-
classical synthesis by his translation of Keynesian principles into mathematical expressions.
This attached it to generally accepted neoclassical thought. See EICHNER, supra note 37, at
9-10. Along with World War II, the Keynesian approach of stimulating economic growth
with massive government expenditures and deficits is credited with reversing the mass un-
employment of the great depression. See SAMUELSON, supra note 209, at 845. Keynesian-
based policy instruments such as wage and price controls were in place in the United States
until the 1970s. See Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts Improvement
Act. A Practitioner's Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 393 n.51 (1984).
246. Joan Robinson is credited with characterizing the neoclassical synthesis as "bastard
Keynesianism." See Paul Davidson, What Revolution? The Legacy of Keynes, 19 J. PosT
KEYNESIAN ECON. 47 (1996).
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IV. CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL INNOVATION AS AN
ECONOMIC PROCESS
This section of the Article will focus on the explanations of contempo-
rary financial innovation proposed by orthodox and heterodox econo-
mists. This discussion will create a foundation from which we shall
explore the reasonableness of the policy implications presented by such
explanations.
A. NEOCLASSICAL THEORY
Scholars and commentators writing from the neoclassical perspective
have approached the process of contemporary financial innovation from
several vantage points and have characterized the process in different
terms.247 Generally, neoclassical thought views contemporary financial
innovation as a reaction on the part of entrepreneurs, firms, and financial
institutions to exogenous environmental changes. 248 Such environmental
changes create opportunities to design new, better, or less expensive ways
to provide the exchange, investment intermediation, and risk intermedia-
tion functions performed by the financial sector. Environmental changes
reconfigure the cost-benefit analysis associated with a particular financial
service, thereby creating changes in the opportunity set. Therefore, exog-
enous environmental changes provide incentives for economic actors to
innovate in order to profit from the changes or to minimize their adverse
impact.249 Orthodoxy concludes that these environmental changes and
their financial consequences are responsible for initiating the process of
contemporary financial innovation. 250 Neoclassical scholars and com-
mentators have listed a number of factors including regulation, taxation,
market volatility, competition, technology, etc., which in combination are
believed to have instigated the process of contemporary financial
innovation.
1. Neoclassical Economic Scholarship
Miller is frequently cited for the proposition that the process of con-
temporary financial innovation begins with changes in taxation and regu-
247. See Finnerty, supra note 9, at 69.
248. See Flood, supra note 15, at 4. Environmental changes leading to financial innova-
tions are treated, for the most part, as if they always occur exogenously to the financial
sector, even though that characterization is not always accurate. See id. It may be more
accurate to view environmental changes as involving factors external to the entrepreneur,
firm or financial institution, over which the economic actor has no direct control, but
whose consequences change the relevant opportunity set. See MARSHALL & BANSAL,
supra note 4, at 19. There are also internal factors, particularly in the firm setting, which
can encourage innovation even though the firm may have some control over such factors.
See id.
249. See Flood, supra note 15, at 4.
250. See Finnerty, supra note 9, at 70-73.
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latory policy.251 In Miller's view, the U.S. tax code creates distinctions
between different types of income. These distinctions create incentives
for innovators to create securities whose purpose is to transmute a highly
taxed form of income into one that generates a lower tax burden.25 2 Suc-
cessful innovations will achieve tax savings or lower the cost of regulatory
compliance.2 53 However, according to Miller, a financial innovation that
merely reduces tax liability or the costs of compliance is unlikely to be a
significant innovation. Most innovations designed for those purposes will
initiate a countervailing reaction from the regulatory or tax authorities,
which negates the innovation's purpose. Kane has characterized this pro-
cess as the "regulatory dialectic. '254 This process is a continual struggle
between regulators and the regulated in which regulatory policy is con-
fronted with financial innovation designed to circumvent the policy. Reg-
ulatory policy is then adjusted to counteract the circumventive
innovation, which, in turn, induces another innovative response. 255 This
process is also known as Goodhart's Law, which concludes that "basing a
policy upon a recognized statistical relationship will bring about a policy-
induced change in the relationship. '256 In Miller's view, a significant fi-
nancial innovation will persist despite regulatory efforts to counteract its
effect.257 Therefore, contemporary financial innovation is a dance be-
tween the regulator and the regulated.
Kane, however, has recognized that regulatory inspired financial inno-
vation is not limited to avoidance reactions. Innovators will also engage
in what Kane has characterized as shape-shifting innovation.258 Firms
that engage in shape-shifting innovation are unregulated or minimally
regulated firms that exist on the periphery of a highly regulated industry.
An example is the development of money market and other mutual funds
in the mid-1970s.259 Money market funds were designed by non-banking
firms to compete with banks and savings associations in the market for
deposits. During the 1970s, United States banking policy prevented
banks from paying interest on demand deposits and the amount of inter-
251. "The major impulses to successful financial innovation over the past twenty years
have come, I am saddened to have to say, from regulation and taxes." MILLER, supra note
14, at 460.
252. See id. at 461.
253. See id.
254. See Edward J. Kane, Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Origins of Financial In-
novation, in FINANCIAL INNOVATION 5-6 (William L. Silber ed., 1975). For a detailed dis-
cussion of the regulatory dialectic and its role in the implementation of regulatory policy
and in perpetuating cycles of financial innovation, see Edward J. Kane, Accelerating Infla-
tion, Technological Innovation, and Decreasing Effectiveness of Banking Regulation, 3 J.
FIN. 355 (1981).
255. See id.
256. PODOLSKI, supra note 29, at 190.
257. See MILLER, supra note 14, at 4. Miller offers the zero coupon bond as an example
of a financial innovation that persisted despite regulatory efforts to negate its desired tax
consequences. Id.
258. See Kane, Origins, supra note 254, at 3-4.
259. See id. at 11-12.
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est that could be paid on savings accounts was strictly regulated.260 This
regulatory structure created an opportunity for non-bank intermediaries
whose activities were not within the jurisdiction of banking regulators.
Non-bank intermediaries created money market and mutual fund ac-
counts that mimicked, as closely as possible, the attributes and character-
istics of demand accounts and savings deposits.261 In an era of high
inflation, the ability of non-bank intermediaries to pay interest at rates
exceeding those available in banks and savings associations provided a
strong competitive advantage. Non-bank intermediaries experienced sig-
nificant growth as their shape-shifting accounts accelerated dis-
intermediation in the banking and thrift industries. 262
As a matter of analysis, Silber disagreed with those theories that view
regulation as the primary motivation for contemporary financial innova-
tion.263 Focusing on the firm, Silber argued that contemporary financial
innovation resulted from financial constraints encountered by the firm.264
He also concluded that the source of the constraints, whether self-im-
posed or dictated by the markets, was irrelevant.265 Self-imposed con-
straints could include, for example, target rates of growth for certain
assets or portfolio liquidity requirements. 266 Market-imposed constraints
include increased economic risk, such as the risk of increased inflation.267
Nonetheless, Silber recognized that the most abrupt environmental
changes faced by a firm, and therefore the most significant constraints
encountered, were changes in the regulatory environment 268 or changes
in the cost of adhering to a regulatory constraint.269 Thus, regulation
260. See id. at 14.
261. See id.
262. Kane recognized that the incentives to engage in any form of financial innovation
are influenced by three environmental factors: technological change, interest and inflation
rate volatility, and pre-existing patterns of financial regulation which affects a firms ability
to adapt to change. See id. at 7-8, 11-12.
263. See id. at 64-65. Silber's analysis of contemporary financial innovation isolated
three exogenous environmental factors that may lead to financial innovation: "(1) factors
that alter the size and/or composition of surplus and deficit units, such as an increase in
total savings or shifts in the composition of real expenditures; (2) technological pro-
gress...; and (3) changes in risks or attitudes towards risk .... Silber, supra note 49, at
56.
264. Silber argued that firms are likely to engage in financial innovation when faced
with any of the following situations:
(a) imposition of regulatory constraints; (b) exogenous decreases in its rate
of growth; (c) an exogenous increase in the variability of major items in its
balance sheet; (d) a change in the competitive nature of the markets facing
the firm; (e) sharply rising yields on the assets in the firm's portfolio; and (f)
a technological breakthrough that has the potential of significantly altering
the opportunity set or cost functions of the firm.
Id. at 69.
265. See id. at 65.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 5.
268. See id. at 67.
269. For example, although interest rate ceilings were long-standing features of banking
and savings regulation, adhering to them became increasingly expensive for banks in the
late 1970s as interest rates available from other investments rose to rates in excess of those
a depository institution was permitted to pay. See id.
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again emerges as the primary motivation for financial innovation.
Finnerty's review of the neoclassical literature isolated at least eleven
categories of factors that contribute to the development of the process of
contemporary financial innovation. Those factors include:
(1) tax asymmetries ... ; (2) transaction costs; (3) agency costs; (4)
opportunities to reduce.., or to reallocate risk... ; (5) opportuni-
ties to increase an asset's liquidity; (6) regulatory or legislative
change; (7) level and volatility of interest rates; (8) level and volatil-
ity of prices; (9) academic . . . advances in financial theories; (10)
accounting benefits; and (11) technological advances and other
factors.270
Finnerty's categories can be reduced to a simpler topology consisting of
basic environmental factors that encourage innovation. 271 Finnerty's
eleven categories can be collapsed into three categories: (1) regulation;
(2) finance theory and its applications; and (3) technology. This is consis-
tent with Miller, Kane, and Silber's analyses as well. Although they did
not focus on the significance of finance theory and technology, those fac-
tors were assumed in their analyses.272
Therefore, regulation, finance theory and technology are offered as the
causes of contemporary financial innovation. However, regulation
emerges as the most important factor. Additionally, those regulations
that have the most immediate impact on economic decision-making are
the ones most likely to be implicated in the process of contemporary fi-
nancial innovation.
a. Regulation
The term "regulation" includes national, supra-national, and self-regu-
lation. The more obvious categories of regulation include taxation, finan-
cial market regulation (including markets for equity, debt, foreign
exchange, deposits, etc.), and legislation. However, the term should be
read to include central bank activities, treaties, and other international
agreements. Changes in international regulatory structures are cited by
neoclassical scholars as one of the principle environmental factors con-
tributing to the acceleration of contemporary financial innovation.
Therefore, the Bretton Woods Articles of Agreement 273 ("Bretton
Woods Agreements") will be discussed to demonstrate the influence of
regulation in the process of contemporary financial innovation.
270. Finnerty, supra note 9, at 72-73.
271. For example, Finnerty lists transaction costs and opportunities to reallocate risk as
factors that encourage contemporary financial innovation. That conclusion is true. How-
ever, such transaction costs and risk reallocation become important when some other fac-
tor has made previously unattainable reductions in transaction costs possible. Likewise, a
change comes about that makes previously insignificant risks matters of greater concern.
Most of Finnerty's factors are not environmental changes, but responses to environmental
changes. See id.
272. See id.
273. See Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-171, as amended, 22
U.S.C. § 286 et seq. (1995).
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The collapse of the fixed foreign exchange rate system, created by the
Bretton Woods Agreements, ushered in what has been characterized as
an unprecedented period of volatility in foreign exchange and interest
rates.274 In 1944, following two years of negotiation, forty-four nations
became signatories to the Bretton Woods Agreements.275 The goal of
these agreements was to establish a stable system of foreign exchange at
predictable rates.276 The Bretton Woods Agreements established the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF).277 The role of the IMF was to pro-
mote trade by stabilizing foreign exchange. The IMF also made loans to
countries to help correct trade imbalances, or other economic problems
that might result in currency devaluation. 278
Before World War II, international monetary and trade relations fre-
quently resembled warfare. Countries competitively devalued their cur-
rencies to make their exports more desirable in international
commerce. 279 Countries established multiple exchange rates in an effort
to prevent speculation on their currencies. 280 They also established pro-
tectionist tariff policies to protect domestic industries. 281 Under the Bret-
ton Woods Agreements, foreign exchange rates were fixed relative to the
U.S. dollar, which was convertible into gold at rates established by the
IMF.2 8 2
However, the system did not anticipate certain problems. Defections
occurred soon after its creation, with Canada's decision to float its dollar
in 1950.283 The U.S. dollar's convertibility to gold led to currency specu-
lation. The use of U.S. dollars and British pounds to adjust member na-
tions' balance-of-trade positions resulted in balance of payments deficits
for the United States and the United Kingdom.28 4 In the late 1950s, Brit-
ain imposed capital mobility restrictions to control its growing balance of
274. See infra notes 283-96 and accompanying text.
275. The signatories to the Bretton Woods Agreements included: the United States, the
United Kingdom, Canada, France, the Soviet Union, Australia, New Zealand, South Af-
rica, India, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, China, the Philippines, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. See THE BRETTON WOODS-GArr SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND PROsPECr
AFTER FiFrv YEARS 13-14 (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996).
276. See GEORG SCHILD, BREITON WOODS AND DUMBARTON OAKS: AMERICAN Eco-
NOMIC AND POLITICAL PLANNING IN THE SUMMER OF 1944 109 (1995).
277. The Bretton Woods Agreements also established the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (popularly known as the "World Bank"), and the Interna-
tional Trade Organization. See generally id. The World Bank was designed to promote
rebuilding and redevelopment in the wake of World War II. See id.
278. See generally id.
279. See Jeanne Asherman, The International Monetary Fund: A History of Compro-
mise, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 235, 238 (1984).
280. For example, countries would establish one foreign exchange rate that was used
for and favored international trade, and another foreign exchange rate that applied to and
discriminated against capital transactions. See id.
281. See id. at 238-39.
282. See Balvinder S. Sangha, Financial Derivatives: Applications and Policy Issues,
Bus. ECON., Jan. 1, 1995, at 46-47.
283. See MILLMAN, supra note 10, at 79.
284. See Asherman, supra note 279, at 266.
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payments deficit. These restrictions provided the impetus for the creation
of the eurodollar market.285 However, the IMF was able to exercise lit-
tle influence over the eurodollar market286 and increased currency specu-
lation resulted.287 Throughout the 1960s, demand for U.S. dollars
strengthened the dollar to the point that U.S exports became less compet-
itive on world markets. This further exacerbated the U.S. balance of pay-
ments deficit.288 The increasing U.S. balance-of-payments deficit and the
U.S. government's decision to print money to finance the Vietnam War
resulted in a weakened U.S. dollar. Nonetheless, the U.S. dollar re-
mained convertible to gold at $35 per ounce.2 89 The result was a run on
gold, as holders of U.S. dollars converted them into gold.290 The United
States tried to persuade IMF member nations with trade surpluses to
share responsibility for correcting the imbalances in international
trade.291 However, in August 1971, President Nixon announced that gold
and foreign currencies would no longer be exchanged for U.S. dollars.2 92
Although the Group of Ten of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (G.10) attempted to realign their currencies' par
values in a manner consistent with the goals of the Bretton Woods Agree-
ments, they were unsuccessful, and by March 1973, the members of the
G.10 began to float their currencies.2 93
As a supra-national regulatory authority, the IMF was able to set for-
eign exchange at fixed parities to the U.S. dollar, with occasional adjust-
ments to correct disequilibria. 294 With the collapse of the fixed exchange
rate system, the world currencies were established by the opinions of in-
ternational currency traders. Floating exchange rates led to increased
foreign exchange and interest rate volatility and illustrated the incom-
pleteness of the markets for risk mediation.295 Financial institutions, i.e.,
commodity futures exchanges and investment bankers, began to design
products that could be used to mediate these risks. Thus, the market for
285. See id.
286. See id. at 267.
287. See id. at 276.
288. See id. at 268-61.
289. See id. at 276-77; MILLMAN, supra note 10, at 90-94.
290. See Asherman, supra note 279, at 277.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 276-77; see also MILLMAN, supra note 10, at 90-94; QuitNN, supra note
116, at 108; DAVIES, supra note 67, at 521-22.
293. The Group of Ten (G.10) met in December 1971 and agreed to realign their cur-
rencies, but by then it was too late for the fixed exchange system. The G.10 (Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and
United States) was initially organized to coordinate the lending decisions of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, but expanded its functions to consider general issues of economic
policy and coordination. See George H. Windecker, Jr., The Eurodollar Deposit Market:
Strategies for Regulation, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 357, 382 (1993); Hal S. Scott, The
Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 ST. Louis U. L. J. 885 (1995). The
loss of dollar convertibility did not destroy the IMF, but reoriented its role regarding for-
eign exchange towards surveillance and providing advice while continuing its lending func-
tion. See DAVIES, supra note 67, at 518.
294. See id. at 517.
295. See BODIN ET AL., infra note 409.
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financial futures and options on currencies and interest rate sensitive se-
curities came into being as a result of regulatory changes that altered the
opportunity set for exchanges. 296
b. Finance Theory
Finance theory plays a central role in the neoclassical explanations of
the process of contemporary financial innovation. Finance theory pro-
vides the theoretical foundation for the design of new financial products
and processes. It also provides the "scientific," (or logical and reliable
rationales) for the use of the products of contemporary financial
innovation.297
The development of finance theory to a point sufficient to support and
advance contemporary financial innovation occurred in four major steps:
the efficient capital market hypothesis; modern portfolio theory; the
M&M theorem on optimal capital structure; and the Black-Scholes op-
tion pricing theory. In concert, these theories provide financial engineers
with a methodological foundation upon which to design the products of
contemporary financial innovation.
i. Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
The efficient capital market hypothesis298 is based on the failure of in-
vestigators to isolate any systematic correlation in security price move-
296. See supra text accompanying note 498-502.
297. Finance theory, particularly when it is cast as "financial science" also serves a legi-
timization function by intimating some of the presumptions that accompany "science" in
our society, i.e., the products of contemporary financial innovation can be trusted because
they have their origins in "financial science," a dispassionate set of information and infor-
mation processing protocols whose processes ostensibly are free from external ideological
and political influence. In a society in which science is deemed largely competent to fulfill
most of the functions traditionally associated with religious belief systems, coupling finance
with science provides this supposed discipline with claims to clinical truth if not certainty.
But see PAULOS MAR GREGORIOS, THE HUMAN PRESENCE 32 (1987).
Today, no scientist can deny that a high measure of indeterminacy persists at
the micro level of reality .... Science, in discovering this indeterminacy, has
now begun to shed its overconfidence about its being able to know all there
is to know. The monopoly of knowledge which it previously claimed is today
called in question.
Id. See also PHILIP SHERRARD, THE ECLIPSE OF MAN AND NATURE: AN ENQUIRY INTO
THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF MODERN SCIENCE (1987).
298. The efficient capital market hypothesis resulted from the work of Louis Bachelier,
Alfred Cowles III and Maurice Kendall. Bachelier published The Theory of Speculation in
1900. Bachelier determined that securities prices moved randomly and could be plotted
mathematically using the random motion of atomic particles, i.e., Brownian motion. See
MILLMAN, supra note 10, at 204; Cunningham, supra note 26, at 546. Cowles, an investor,
performed a longitudinal study of the recommendations of financial services, the securities
transactions of major insurance companies, the recommendations of investment advisory
publication and Wall Street Journal editorials and concluded in his article, Can Stock Mar-
ket Forecasters Forecast?, 1 ECONOMETRIA 309 (1933), that the market, as a whole, gener-
ally had outperformed the forecasters and that a random series of forecasts was generally
as good as the work of the professional forecasters. See generally PETER L. BERNSTEIN,
CAPITAL IDEAS, THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET 29-38 (1992).
Kendall's work reiterated Bachelier's conclusion that successive prices for securities and
commodities follow a random pattern. See Maurice Kendall, The Analysis of Economic
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ments over time.2 99 Security price changes follow a random walk
uncorrelated to their price histories. 3°° This was interpreted as evidence
for the conclusion that security prices fully reflect all public information
about a security.30 1 The competition for profits makes the market effi-
cient, and it should not be possible to achieve above-normal returns
based on information the market has already impounded.30 2 If future
price changes could not be reliably predicted, it became increasingly im-
portant to develop efficient methods of transferring any risks with the
potential to negatively impact profitability.30 3
ii. Modern Portfolio Theory
Modern Portfolio Theory had its foundation in the work of Harry Mar-
kowitz, who concluded that investing is a function of the interplay be-
tween risk and return. Therefore, the rational utility maximizing investor
would select a portfolio that produced the best possible rate of return
given the investor's risk preferences.30 4 The efficient portfolio was a
properly diversified portfolio, designed to minimize variance for a se-
lected level of return by balancing the risk profiles of the portfolio's as-
sets.305 However, all risk cannot be eliminated by diversification. 30 6
Therefore, portfolios consisting of assets with highly negative activity cor-
relation coefficients, i.e., assets whose risk characteristics are triggered by
different considerations, should maximize return at the selected level of
risk.307
iii. The M&M Theorem
In 1958, Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller developed a theorem of
optimal capital market structures. Assuming perfect markets30 8 and the
Time Series, Part I: Prices, 96 J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'Y 11 (1953); Baskin & Miranti, supra
note 68, at 11.
299. See BASKIN & MiRATwI, supra note 68, at 11.
300. See generally BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET
(1990).
301. See Cunningham, supra note 26, at 559-60.
302. See id. at 560; Hazen, supra note 26, at 987; Lowenstein, supra note 26, at 925.
303. See Finnerty, supra note 9, at 20.
304. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77 (1952); BASKIN &
MIRANTI, supra note 68, at 11; BERNSTEIN, supra note 298, at 41-48.
305. Niehans, supra note 49, at 476.
306. Specifically, beta, or systemic market risk, is the risk that cannot be overcome by
diversification; whereas unsystemic market risk is risk that is related to a specific firm and
can be eliminated by portfolio diversification. See Robert Teitelman, The Revolt Against
Free-Market Finance, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1992, at 42.
307. See BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 68, at 12. Modem Portfolio Theory was elabo-
rated into the Capital Assets Pricing Model ("CAPM"), which, under the assumptions of
perfect markets, homogeneous expectations, and costless short sales, would explain the
relationship between risk and securities prices as a linear equilibrium relationship between
risk and return. See id. (citing John Litner, The Valuation of Risk, Assets and the Selection
of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13, 13
(1965)); BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 68, at 12.
308. See Cunningham, supra note 26, at 559. The perfect market heuristic assumes a
homogeneous commodity, a large number of fully informed participants with equal access
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absence of taxes, a firm's debt-capital ratio is irrelevant to the firm's
value. Instead, its value consists solely of the income stream flowing from
the firm's assets. 30 9 Although individual investors may improve their
portfolio's performance by hedging, hedging will not improve a firm's
value. A firm's value is independent of the way it is financed.310 Firms
do not live under the assumptions of the Modigliani and Miller theorem.
However, the model has been credited with the greater willingness for
firms to assume the higher levels of debt associated with contemporary
corporations. 311
iv. Option Pricing Theory
Fischer Black and Myron Scholes produced the Black-Scholes option
pricing theory in 1973.312 The Black-Scholes model used five variables to
derive option prices for equities: the stock price, the variance on the stock
price, the option's exercise price, the time to maturity, and the risk-free
interest rate.313 In addition to providing pricing solutions for simple put
and call options, Black and Scholes argued that their model also could be
used to value complex contingencies. Such contingencies could include
redeemable or convertible debt securities, or the impact of a merger or
acquisition on a firm's equity.314 The ability to measure and price com-
plex risk would encourage the development and refinement of instru-
ments and markets in which risk could be bought and sold.315
c. Technology
Technological innovations in communications and information man-
agement have had a significant impact on the development of the process
of contemporary financial innovation. Advances in telecommunications
made the world smaller, enabling a trader to transact globally, made capi-
tal more mobile and information more accessible, and reduced the time
period between which information is created and its effects are exper-
to the market and the ability to borrow at the market rate. The participants act rationally
and incur no transaction costs. See id.
309. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Fi-
nance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261, 261-64 (1958); BASKIN &
MIRANrI, supra note 68, at 16; Niehans, supra note 49, at 472.
310. See Dwight M. Jaffee, The Impact of Financial Futures and Options on Capital
Formation, 4 J. FUTURES MKTS. 417, 435 (1984).
311. See MINSKY, supra note 215, at 101.
312. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabili-
ties, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
313. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Option Pricing: A Review, in THE HANDBOOK OF Fi-
NANCIAL ENGINEERING 256-57 (Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Charles W. Smithson eds., 1990).
The Black-Scholes model was premised on the following market assumptions: no penalties
for short sales, no taxes or transaction costs, the market operates continuously, the risk-
free interest rate is a constant, the stock prices are continuous, and the option can only be
exercised upon expiration. See id.
314. See Richard Roll, What Every CFO Should Know About Scientific Progress in Fi-
nancial Economics: What Is Known and What Remains to Be Resolved, 23 FIN. MGrr. 69,
70-71 (Summer 1994); Smith, supra note 314, at 257.
315. See MILLMAN, supra note 10, at 24.
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ienced. Additionally, the availability of the number crunching capability
provided by advances in computer technology made use of sophisticated
financial models practical. 316
2. The Neoclassical Explanation
Relying on changes in regulation, finance theory and technology, neo-
classical theory is able to generate the following explanation of the devel-
opment of contemporary financial innovation.
Contemporary financial innovation begins with a change in regulatory
or tax policies that restructures the opportunity set for entrepreneurs,
firms and financial institutions. For example, the collapse of the Bretton
Woods Agreements resulted in a shift from fixed to floating exchange
rates. Floating exchange rates increased volatility in exchange rates, in-
terest rates and multinational corporate earnings.317 Such increased vola-
tility created a need for products and processes that firms and financial
institutions could employ to mediate these risks.318 Commodity futures
exchanges were quick to develop products to permit the trading of unde-
sired exchange and interest rate risks. However, there were a number of
limitations to exchange traded instruments, particularly their lack of flexi-
bility.319 Additionally, transactions executed on U.S. exchanges could
provide no real assurances of confidentiality. 320 Exchange traded instru-
316. For example, the first set of calculations required to apply Markowitz's portfolio
selection theory is described as follows:
First, the investor has to calculate the expected returns and the covariances
for all the securities under analysis. To analyze only 50 securities, as many as
1,225 separate calculations are required; by the time the universe of stocks to
be analyzed reaches 2,000-not an unrealistic number for large bank trust
departments or major investment advisory organizations-the calculations
required reach 2,003,000.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 298, at 64.
317. See ELI BARTON, GORDON M. BODNER, ADITYA KAUL, EXCHANGE RATE VARIA-
BILITY AND THE RISKINESS OF U.S. MULTINATIONAL FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM THE BREAK
DowN OR THE BRE-I7ON WOODS SYSTEM (1994).
318. Corporate managers believed that their security prices and earnings would be
more predictable, or at least less variable, if they were better able to manage the exchange
and interest rate risks their firms encountered. As Professor Hu has demonstrated, this
impulse on the part of managers stems from their perception that their personal and class
well-being is dependent on the stability of corporate value and earnings. Managers who
distinguish the corporation from its shareholders will tend to hedge, even though finance
theory teaches that hedging will not impact the value of the corporation. See Hu, supra
note 6, at 1014-24.
319. Until recently, exchange traded futures' contractual terms were fixed by the ex-
change, the only term that was not built into the contract was the price. In February 1993,
the Chicago Board of Trade began trading what are called FLexible EXchange ("FLEX")
option contracts, which allowed market participants to have some of the flexibility offered
by OTC contracts. See William Barclay, FLEX Options: A New Generation of Derivatives,
in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES & SYNTHETICS 48 (Klein & Lederman eds., 1994).
The exchange permitted FLEX options to be customized as to choice of strike price, choice
of expiration date, style of exercise, and the choice of index value at expiration. See id. at
50.
320. Knowledgeable market observers could determine, based on a transaction or se-




ments offered the advantage of the clearinghouse function, which serves
to insulate transactors from counterparty credit risk.321 However, the
need for confidential hedging protocols, finely tuned to a specific firm's
risk portfolio, created an incentive to develop new risk-shifting
instruments.
Initially, investment bankers were hesitant to meet this apparent mar-
ket demand. The financial solutions firms sought would contain option
components, or other complex contingent claims on assets. Although
many risk shifting techniques were susceptible to reliable pricing, before
Black-Scholes, writing an option was fraught with risk. Options, by their
nature, provide the buyer with large potential gain while placing only the
option premium at risk. The writer of the option, however, would be
required to assume the risk of the buyer's potential gain. If a portfolio of
options was not priced accurately to compensate the writer for the portfo-
lio of risks assumed, the writer faced the risk of eventual financial catas-
trophe. The work of Black-Scholes enabled option writers to more
accurately measure the risks assumed and compensate themselves for it.
When the benefits of option pricing theory are combined with the ability
to use computers to process the necessary information efficiently, the
stage was set for the marketing of swaps and other OTC financial deriva-
tives, which increased the efficiency and flexibility of the capital alloca-
tion process.322
As neoclassical thought maintains a microeconomic orientation, the
risks it recognizes as flowing from contemporary financial innovation are
risks involving the users of financial innovations. Risks, such as credit
risk, market risk,323 liquidity risk, 324 legal risk, and operating risk,325 are
hazards that impact the parties to a transaction involving contemporary
financial innovations. These risks generally are viewed as manageable.
The parties may organize and memorialize their transactions in ways that
minimize or eliminate such risks.
321. A clearinghouse is "an adjunct to a futures exchange through which transactions
executed on the floor of the exchange are matched, settled and guaranteed." The clearing-
house is responsible for a continuing assessment and collection of margin and providing for
orderly delivery, when appropriate. See FUTURES INDUSTRY INSTITUTE, INTRODUCTION
TO THE FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS 51 (1994).
322. Bernstein reports that, within six months of the publication of the Black-Scholes
option pricing theory, "Texas Instruments took a half-page advertisement in the Wall
Street Journal to say 'Now you can find the Black-Scholes value using our ... calculator."'
BERNSTEIN, supra note 298, at 227.
323. Market risk is the risk that the market (prices or values established in a relevant
market) will move away from the prices or values anticipated.
324. Liquidity risk is the risk that, at the time of sale, there will be insufficient liquidity
in the relevant market to sell an asset quickly or close to its fundamental value. See Ber-
nard J. Karol, An Overview of Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J. L. Bus. &
FiN. 195, 205 (1995).
325. Operating risk is the risk that products or processes will not be managed properly,
resulting in a loss of profit or other anticipated benefits. See Helen A. Garten, Regulatory
Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L.
REv. 501, 531 (1989).
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The risk that has generated the most concern has been systemic risks
resulting from financial derivatives transactions. Systemic risks are the
risks capable of precipitating a systemic crisis.326 A systemic crisis is "a
disturbance that severely impairs the working of the financial system and
at the extreme, causes a complete breakdown in it. '' 327 The concern with
the threat of systemic crises stem from two sources. The reciprocal obli-
gations of participants in a highly concentrated market328 make such a
market very susceptible to disruption upon the failure of a major partici-
pant.32 9 As a consequence of linkages between a relatively small number
of participants, a domino effect could result in which the default or insol-
vency of one participant could in turn trigger losses among its counterpar-
ties.330 Additionally, the failure of a federally insured market participant
might have severe consequences for the federal deposit insurance fund,
potentially shifting such participant's losses to the taxpayers-an eventu-
ality that is not unprecedented.331
3. The Neoclassical Explanation Considered
The neoclassical explanation of the process of contemporary financial
innovation views the process as an attempt to develop ways to more effi-
ciently provide the fundamental services of the financial sector. This ex-
planation is consistent with the conclusion that the process of
contemporary financial innovation is the same as the earlier process of
financial innovation. When regulatory policies raise costs or limit oppor-
tunities, financial innovation occurs. Innovators use finance theory and
technology to create new products and services that avoid the burdens
imposed by regulation, or use loopholes or gaps in regulatory policy to
326. See Andrew Cornford, Some Recent Innovations in International Finance: Differ-
ent Faces of Risk Management and Control, 30 J. ECON. IssuEs 493, 497 (1996).
327. Id.
328. For example, in 1991, 50 U.S. banks wrote the overwhelming majority of interest
rate and currency swaps. However, eight banks of the fifty wrote 86% of the OTC interest
rate derivatives and 88% of the OTC currency derivatives. See CHARLES W. SMITHSON,
CLIFFORD W. SMITH, C.D. SYKES WILFORD, MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 80 (1995).
329. See J. Christopher Kojima, Product-Based Solutions to Financial Innovation: The
Promise and Danger of Applying the Federal Securities Loans to OTC Derivaatives 33 AM.
Bus. L.J. 259, 274 (1995).
330. This was the scenario looming upon the collapse of the Bank of New England in
1991, at which point it became necessary to close out $36 billion in off-balance sheet, pri-
marily derivatives, activity. As the Bank of New England's exposure was wound down
over a period of weeks, the possibility remained that the Federal Reserve would be called
upon to assume the Bank of New England's open positions to prevent the shock that
would result from its wide-scale default. However, that did not become necessary as the
Bank of New England was able to close out its derivatives positions without the Federal
Reserve's assistance. See Craig Torres, Dangerous Risks: How Financial Squeeze was
Narrowly Avoided in "Derivative" Trade, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1991, at Al. In addition to
the savings and loan and commercial banking crises of the late 1980s, a number of other
systemic threats, events that pose the potential to erupt into systemic crises, have punc-
tuated recent economic history. Examples include the default in the London Metals Mar-
ket in 1985, the near failure of the Hong Kong Futures exchange in 1987, the October 1989
market break, and the failure of Barings Bank in 1995. See Cornford, supra note 326, at
497-500.
331. See Sangha, supra note 282, at 51.
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their advantage. Thus, from the neoclassical perspective, contemporary
financial innovation corrects those flaws that regulation has introduced
into the market. In fact, as in the case of shape-shifting innovation and
the deposits markets, contemporary financial innovation points the way
to a deregulated future in which products and services compete freely
across former regulatory boundaries. However, as will be discussed in
the next section of this Article, the neoclassical view of the process of
contemporary financial innovation is incomplete.
First, the neoclassical explanation relies on finance theory both to pro-
vide the theoretical underpinning of new instruments and processes and
to fortify them with the imprimatur of science.332 The reliance of neo-
classical thought on finance theory is based on the concept of efficient
capital markets. However, scientific support for the efficient capital mar-
kets hypothesis is evaporating. 333 The efficient capital market hypothesis
assumes that information the market uses to arrive at securities prices is
based on rational expectations of asset values. Professor Langevoort has
argued that "noise," i.e., information unrelated to rational expectations of
asset values, also is incorporated by the market and is reflected in securi-
ties prices.334 If the market is unable to distinguish between rational
trading and "noise," then securities prices need not reflect fundamental
value and the capital market's ability to allocate resources to their best
use is unreliable.335 Professor Cunningham has argued that market be-
havior is more accurately reflected by non-linear models generated by
chaos theory, which relegates rationality and efficiency to less significant
roles in market dynamics. 336 Thus, the scientific basis of finance theory is
less secure, and its use in the process of contemporary financial innova-
tion raises additional risks not addressed by neoclassical theory. As the
other foundational financial hypotheses are based on the assumption of
market efficiency, they are also subject to question.
More importantly, the models generated by finance theory lack the re-
liability of the fundamental models of science. Fundamental models re-
flect cause and effect relationships and can be used to draw reliable
332. See, e.g., Hu, Swaps, supra note 1, at 337. "[Tjhis process of financial innovation
now has many of the features associated with the process of technological innovation seen
in recent decades in biotechnology, computer, and other science-based enterprises. The
features which epitomize science-based enterprises are becoming applicable to major fi-
nancial institutions." See id.
333. See Cunningham, supra note 26, at 571-81 (demonstrating that tests of market effi-
ciency based on non-linear models reveal evidence of underlying patterns inconsistent with
the random walk model).
334. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 855. Noise trading may be engaged in by ill-
informed traders or traders who are using a decisional heuristic other than rationality. See
Cunningham, supra note 26, at 566.
335. See Cunningham, supra note 26, at 566-67.
336. Chaos theory or non-linear dynamics generally holds that there is a pattern under-
lying the apparent randomness of physical events and that chaotic systems, like capital
markets, are non-random and are influenced by endogenous rather than exogenous events.
See id. at 547, 602.
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conclusions about dynamic process.337 Most financial models are either
phenomenological models or statistical models.338 Phenomenological
models are "as if" models that reach conclusions by analogizing from
known phenomena to the unknown.339 As such, they offer interpreta-
tions rather than predictions. 340 Statistical models are used to find corre-
lations between variables when a dynamic process is not fully
understood.341 Therefore, these models can generate answers, but such
answers have no necessary relationship to cause and effect.342 Addition-
ally, fundamental models seek to understand deep truths (meaning the
nature of reality). It appears very unlikely that the economic activity of
human beings will be found to operate consistent with immutable laws.
At best, financial models may provide useful information, but that result
is not certain. 343
The second reason the neoclassical view of the process of contempo-
rary financial innovation is incomplete is that it views technology in in-
strumental terms. From the instrumental perspective, technology creates
new opportunities by permitting information to be processed more
quickly and in more sophisticated ways. It lowers costs, permitting the
products of financial innovation to become more widely available. How-
ever, technology, by contributing to the complexity of the financial sector,
can influence a variety of sectoral processes. Technology can impact a
market's competitive dynamics, as well as its susceptibility to operational
risks. The neoclassical explanation recognizes, but understates, the signif-
icance of technology in understanding sectoral dynamics.
Finally, the assumptions underlying neoclassical theory limits and bi-
ases the explanations offered by orthodoxy. The assumptions of ex-
change-based trading, rationality, an ergodic environment, gross
substitution, and the fungibility of money bear limited resemblance to the
real world. Thus, variables outside of the assumptions of the neoclassical
model may be at work, influencing sectoral dynamics, but unobserved or
unaccounted for.
The assumptions underlying neoclassical theory also limit its under-
standing of the risks presented by financial innovation. The only risks
337. See Emanuel Derman, Valuing Models and Modeling Value, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT.,
Spring 1996, at 2.
338. See id.
339. See id. at 3-4.
340. See id. at 4.
341. See id. at 3-4.
342. See id.
343. See id. at 6. See also Friedrich A. Von Hayek, The Pretense of Knowledge, 79 AM.
ECON. REV. 3, 4 (1989).
Unlike the position that exists in the physical sciences, in economics and
other disciplines that deal with essentially complex [social] phenomena, the
aspects of the events to be accounted for about which we can get quantitative
data are necessarily limited and may not include the important ones .... in
the social sciences often that is treated as important which happens to be
accessible to measurement [sic].
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given serious consideration are default risks and their consequences. The
impact of less dramatic events are not considered. The long-term conse-
quences of a financial sector in which the meaning and consequences of
debt are viewed very differently than they were a generation ago is also
disregarded. The largest change resulting from the process of contempo-
rary financial innovation is the way it has changed our belief in our ability
to fully manage risks. The risks created by a belief in perfect risk man-
agement also are obviated by neoclassical theory.
The Article will now examine heterodox theory. It will determine
whether the analysis it offers is able to more completely explain the pro-
cess of contemporary financial innovation and the risks this process may
present to the financial sector and the economy.
B. HETERODOX THEORY
Many post-Keynesian thinkers acknowledge the elegance and forceful
logic of the axioms of neoclassical theory. However, they find it fails to
address much of what they perceive to be the real world economic
problems confronted by contemporary economies.344 Post-Keynesians
believe that economic issues cannot be understood without reference to
the role of money, uncertainty and the irreversibility of time.345
Post-Keynesians are not generally thought of as a cohesive group.
However, most would acknowledge four essential differences between
their viewpoint and that of neoclassical theory. First, post-Keynesians re-
ject equilibrium as the natural state or tendency of the economy. Instead,
they interpret economic history as depicting an economy expanding con-
tinuously over time. They also find the economy subject to biases and
imbalances that cannot be corrected solely by market forces. 346 Thus, for
example, the invisible hand of neoclassical theory was unable to correct
the chronic unemployment of the Great Depression, whose remediation
required government intervention. Second, the post-Keynesian system
acknowledges that contemporary economies employ sophisticated credit
and financial institutions. 347 Financial institutions and the economy both
use and respond to money, which affects unemployment, output and eco-
nomic decision-making. 348 The tendency of economic actors to prefer li-
quidity further highlights the importance of credit and money in
contemporary economies. 349
344. See EICHNER, supra note 37, at 3-4. Post-Keynesians believe that income distribu-
tion, class conflict, economic growth, and inflation to be economic questions that are better
understood by observation than by abstraction from models and pre-industrial exchange-
based systems. See J.E. KING, CONVERSATIONS WITH POST KEYNESIANS 11 (1995); DAVID-
so-, supra note 216, at 1.
345. See DAVIDSON, supra note 216, at 17; King, supra, note 344, at 11.
346. See EICHNER, supra note 37, at 12-13.
347. See id. at 14.
348. See DAVIDSON, supra note 216, at 17.
349. See id. at 18; supra notes 319-38 and accompanying text. The neoclassical theory,
with its origins in exchange transactions, treats money as any other commodity-one
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Third, post-Keynesian thought recognizes that markets are not per-
fectly competitive because some firms and institutions have the ability to
exercise market power. Large corporations and trade unions in well-or-
ganized industries may have the ability to exercise oligopolistic tenden-
cies that distort the anticipated relationship between supply and demand
under perfect competition.350 Finally, post-Keynesians focus their efforts
on the behavior of actual economies in calendar time. They examine the
conditions of such economies' experience, as opposed to extrapolating to
the real world from models of hypothetical market conditions. 351
The post-Keynesian paradigm envisions a system in which income dis-
tribution can be restructured without fear of decreased productivity.
They believe that competitive markets should mediate automobile colors
and hemline lengths, but not the availability of housing or the amount of
unemployment. 352 Moreover, they view such a system as being attainable
without extreme transformation of the basic societal institutions.353
1. Critique of Rationality
Heterodox theory questions the positioning of rational self-interest as
the core stimuli of all economic decision-making. The rationality heuris-
tic requires that decision-making occur in an ergodic environment in
which economic actors have homogeneous expectations. They also must
have complete and accurate information concerning the consequences of
all potential decisions and the ability to costlessly reverse any decision.354
However, economic actors tend to have heterogeneous expectations. 355
They typically lack precognition as well as the ability to disregard calen-
dar time in the way that costless reversibility assumes. 356 Unlike the pre-
dictions that can be made concerning the throw of dice or the flipping of
coins, future economic events are non-probabilistic. Each economic
event is intrinsically unique with respect to its relationship to a constantly
changing tableaux because each event takes places at a different point in
time.357
At best, economic actors engage in what Keynes characterized as con-
ventional decision-making. They form their expectations concerning the
outcomes of their actions on their belief that their assessment of current
economic conditions is correct; the future will be very much like the past,
whose availability will have an impact on inflation, but not on real production. See
EICHNER, supra note 37, at 14.
350. See id. at 15-16.
351. See id. at 16. Post-Keynesians also believe that growth and income distribution in
which both respond to the rate of investment, as opposed to the neoclassical view, which
would attribute growth and income distribution, as between labor and profit, to price and
price movements. See id. at 12.
352. See MINSKY, supra note 215, at 101.
353. See EICHNER, supra note 37, at 17.
354. See Crotty, supra note 218, at 486-87.
355. See Cunningham, supra note 26, at 596.
356. See Crotty, supra note 218, at 488-89; Stout, supra note 26, at 55.
357. See Don Goldstein, Uncertainty, Competition, and Speculative Finance in the Eight-
ies, 29 J. ECON. IssUEs 719 (1995).
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and popular sentiment is more likely than not to be correct. 358 Addition-
ally, economic actors utilize a range of different decisional heuristics.
Some of the heuristics used can lead to biases that result in decisions that
vary systematically from those predicted by rational self-interest. 359
Rejection of the rationality heuristic results in a very different view of
contemporary financial innovation. First, heterodox thinkers do not view
contemporary financial innovation as a rational response to exogenous
changes. Rather, it is seen as a result of the interaction of endogenous
changes in the financial sector. These force new products and processes
upon actors as a financial survival mechanism. They may also seduce the
actor with the new when the basis upon which conventional decision-
making was supported collapses.
Second, rationality as a basis for economic decision-making assumes
the existence of a collected body of shared knowledge. Economic actors
have access to decades, if not generations, of information concerning
their options and the consequences of such options.360 This information
allows individual actors to respond to familiar experiences with relative
confidence. 361 However, the basis for rational decision-making collapses
in the face of a previously unexperienced event. 362 The implementation
of the innovative is an event outside of normalcy, a "special function. '363
It is analogized to the difference between "making a road and walking
along it.' '364 The two activities require very different sets of skills and are
based upon different motivations. Thus, the path from the customary to
the innovative requires something outside of everyday experience. In
Schumpeterian terms, it requires "leadership," a need that emerges and a
type of individual that advances when new possibilities arise.365
358. See Steve Keen, Finance and Economic Breakdown: Modeling Minsky's "Finan-
cial Instability Hypothesis," 17 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 607, 608-09 (1995).
359. See Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics, MSER REPORTER, Fall 1993, at 8-9;
see generally Lola L. Lopes, Psychology and Economics: Perspectives on Risk, Cooperation,
and the Marketplace, 45 ANN. REV. OF PSYCH. 197 (1994). However, it has been argued
that economic rationality does not require the conscious rationality of individuals. Rather,
an overarching market rationality emerges from choices mediated by rules of conduct em-
bedded in the operation of financial institutions. See id.
360. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 84-85
(1983).
361. See id. at 84.
362. The Austrian School of Economics has suggested that the distinctions drawn be-
tween the effects of rationality and uncertainty in market processes are too extreme. While
acknowledging that everything is subject to change, the Austrian view is that the changes
that actually occur are rarely so different from the anticipated range of outcomes as to
negate the predictive ability of theories based on the rationality decisional heuristic, See
Israel M. Kirzner, Market Process Theory: In Defence of the Austrian Middle Ground, in
THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN Aus-
TRIAN ECONOMICS 4-6 (1992). See generally Schwartzstein, supra note 38 (examining key
concepts of the Austrian School of Economics).
363. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 360, at 86-87.
364. Id. at 85.
365. See id. at 87-88. "The specific problem of leadership arises and the leader type
appears anywhere new possibilities present themselves." Id. at 88.
1998]
SMU LAW REVIEW
In the context of contemporary financial innovation, the "leader" is a
manager. "Leadership" is the ability to substitute the traditional or con-
ventional data set for one which incorporates new information about
changes occurring in the sector and achieve a new result. New informa-
tion not only includes information that would fit into the calculus of a
rational utility maximizer, such as changes in technology. Rather, the
heterodox literature indicates a number of sources of endogenous
change, which may change the opportunity set in ways that will persuade
managers to embrace innovation. Such changes include: structural
changes altering the competitive dynamics of a market or markets; class
specific information concerning the expectations, rewards and punish-
ments associated with managerial performance; the supply, demand or
function of sectoral instruments, such as money; and information con-
cerning change in generally held perceptions of sectoral dynamics.
Therefore, the rise of contemporary financial innovation is not simply
attributed to entrepreneurial efforts to profit. Nor is it explained by
changes in regulation, finance theory and technology. Heterodox theory
views contemporary financial innovation as a response to the interaction
of endogenous changes in the financial sector. Contemporary financial
innovation begins with coercive competition among firms and financial
institutions. Such competition changes the basis of conventional deci-
sion-making and generates new dynamic processes. Contemporary finan-
cial innovation provides products to enhance perceptions of managerial
performance and shareholder value that may have been tarnished by the
effects of coercive competition.366 At the root of the rise in competition
are technological changes, which reorder markets and change competitive
dynamics. 367
2. Technology
Heterodox thinkers argue that technological changes can destroy tradi-
tional sources of profitability. The wide-scale implementation of wire
price quote services, wire transfer technology, twenty-four-hour trading,
and program trading have been instrumental in changing the dynamics of
deposit and other investment intermediation markets.368 These changes
have enhanced the mobility of capital both within and across national
borders, and they also have changed the standards by which managerial
performance is evaluated.369 In the heterodox view, the competition-en-
hancing changes that technology introduced has been a chief factor in the
advent of contemporary financial innovation. Additionally, the financial
366. See Michael Carter, Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility, 23 J. ECON. IS-
SUES 779, 785 (1989).
367. See id. at 787.
368. See id. at 786.
369. See id. at 786-87; see also Imad A. Moosa, A Note on Capital Mobility, 63 S. ECON.
J. 248 (1996) (observing that empirical work frequently understates the magnitude of capi-




innovations resulting from technological changes have created an endog-
enous feedback loop that accelerates both the pace and the magnitude of
contemporary financial innovation. 370
Although changes induced by technology are a necessary component of
contemporary financial innovation, they are not the sole cause. Rather,
technological changes both induce and cooperate with other sectoral
processes to make contemporary financial innovation and the diffusion of
its products appear inevitable.
3. Competition Under Uncertainty
Heterodox thinkers emphasize that conventional expectations of risk
and return are developed without appreciation of the consequences of
uncertainty on conventional decision-making. Conventional decision-
making under uncertainty can yield meaningful models of future eco-
nomic conditions as long as they are based on meaningful conceptions of
the fundamentals.371 When conventional expectations about the compo-
sition and behavior of the fundamentals clash with objective experience,
the basis for conventional decision-making evaporates. At that point,
new conceptions of the fundamentals arise, and with them, new views of
market dynamics. However, the fundamentals are also a product of con-
ventional decision-making under uncertainty and respond to the give-
and-take of changes in information, market movements, investor behav-
ior and economic events in much the same way. 372
In the heterodox view, the nature and extent of the competitive pres-
sures experienced by firms are components of conventional expectations
concerning the firm's prospects and value. When market structures
change in ways that greatly intensify competitive pressures, producing a
negative impact on firm profitability, a shift in the basis of conventional
decision-making can also occur. Firms may be coerced by such competi-
tion to develop or adopt innovative financial products and processes to
enhance profitability, and with it, estimations of corporate and manage-
370. Endogenous in the sense of feeding back upon itself through its interactions with
market and secular events. See Goldstein, supra note 357, at 93.
371. The fundamentals are "those factors most important to the maximization of mar-
ket participants' individual utility functions." John T. Harvey, Long-Term Exchange Rate
Movements: The Role of the Fundamentals in Neoclassical Models of Exchange Rates, 30 J.
ECON. ISSUEs 509, 511 (1996). See also DONALD W. MOFFAT, ECONOMICS DICTIONARY
135 (2d ed. 1983). The fundamentals are the factors rational economic actors rely on in
decision-making designed to increase, for example, their individual worth. The collective
activity of such economic actors in an efficient capital market should result in prices follow-
ing a random walk, and as the market prices fully reflect available information, it should be
impossible for traders to earn excess returns due to speculation. Nonetheless, review of the
empirical work of short-term exchange rate price movements found variability that ap-
peared unrelated to changes in the fundamentals, the information on which rational trad-
ers base their trading decisions. See Mark P. Taylor, The Economics of Exchange Rates, 33
J. ECON. LiTERAVuRE 13, 29-30 (1995). A proposed explanation for these departures from
theory is the existence of "speculative forces at work in the foreign exchange market which
are not reflected in the usual menu of macroeconomic fundamentals." Id. at 30 (citation
omitted).
372. See Crotty, supra note 218, at 487-88; Goldstein, supra note 357, at 724.
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rial performance. 373 Once firms begin to develop or use innovative prod-
ucts and processes, other firms in the relevant market will be coerced by
the prospect of losing market share or being blocked from entering a new
market by first movers. 374 As a result, they too will embrace innovative
products and processes, even if they lack information concerning the risks
and reliability of such innovations. 375 Prior to the shift in the basis of
conventional decision-making resulting from increased competition, tak-
ing such actions on incomplete information would have appeared
unreasonable. 376
4. Asymmetric Reward Structure
Heterodox scholars also argue that contemporary financial innovation
is encouraged by the ways that managers make decisions. Managers,
faced with shrinking profits or new expanding markets, can make one of
at least two choices. They can embrace the new, and develop or use inno-
vative financial products, or they can rely on some other more traditional
course of action. Managers will base their decisions on their perception
of the course of action most likely to simultaneously enhance shareholder
value, while demonstrating managerial competence. However, despite
neoclassical notions of costlessly reversible transactions, managers know
that a mistake may be injurious to the well-being of the corporation, its
shareholders, and managerial careers. Therefore, managers recognize
that their decisions will not be evaluated solely on their merits. Rather, a
manager's decision will be evaluated based on whether it is consistent
with, or departs from, conventional decision-making and popular senti-
ment, and rewarded asymmetrically in a manner consistent with conven-
tional decision-making. 377
For example, a manager might determine that using certain derivative
instruments created, rather than ameliorated, certain risks. Therefore,
she would refuse to invest in such instruments despite the fact that most
of her managerial peers in comparable firms were doing so. In the short-
term, such a manager is likely to be replaced with a member of the pre-
vailing herd. Assume, however, that despite her better judgment, the
manager follows the lead of her peers. She invests and ultimately suffers
the significant losses that her peers also experience. Despite the losses
suffered, she and her peers will not be punished severely. However, one
who fails to jump on the bandwagon when the herd's instincts prove to be
correct will be punished severely. 378
373. See Goldstein, supra note 357, at 725-26.
374. See Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation and First-Mover Advantages, 25 J. FIN.
ECON. 213, 230-34 (1989) (observing that first-movers benefit from primacy by capturing
and retaining market share, even after the introduction of competing products).
375. See MINSKY, supra note 215, at 119.
376. See id.
377. See Goldstein, supra note 357, at 726.
378. See id. This process can also be viewed as a function of coercive competition, i.e.,




Thus, "[d]ecision makers facing great pressures to act, but with truly
uncertain prospects, will tend to move as a herd. '379 They prefer to ac-
cept the risk of being wrong and losing money along with everyone else
to what appears to be the greater risk of being wrong and losing money
alone.
5. Money and Credit
Heterodox thinkers also recognize the role of credit and money as a
component of the process of contemporary financial innovation. Hetero-
dox theory does not treat money as if it were gold, a commodity. Rather,
it recognizes that the principles applicable to an economy using commod-
ity money (e.g., gold) are very different from the ones encountered in a
credit money system. 380 In a commodity money system, the money sup-
ply will vary with the degree of success of gold mining or production ven-
tures. In such a system, it is not inappropriate to treat the supply of
money as exogenous to the financial sector.381 However, money is not an
ordinary commodity.382 The money supply is created endogenously by
379. Id.
380. See King, supra note 344, at 8. Neoclassical theory generally holds that output and
price are determined by the forces of aggregate supply and aggregate demand, so that
escalating prices, as indicia of inflation, may be moderated by a properly publicized change
in monetary policy lowering the quantity of money available, or the interest rates at which
it is available. See id. at 3-6. This view appears reasonable as long as money is defined as
currency. However, it is fairly clear that assets other than currency have some of the char-
acteristics of money. The task of defining money has yielded various formulations over the
years. Money has been viewed, inter alia, simply as the sum of currency, demand deposits
and time deposits, and less simply as the sum of the relative "moneyness" of a variety of
assets. For a description of the various ways money has been defined for the purpose of
monetary policy, see id. at 60-74. If money, contrary to the neoclassical approach, is more
than currency and its close substitutes, but includes a wide variety of other financial assets
as well, then attempts to control aspects of the economy by controlling the growth of the
money supply, or interest rates, will be of questionable efficacy unless the relevant authori-
ties have the ability to control the creation and growth of all assets with some of the pri-
mary characteristics of money. To some professional, as opposed to academic economists,
this task has been considered all but meaningless. For example, "to all except perhaps the
most indigent of economic actors, the money stock-in contrast to oil and credit, is a
meaningless abstraction." Podolski, supra note 29, at 223 (citation omitted). "[T]he con-
cept of the 'money supply' is a 'meaningless anachronism'-a legacy of gold." Id. (citation
omitted). In addition to definitional difficulties concerning what should be considered
money, neoclassical theory maintains that the supply of money is important, but not its
demand, or the supply and demand of credit. See MINSKY, supra note 215, at 112; Wolfson
at 192 (source on file with author). Moreover, the supply of money is treated as being
exogenous to the financial sector. See MINSIKY, supra note 215, at 112.
381. See MINSKY, supra note 215, at 112.
382. The orthodox assumptions about the nature of money: blind neoclassical analysis
to the impact that the demand for money and credit generate. Neoclassical analysis also
fails to recognize that the power to create money and credit is not the sole province of
central bankers. To the contrary, some heterodox economists have concluded that "almost
everywhere in the developed world, the power to create money lies almost entirely in the
private sector" with private banks. Victoria Chick & Sheila C. Dow, Regulation and Differ-
ences in Financial Institutions, 30 J. ECON. IssuEs 517 (1996). In keeping with an exchange
model of economic activity, neoclassical theory treats money as if it were commodity
money, a specie that the sovereign has sole authority to mint. See id. at 521.
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the demand for money and credit. 383
Firms and financial institutions encountering regulations that place re-
strictions on access to money will innovate to meet their credit and cash
requirements. The eurocurrency market is a good example of this reac-
tion as financial institutions created the eurodollar in response to restric-
tions on foreign access to British pounds. 384  The process of
contemporary financial innovation by producing assets with some of the
characteristics of money has "decreased the capacity of the authorities to
influence monetary conditions by changing the general level of interest
rates," and by doing so, the growth of the money supply.385 Therefore,
from the heterodox perspective, neoclassical monetarism had the unantic-
ipated result of limiting the ability of central bankers to control the
growth of the money supply.386
C. FINANCIAL INSTABILITY HYPOTHESIS
The heterodox view of contemporary financial innovation as a function
of competitive changes and changes in perceptions of sectoral dynamics
comes together in Hyman Minsky's financial instability hypothesis. Min-
sky concluded that the rise of contemporary financial innovation is a
stage in the development and retreat of cyclical fragility and, occasionally,
instability in the financial sector.387 According to Minsky, financial inno-
vation occurs near a point between the upward and downward legs of an
instability cycle. Its introduction into this cycle ultimately exacerbates the
downward leg, i.e., the rise of fragility and potential instability.388
Minsky begins his analysis at the point at which the economy is grow-
ing at a rate sufficient to achieve and maintain full employment.389 Cor-
porate borrowers and institutional lenders are risk adverse. Therefore,
firms have low debt-to-equity ratios, and lenders attach a high risk pre-
mium on loans to corporate borrowers. 390 Economic prosperity contin-
ues and the secular consensus regarding the fundamentals, particularly
regarding risk, begin to change. The result is less risk aversion on the
383. Therefore, changes in the money supply are a reflection rather than a cause of
changes in the real sector. See id.
384. See PODOLSKI, supra note 29, at 208; supra notes 116-33 and accompanying text.
The eurodollar market also lowered participants' transaction costs, which in part explains
its persistence after foreign lending restrictions were removed. See PODLOSgI, supra note
29, at 208.
385. PODOLSKI, supra note 29, at 222 (emphasis omitted).
386. See Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From
Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1310-14
(1995).
387. See generally Hyman P. Minsky, Financial Innovations and Financial Instability:
Observations and Theory, in FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS: THEIR IMPACT ON MONETARY
POLICY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 25-28 (1984) [hereinafter FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS].
388. See id. at 27.
389. See Keen, supra note 358, at 611. In evaluating the health of the U.S. economy in
1983, Minsky posited six percent unemployment as the full employment rate. See MINSKY,
supra note 215, at 299.
390. See Keen, supra note 358, at 611.
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part of borrowers and lenders, a lower risk premium, and higher corpo-
rate debt-to-equity ratios. 391 The increased availability of finance encour-
ages firms to increase both productive and speculative investment.392 In
this environment of prosperity and ready credit, prior conservative esti-
mations of asset values are readjusted using more optimistic assumptions.
Asset prices tend to move upward as a result of what Minsky character-
ized as "balance-sheet adventuring. '393 This period of euphoric expecta-
tions leads to increased investment, improved corporate earnings, and
lower unemployment. 394 These conditions validate the recent use of
speculative finance395 and the maintenance of higher debt-to-equity ra-
tios.396 However, the rise of debt-to-equity ratios results in less liquidity.
Firms go to the debt market, which is now responding to increased de-
mand, with higher interest rates.397 Still, euphoric expectations persist
despite rising interest rates and the increasing inelasticity of the demand
for credit.398
"Ponzi financiers" begin speculating in corporate assets and ownership
claims, promoting mergers and acquisitions while incurring debt, which
becomes increasingly difficult to service.399 Eventually, assets will have
to be sold to service debt, at which point, demand threatens to decrease
asset values premised, on balance sheet adventuring to more realistic
levels. Financial innovations that permit the maintenance of high asset
values, thereby increasing the finance available based on such asset val-
ues, will be introduced. 400 At this point, innovations specifically designed
to increase asset values will enter the market.40 1 In the short term, such
391. See id.
392. See id.; Wolfson, supra note 380, at 335.
393. See Keen, supra note 358, at 611; MINSKY, supra note 215, at 42.
394. See MINSKY, supra note 215, .at 42.
395. Minsky viewed the resort to borrowing for the purpose of servicing existing debt as
speculative finance. See id. Others have referred to this practice as compensatory spend-
ing. See Robert Pollin, Destabilizing Finance Worsened this Recession, CHALLENGE, Mar.-
Apr. 1992, at 17, 18; Wolfson, supra note 380, at 336 (discussing necessitous borrowing).
396. See MINSKY, supra note 215, at 42. The rise in speculative mergers and acquisi-
tions in the 1980s can be described in Minskian terms. In the early 1980s, the market value
of corporations in relation to their net worth was depressed, and corporations could be
purchased at a market value, which represented a fraction of such corporations' net worth.
As a consequence, firms increased their borrowings to finance acquisition of existing cor-
porations, which led by the early 1990s to firms paying, on average, 44% of pre-tax earn-
ings to service debt. See Pollin, supra note 395, at 19. Such interest payments were
approximately twice as much as firms' average interest payments in the 1960s and 1970s.
See id.
397. See Keen, supra note 358, at 611-12.
398. See id. at 612.
399. See id. See generally Pollin, supra note 395, at 18-19.
400. See FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 387, at 27.
401. An example of such an innovation would be the segmentation of a security into a
number of potential cash flows. See Robert A. Jarrow & Maureen O'Hara, Primes and
Scores: An Essay on Market Imperfections, 44 J. FIN. 1263 (1989). In the 1980s, primes and
scores were introduced. See id. at 1264-66. These securities represented the various com-
ponents of traditional equity instruments. See id. at 1263. They divided voting rights,
rights to dividends, and the appreciation rights, which ordinarily accompany an equity se-
curity, among two separate securities. See id. Jarrow and O'Hara studied situations where
corporate equity was divided into separately traded securities and concluded that the sum
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financial innovation will increase profits by maintaining the appearance
of prosperity and encouraging new investment.402 Ultimately, however,
financial innovation will be unable to generate the profits necessary to
service debt. Firms will attempt to sell assets to service debt, and the
asset market will become flooded. Investment subsequently collapses
and the economy is forced into either debt-deflation (i.e., depression) or
price inflation. 40 3 In Minsky's scenario, instability can be averted by gov-
ernmental intervention. The central banker in the role of lender of last
resort will need to introduce sufficient bridge liquidity to prevent the col-
lapse of depository institutions and the destabilizing effect that would
have on the economy. 40 4
Minsky developed his financial instability hypothesis, in part, as an ex-
planation for the Great Depression, and, therefore, its application to less
dramatic events can appear stretched.40 5 Nonetheless, his basic observa-
tion concerning the role of financial innovation in the development of
financial instability is supported by historical investigations of financial
manias and panics.40 6 Moreover, empirical studies have associated
changes in asset values and volitility with the introduction and use of cer-
tain financial innovations. 40 7 Thus, in the heterodox tradition, Minksy's
of the new components exceeded the value of the solitary equity security. See id. at 1263-
64. Additionally, securitized instruments will accomplish this function.
402. See FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 387, at 28.
403. See Keen, supra note 358, at 614-15.
404. See MINSKY, supra note 215, at 43-44. However, Minsky felt that the central
banker could not simultaneously control the money and act as lender of last resort. See
FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 387, at 37-38. Other economists do not find such
dual roles necessarily incompatible. See Allan H. Meltzer, Discussion, in FINANCIAL INNO-
VATIONS: THEIR IMPACT ON MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 42, 44 (1984).
405. Minsky's analysis of the role of financial innovation in the development and pro-
gress of financial fragility and instability focuses on innovations by financial institutions,
primarily banks and other depository institutions and firms. See FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS,
supra note 387, at 38-39. It is unclear to what extent the role of financial innovation by
governments and non-depository financial institutions, such as exchanges, either deepens
or mitigates the development of fragility. It appears reasonable to conclude that govern-
mental financial innovation designed, for example, to strengthen the savings industry, such
as the securitization of government-insured mortgages, will play a role in the cycle similar
to that of innovations by banks and savings associations themselves. However, additional
work in Minsky's theory appears necessary with regard to other governmental financial
innovations, such as index-linked securities. Additionally, financial innovations by ex-
changes seem aimed most directly at increasing the volume of exchange transactions and,
therefore, increasing profitability for the exchanges and its members. Although exchange-
traded derivative instruments clearly play a significant role in the tendency towards in-
creased debt positions, their development, as opposed to their use, does not seem
compensatory.
406. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES 38-40 (1978),
where, without stating that Minsky's model proves valid in all circumstances, the author
identifies the objects of speculation associated with periods of increasingly euphoric expec-
tations and the role such objects of speculation played in the progress from euphoria to
instability. See also Brenda Spotton, Financial Instability Reconsidered: Orthodox Theo-
ries Versus Historical Facts, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 175, 181-83 (1997), in which Professor Spot-
ton associates the development of financial instability both with financial and technological
innovation.
407. For example, studies have demonstrated that the introduction of an exchange-
traded option on an equity security results in an increase (approximately two percent) in
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hypothesis provides a model for viewing the role of the process of con-
temporary financial innovation and its consequences for the sector and
the economy.
D. THE HETERODOX EXPLANATION
The heterodox view of financial innovation-not as an end in itself, but
as a symptom or indication of certain sectoral dynamics-produces the
following explanation.
Generally, contemporary financial innovation is a response to rising
fragility and instability within the financial sector.408 The recent history
of the United States' banking and thrift industries provides a ready exam-
ple of this process from the supply perspective. However, similar forces
were at work in the real sector, providing a demand-based impetus for
the development of contemporary financial innovation as well.
40 9
The banking industry was faced with increased competition resulting
from the shape-shifting innovations of non-banking intermediaries.410
Additionally, traditional sources of profitability for commercial and in-
vestment banks became less reliable. Since the Great Depression, bank-
ing regulation determined the amount of interest that could be paid on
time deposits and prevented the payment of interest on demand depos-
its.411 Mutual funds, money market funds, insurance companies, pension
funds and other non-bank intermediaries were not subject to such inter-
est payment limitations. These firms created innovative accounts that
competed successfully in the deposit market with banks and other regu-
lated depository institutions. 412 This process of disintermediation cut into
the equity security's price and a decrease in the security's volatility. See Jennifer Conrad,
The Price Effect of Option Introduction, 44 J. FIN. 487, 488, 497 (1989) (noting permanent
change). Similar findings appear in Jerome Detemple & Phillip Jorion, Option Listing and
Stock Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 14 J. BANKING & FIN. 781, 800 (1990) (noting that
the effects fade over time) and in Wi Saeng Kim & Colin M. Young, The Effect of Traded
Option Introduction on Shareholder Wealth, 14 J. FIN. RESEARCH 141 (1991) (finding that
early call option listings improve the wealth of underlying security holders). But see Ken-
neth S. Bartunek, Option Delisting of Stocks That Continue Trading: An Examination of
Welfare Effects, 31 FIN. REV. 565, 581 (1996) (finding that option delisting had a small
negative impact on the underlying equity security, i.e., on stocks with an average price of
$15.02, delisting results in a price drop of $0.07). Additionally, delisting resulted in no
significant volatility effects. See id. at 580-81.
408. In this context, financial fragility is used as a measure of the vulnerability of the
system to financial instability. See Wolfson, supra note 380, at 347. Financial instability is
the actual occurrence of a problem or problems, which threaten disruption of one or more
of the basic functions of the financial sector. See id.
409. See ELI BODIN ET AL., EXCHANGE RATE VARIABILITY AND THE RISKINESS OF
U.S. MULTINATIONAL FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BRETrON
WOODS SYSTEM, (Weiss Center, Wharton School, Working Paper No. 94-6, Aug. 1994),
where the authors argue that the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed-rate foreign ex-
change system precipitated an unprecedented period of exchange rate, interest rate, and
corporate earnings volatility.
410. See supra text accompanying note 63.
411. From 1933 until 1979, the Federal Reserve used Regulation Q to establish the
maximum interest rates payable on time deposits. See Canova, supra note 386, at 1297-98.
412. See Goldstein, supra note 357, at 729. Although Congress considered the problem
of disintermediation, it declined to bring the innovative accounts within the jurisdiction of
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the traditional sources of deposits and interacted with a simultaneously
occurring erosion in commercial banks' core business of commercial and
industrial lending.
Corporations increasingly began to float their own commercial paper,
bypassing commercial banks and taking their short-term financing needs
directly to the capital markets. For example, in 1973, the share of the
short-term corporate debt market held by the ten largest New York banks
was 19.2%. By 1984, that amount had fallen to 11.7%.413 Commercial
banks sought to replace this traditional source of profitability with
higher-risk and, therefore, higher-return loans, for example, in the less-
developed countries market,414 and commercial real estate, as well as by
developing non-lending sources of earnings, including the marketing of
innovative financial products.415 Thus, increased competition resulted in a
shift in market participants' perceptions. Loans were made that would
have previously been considered unsound. Bankers retreated from rela-
tionship-oriented business to a transaction orientation driven by short-
term profitability.416 The asymmetric reward mechanism encouraged the
rapid dissemination of the new version of the fundamentals throughout
the industry. Managers followed the crowd, understanding that tactic to
be personally beneficial, irrespective of its ultimate impact on their
institutions.
Commercial bankers advocated deregulation as a way to enhance their
competitive position. 417  However, deregulation ultimately increased
competition by permitting thrifts and other federally regulated savings
institutions into the commercial lending market.41 8 Thus, financial inno-
vation by non-banks forced coercive competitive pressures on commer-
cial banks. This contributed to increased industry fragility and ultimately
to the last decade's crisis in the banking and thrift industries.41 9
Investment banks also saw their traditional sources of profitability
dwindle as issuers began to rely more on private placements and shelf-
Regulation Q. See Money Market Mutual Funds: Hearings on Oversight on the Supervi-
sion and Regulation of Money Market Mutual Funds and the Effects of the Funds on Finan-
cial Markets Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong. 493, 493-95 (1980).
413. See Goldstein, supra note 357, at 729.
414. The search for new customer bases ultimately would lead commercial banks to
finance poorer credit risks, highly leveraged mergers and acquisitions, and commercial real
estate. See id. at 729-30. The consequences of these ventures were instrumental in precipi-
tating the commercial banking crisis of the late 1980s.
415. See id.
416. See id. at 729.
417. The enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) was considered a great success by
private banking interests. See Canova, supra note 386, at 1315-16. The Act liberalized
interest rate ceilings pending their eventual phase-out, preempted state mortgage rate ceil-
ings, and permitted the use of negotiable order of withdrawal accounts, i.e., interest-bear-
ing checking accounts issued by savings associations. See id.
418. See WHITE, supra note 20, at 72-81.
419. See Goldstein, supra, note 357, at 728-29.
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registration.420 The rise in the influence of the institutional investor com-
munity enabled corporate chief financial officers to bypass public issues
and have their securities placed privately with institutional investors.
This greatly decreased investment bankers' earnings.421 Additionally, in
1982, the SEC promulgated Rule 415,422 which permitted large blocks of
securities to be underwritten and sold as subunits over a two-year period,
rather than all at once.423 In addition to making securities registration
less expensive to the issuer, this practice encouraged competitive bidding
for underwriting services each time a block of securities was taken "off
the shelf".424 As a result, investment bankers turned more to trading,
mergers and acquisitions, consulting and marketing OTC derivatives as
risk management protocols.425 Again, financial fragility flowing from in-
creased competition spurred the resort to contemporary financial innova-
tion, frequently without due attention to the legal risks and operational
risks they created.
E. HETERODOX RISKS
Heterodox thought views the main risks presented by contemporary
financial innovation as the effect it has on conventional perceptions of
sectoral dynamics, its tendency to encourage greater risk taking, and its
propensity to effect monetary expansion, limiting the ability of monetary
authorities to use money as a policy tool in the control of the economy.
1. Greater Risk Taking
The availability of interest rate derivatives encourages the belief that
interest rate risk can be perfectly hedged. 426 In a period of euphoric ex-
pectations and falling corporate earnings, firms assume greater debt even
in the face of interest rate inelasticity. The assumption of greater debt is
based on the belief in the existence of perfect dynamic hedges and fi-
nance theory's conclusion that the value of a firm is independent of how
its is financed.427 Firms also believe that assets whose values have been
inflated by "balance sheet adventuring" or supported by financial innova-
tions will be able to generate cash flows sufficient to service such debt.428
Correlatively, financial institutions absorb more risk in their portfolios
420. See id. at 730.
421. See id.
422. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1997).
423. See Goldstein, supra note 357, at 730.
424. See id. at 730-31.
425. See id. at 731.
426. However, uncertainty in dynamic economic systems makes the ability to accurately
and reliably compose dynamic hedges difficult, if not unlikely. See McClintock at 17
(source on file with author). Well-constructed hedges should hold as long as the funda-
mentals underlying decision-making remain stable, but when the fundamentals change, as
they have a tendency to do over time, the assumptions on which such hedges are con-
structed can disintegrate. See id.
427. See supra notes 304-11 and accompanying text.
428. See Pollin, supra note 395, at 18-19.
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than they would have prior to the introduction of interest rate deriva-
tives. Lenders rely on their ability to effectively hedge high-risk posi-
tions, maintenance of which would have been unlikely during periods of
less optimistic expectations. 429 Moreover, the asymmetric reward struc-
ture encourages the diffusion of such strategies throughout the sector.
There are clear examples of increased risk-taking on the part of finan-
cial institutions in the 1980s as traditional sources of profitability faded
and euphoric expectations permitted the absorption of increasingly risky
assets into lenders' portfolios. For example, as the savings and loan crisis
was developing in the mid to late 1980s, a number of savings and loan
institutions (S&Ls) resorted to "risk-controlled arbitrage." This financial
innovation was a package of complex hedging products designed to allow
thrifts to lock in profits on investments in securitized mortgage instru-
ments.430 The promoters of risk-controlled arbitrage claimed that their
hedging protocol would preserve the spread between the investment yield
on the securities and deposit cost regardless of the direction of interest
rate movements. 431 However, built into these hedging packages was the
assumption that both long-term and short-term interest rates would al-
ways move in the same direction.432 When short-term rates rose and
long-term rates fell, the hedges collapsed, and Franklin Savings Associa-
tion lost approximately $424 million. Commentators compared the herd-
like resort to such exotic financial derivatives by S&Ls as tantamount to a
"mass psychosis. ' 433 The "scientific" bases of financial derivatives and
the erosion of traditional sources of profitability helped to push conven-
tional decision-making to increasingly irrational positions.
2. Increased Speculation
Risk-controlled arbitrage is also an example of the concern of hetero-
dox economists that contemporary financial innovation encourages in-
creased levels of speculative activity at the expense of productive
enterprise.434 Keynes observed that speculation is "the activity of fore-
casting the psychology of the market," while enterprise is "the activity of
forecasting the prospective yield of assets over their whole life."'435 Con-
temporary financial innovations and, in particular, financial derivatives
provided investors with the belief that they could take speculative posi-
tions that would be insulated from losses by these new products and
429. See Carter, supra note 366, at 784; WALMSLEY, supra note 86, at 14.
430. See Charles McCoy, Bad Bets: Many Big S&L Losses Turn Out to Be Due to a
Financial Gamble, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1991, at Al. Such S&Ls included Far West Federal




434. Derivatives trading appears to encourage speculation generally because it enables
investors to take large speculative positions at relatively low cost, and the prospects of
higher speculative yields tend to divert investment from productive to speculative uses.
See Jaffee, supra note 310, at 417; Stout, supra note 26, at 66.
435. KEYNES, supra note 211, at 158.
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processes. Institutional investors have increasingly resorted to short-term
speculating in the financial markets rather than long-term investing. This
practice also is attributed to the sophisticated hedging protocols provided
by contemporary financial innovation. Institutional investors conclude
that they can reliably capture the higher yields of speculation with the
risk control provided by financial derivatives. 436 Since the early 1980s,
the turnover rate of institutional investors in the equity markets have ac-
celerated dramatically. 437 Despite the efficient capital market hypothesis,
institutional investors, by their trading turnover, appear to believe that
frequent trading enables them to beat the market. Additionally, the
asymmetric reward structure encourages the diffusion of activity based on
this view throughout the sector.438 Keynes posited that the capital mar-
kets operate as effective resource allocators only when the predominant
activity is investment as opposed to speculation.439 The increased specu-
lation encouraged by contemporary financial innovation have lead some
to argue that the capital resource allocation process has been converted
into a casino, in which real growth suffers at the expense of short-term
speculation.440
3. Monetary Consequences
In heterodox thought, money is a special form of property and not an
ordinary commodity.441 The ability of contemporary financial innovation
and financial derivatives, in particular, to create new assets with some of
the attributes of money impacts the ability of central bankers to use mon-
etary controls of effect economic policy. In fact, any attempt to exert
regulatory control over money is likely to generate a circumventive, inno-
vative response, yielding money substitutes that obviate the efforts of the
regulators and results in monetary expansion. 442 Unfortunately, mone-
tary expansion has been associated with increased risk of financial insta-
bility and crisis.443 In a period of euphoric expectations, assets with a
high degree of liquidity are created as innovative money substitutes.
They facilitate the expansion of credit and debt and frequently direct ex-
cess liquidity towards speculative ventures. 444
436. See Hazen, supra note 26, at 997 n.45 (quoting Felix G. Rohatyn, Institutional "In-
vestor" or "Speculator," WALL ST. J., June 24, 1988, at A18).
437. See Goldstein, supra note 357, at 732-33.
438. See id. at 733.
439. See Harvey, supra note 371, at 8.
440. Neoclassical scholars generally conclude that increased speculation is not a major
concern "as long as all speculative losses are borne privately." See also Kojima, supra note
329, at 279. However, even if all losses are borne privately, the impact of such losses on,
for example, mutual fund holders and eventual pension fund recipients, could conceivably
spill over as investors and pensioners find themselves with inadequate resources with
which to face retirement.
441. See McClintock, supra note 426, at 14.
442. See supra text accompanying notes 380-86.
443. See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 406, at 59-65.
444. See Spotton, supra note 406, at 191-92.
19981
SMU LAW REVIEW
F. THE HETERODOX EXPLANATION CONSIDERED
The orthodox and heterodox explanations for the rise of contemporary
financial innovation suggest different processes and significantly different
consequences. However, the heterodox view presents an explanation
that resonates with recent financial sector history. The rise of contempo-
rary financial innovation occurred simultaneously with a realignment of
the deposits markets, which placed competitive pressures on banks and
other depository institutions. Banks responded by developing new lines
of business, including higher-risk loans and the development and market-
ing of financial innovations. Financial innovations gained wide accept-
ance, even though they were poorly understood. Their diffusion
throughout the sector encouraged speculation and greater levels of risk
taking, and would result in unprecedented financial losses for highly so-
phisticated firms.
The heterodox understanding of the consequences of contemporary fi-
nancial innovation indicates that this process presents significant risks to
the financial sector. Financial derivatives may pose the greatest risk be-
cause of their ability to alter perceptions of sectoral dynamics. Therefore,
the ability of regulatory policy to contain all the unintended conse-
quences of financial derivatives will be examined, as will the structure of
the regulatory system.
G. REGULATION OF CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL INNOVATION-
FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES
In the United States, financial derivatives are regulated by a web of
regulations and policies emanating from federal and state agencies, fed-
eral and state courts, as well as self-regulatory bodies.445 The regulatory
approach continues the pattern established for the regulation of securities
and commodity futures.446 Specifically, most regulatory efforts are di-
rected toward the control of fraud and anti-competitive market practices
445. Standard-setting agencies also play a role in the regulation of financial derivatives
by determining how such holdings and transactions involving such products are treated for
accounting purposes, as the nature of the accounting treatments available can play a signif-
icant role in the design, as well as the decision to enter into transactions involving financial
derivatives. The regulations, judicial opinions, and self-regulatory conventions of some in-
ternational jurisdictions will also be factored into the decision-making process of dealers
and users in determining how these and other products of contemporary financial innova-
tion should be designed, marketed, and used both in the United States and abroad.
446. Modern U.S. regulation of the commodity futures markets can be traced back to
the passage of the Futures Trading Act of 1921, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) and, after it was
declared unconstitutional, the subsequent enactment of the Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42
Stat. 998 (1922). These enactments were designed to address the fairly regular introduc-
tion of anti-competitive practices to the floors of the commodity futures exchanges. See
Pouncy, supra note 70, at 1635-40. Although Congress would act in 1936 with the passage
of the Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) and again in 1974 with the
passage of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463,
88 Stat. 1389 (1975) to improve the regulation of these markets by creating larger agencies
with ostensibly greater enforcement powers and responsibilities, the concerns animating
regulatory efforts have for the most part remained the same.
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and the maintenance of minimum standards of financial integrity for mar-
ket participants. 447 Thus, regulation tends to address the neoclassical
concern with the potential for the development of systemic threats. Reg-
ulatory efforts to ensure the financial integrity of individual market par-
ticipants through the use of capital adequacy and similar financial
requirements should prevent defaults that could precipitate systemic
threats. However, this pattern of regulation does little to address the het-
erodox concerns with greater risk taking, increased speculation and di-
minished monetary control. In fact, the regulatory pattern appears to
magnify the degree to which both neoclassical and heterodox concerns
may be created.
First, the regulatory pattern pays little attention to the potential of the
process of contemporary financial innovation to generate products and
processes specifically designed to support increased levels of risk taking,
the promotion of increased speculation, and the creation of credit and
money substitutes. 448 Although regulators have become concerned with
the potential for firm and financial institution defaults to trigger secular
disturbances, they have not been as concerned with the consequences of
increased risk taking within the sector. Additionally, the division of regu-
latory authority along institutional lines has permitted the development
of credit and money substitutes under the jurisdiction of financial mar-
447. The banking regulators, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency have implemented the capital adequacy guidelines, contained in the 1988
report of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices of the
Bank for International Settlements ("Basle Accord"). Capital adequacy requirements re-
flect regulatory concern that financial institutions maintain an adequate "cushion" of capi-
tal, the arithmetic difference between assets and liabilities, to protect depositors, and in the
case of federally insured banks and savings associations, the insurance fund, in the event of
a liquidity shortfall. See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model
of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 925, 935 (1996). The impetus for the development of international capital adequacy
standards is reported to have come from the U.S. and the U.K. banking communities who
feared that their implementation of new bilateral capital adequacy standards would put
their markets at a competitive disadvantage. See id. at 938; John C. Deal et al., Capital
Punishment. The Death of Limited Liability for Shareholders of Federally Regulated Finan-
cial Institutions, 24 CAP. U. L. Rav. 67, 73 (1995). The Basle Accord, among other things,
addresses the concern that off-balance sheet transactions in OTC derivatives may subject
financial institutions to credit risks for which they are not required to maintain reserves, as
well as concerns that such risks, given the high concentration of OTC financial derivatives
business in banks and banking subsidiaries, might present systemic threats to the industry.
The Basle Accord promoted the implementation of risk-based capital adequacy standards
in which a financial institution's credit risk exposure is adjusted by a credit conversion
factor and a risk factor (determined by the creditworthiness of the counterparty) to arrive
at an amount that is added to the financial institution's other risk adjusted assets. This
amount is compared to the bank's capital to determine whether adequate capital reserves
exists. The Basle Accord was modified in 1994 to propose the recognition of the effect of
netting provisions, for capital computation purposes. See id., Colombatto & Macey, supra,
at 935-37.
448. Professor Hazen has identified the tendency of financial derivatives to promote
injurious speculation and has proposed that all financial derivatives be subject to an en-
hanced economic purpose test. See Hazen, supra note 26, at 1029-31. Professor Hazen
would require regulators to balance a new derivative instrument's beneficial economic im-
pact against potential negative speculative impact and approve those instruments that pro-
vide an economic benefit without promoting excess speculation. See id. at 1031.
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kets rather than banking regulators. There has been greater emphasis on
the collection of information concerning the financial integrity of individ-
ual market participants. However, this information has not influenced
prospective regulatory efforts, but instead is used to contain problems
caused by products after adverse consequences have resulted from their
introduction.
Additionally, the regulatory pattern interacts with the process of con-
temporary financial innovation and stimulates the development of prod-
ucts to defeat regulatory jurisdiction. As the regulatory pattern is
characterized by regulatory competition and regulatory overlap, compli-
ance with the requirements of multiple regulators necessarily raises costs
without significantly diminishing the legal risk of mischaracterization. 449
Therefore, if regulation can be avoided or a particular regulator selected,
the costs of regulatory compliance should decrease. Additionally, the
risk that a product or process may be mischaracterized in a way that
places it within the regulatory jurisdiction of an undesirable regulator
also is diminished. Therefore, the current regulatory structure has and
will continue to vector contemporary financial innovation toward the
most desirable regulators or towards products that are least susceptible to
regulation.450 This situation presents the prospect of increasingly sophis-
ticated and specialized products. The risks presented by these products
also will increase as the impetus to be first to the market will result in
their deployment with incomplete information.
Thus, the heterodox explanations of the rise of contemporary financial
innovation raises significant concerns that are not addressed by neoclassi-
cal thought. As neoclassical thought has provided the regulatory para-
digm for the financial sector, the concerns of heterodoxy are overlooked
in that arena as well.
This Article will now examine examples of the legal scholarship's anal-
ysis of the process of contemporary innovation. This review suggests that
some of the concerns of heterodoxy are considered by legal scholars, but
their analysis is limited by their use of the analytical tools provided by
orthodoxy.
V. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND CONTEMPORARY
FINANCIAL INNOVATION
The legal scholarship examining the origins and consequences of con-
temporary financial innovation, and, in particular, derivative financial in-
struments, is firmly embedded in the neoclassical tradition. There are,
449. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Or-
ganizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAW. 447, 453-57
(1995) (discussing the theory of regulatory competition).
450. It is possible that the most innocuous regulator will also be the most efficient.
However, if the examples of the CFTC and SEC are any guidance, the more innocuous
regulator, the CFTC, achieved that reputation as a result of its less aggressive enforcement
policy, which is believed to have resulted, particularly in its early years, from industry cap-
ture. See generally Markham, supra note 72.
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nonetheless, significant differences in the extent to which this scholarship
wholeheartedly embraces the neoclassical explanations of the rise of con-
temporary financial innovation. There also are differences in the way
risks are perceived and characterized. 451 One view suggests that the ori-
gins, character, and usages of financial derivatives create risks that are
not suggested in the development, diffusion and use of traditional and
modern financial instruments.452 Another view concludes that financial
derivatives are not unlike other instruments of corporate finance and, as
such, present no real additional risks or concerns.
The first view is articulated by Professor Hu, who has identified
through his scholarship several apparent risks and concerns presented by
financial derivatives that are not generally created by other financial in-
struments. 453 Professor Macey, however, has concluded that the risks
presented by financial derivatives are not significantly different from the
risks of other modern securities traded in the capital markets. 454
Professor Hu has identified a species of unique risk, i.e., information
failure, the possibility that financial innovators and end-users will fail to
make appropriate investment in information. Therefore, they will not
fully appreciate the risks associated with the use and diffusion of financial
derivatives throughout the economy.455 Although Professor Hu's analy-
sis of information failure does not employ heterodox theory, it does sug-
gest an impatience with some of the weaknesses of neoclassical thought.
Professor Hu attributes the failure of financial innovators to make ade-
quate investment information to three principal causes. 456 First, Hu iden-
tified inappropriability, the inability of the innovator to capture all of the
value of her investment in information. The innovator limits her invest-
ment information to avoid financing the production of information that
451. However, legal scholarship is increasingly recognizing the limitations of neoclassi-
cal theory as a basis for analysis and policy formulations. See generally Cunningham, supra
note 26, at 547-51; Lowenstein, supra note 26, at 925-28; Hazen, supra note 26, at 987-89.
452. See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Information Failure
and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L. J. 1457 (1993).
453. See id.; see also Henry T.C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives,
Retail Mutual Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L. J. 2319 (1996).
454. See Jonathan R. Macey, Derivative Instruments: Lessons for the Regulatory State,
21 J. CoRP. L. 69, 71 (1995).
455. See Hu, supra note 452, at 1463-64. See also Hu, supra note 453, at 2324, where
Professor Hu discusses the risks presented by asset class illiteracy, which can be viewed as
an additional form of information failure. Professor Hu also has a risk presented to share-
holder value by inappropriate use of financial derivatives to hedge corporate risks. See Hu,
supra note 6, at 1016. The potential inappropriateness of hedging is suggested by the con-
clusion of finance theory that, given certain assumptions, hedging does nothing to increase
corporate value as individual shareholders can engage in hedging on their own if they so
desire. See id. at 1016-17.
456. Although Professor Hu's focus is on the role of banks as innovators, much of his
analysis is applicable to other financial innovators as well. See Hu, supra note 452, at 1462.
Banks, through the availability of federally insured deposit insurance, present a somewhat
different set of risks as financial innovators than other financial institutions and financial
firms, but the availability of deposit insurance does not significantly impact the generaliza-
tion of Professor Hu's analysis to financial innovators.
1998]
SMU LAW REVIEW
may become available to her competitors.457 Second, Professor Hu ar-
gues that information failure results from cognitive bias, the operation of
decisional heuristics, which may lead to underestimation or misinterpre-
tation of risks.458 Third, Professor Hu has identified agency-principal
conflicts, which promote a tendency among agents to understate risks to
the principal when the behavior involved could provide high rewards to
the agent.459 These factors are offered as the causes of information fail-
ure. However, it appears that these factors do not fully explain how nor-
mal levels of risk adversity are overcome to permit decision-making
under incomplete information.
Although the possibility of inappropriability seems plausible,460 Profes-
sor Hu places the development and diffusion of financial derivatives in an
ergodic environment. In such an environment, additional expenditures
on information would appear to ameliorate some of the operational risks
financial derivatives may create. In an ergodic environment, such infor-
mation is assumed to exist. Additionally, if the information is produced,
it is believed that the additional information increases the ability to relia-
bly predict future events. Innovators will know how their products will
function in real world applications, and the risks they may be expected to
generate. Heterodox thought, however, assumes a decisional environ-
ment of uncertainty. In this environment, investment in additional infor-
mation may not produce a proportional improvement in risk
comprehension and reduction. Given the limitations of phenomological
and statistical modeling, it is unlikely that any model of the risks and
consequences of financial derivatives will be able to make consistantly
accurate predictions. The interpolations and extrapolations offered by fi-
nancial models may vary significantly from reality. Thus, Professor Hu's
proposal for a mechanism to generate and share information throughout
the sector may not generate the benefits of risk reduction anticipated.
The existence and operation of decisional heuristics other than ration-
ality is consistent with heterodox theory. Professor Hu argues that deci-
sion-makers ignore low probability events, 461 underestimate the
occurrence of events for which they have no ready associations, 462 and
overemphasize views that are based on personal expertise while deem-
phasizing views of other professions. 463 The operation of these biases
might explain why decision-makers would ignore legal risks. Such risks
457. See id. at 1481-82.
458. See id. at 1487-88.
459. See id. at 1492-94.
460. But see Tufano, supra note 374, at 213. Professor Tufano's study determined that
the first firm to create and market an innovative product maintains a market share advan-
tage over firms that enter the market later and charge less. See id. at 230-34. Thus,
although first-movers may be concerned with investing information that will enable com-
petitors to duplicate their efforts, they tend not to lose substantial market share as a result
of subsequent competition.
461. See Hu, supra note 452, at 1488.
462. See id. at 1490.
463. See id. at 1491.
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were thought to rarely arise, and the views of financial experts about their
likelihood were given greater weight than the views of legal experts.
These cognitive biases do not fully explain the decision to forgo informa-
tion about a product's operation in the real world. The decision to mar-
ket a product with incomplete information is more likely to result from
real or perceived business pressures, or the influence of other information
with the ability to coerce action. Heterodoxy suggests that the asymmet-
rical reward structure may encourage decision-making on incomplete in-
formation. Managers of financial innovation design who jump on the
bandwagon, even when they are unsure of its ultimate destination, find
career safety in the fact that their peers are operating on the same infor-
mation base, whether adequate or inadequate. Those who expend the
time and effort to undertake investigations not commenced by their peers
may create a delay in product development, which may result in lost mar-
ket share or market entry preclusion.464 The post-marketing discovery of
unanticipated risks may be perceived as creating a lower probability of
adverse career consequences than the career consequences flowing from
a missed opportunity.
The agent-principal conflict identified by Professor Hu occurs in a his-
torical context in which commercial and investment banks faced in-
creased competition and the erosion of traditional sources of
profitability. 465 In this context, the agency-principal conflict may be seen
as a further manifestation of the agent's awareness of the asymmetrical
reward structure. Professor Hu suggests that "the more an agent can sup-
press the apparent risk undertaken without arousing the principal's suspi-
cions, the better the agent will look. '466 Thus, such an agent will have an
incentive to withhold information likely to impede her desire to engage in
activity whose risks are unknown or underappreciated by her colleagues
and superiors. However, if the agent is acting in an environment of in-
creasingly unrealistic expectations concerning future earnings, the agent's
"suppression" of potentially adverse information may be the only way to
achieve the productivity results her peers are achieving with similar inno-
vations in comparable firms. Again, the need to move with the herd may,
in this instance, be characterized as the agent's placing her interest and/or
her class interest above the interest of the principal.
Professor's Hu's analysis of these risks leads him to the conclusion that
a balance can be achieved between the potentially devastating conse-
quences presented by the financial derivatives markets and the great ad-
vantages they offer.467 However, he suggests that the ability of regulators
to achieve this balance is unlikely, and characterizes regulatory efforts as
resembling the blind leading the nearsighted. 468 In other words, financial
464. See supra text accompanying note 374.
465. See supra text accompanying notes 373-76.
466. Hu, supra note 452, at 1492.
467. See id. at 1503-05.
468. "If the puzzle is why banks know so little, then the dilemma is how can regulators,
who know even less, be effective. How can the blind guide the nearsighted?" Id. at 1463.
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innovators do not always know enough about the products they are mar-
keting and therefore, regulators must know even less. This analysis leads
Professor Hu to advocate an incremental approach to the development of
regulatory initiatives to require disclosure of information on the produc-
tion of "systemic" risks. 469 Incrementalism, he argues, should preserve
the vitality of the process of financial innovation by avoiding the imposi-
tion of inappropriate regulatory burdens. However, it also will allow a
useful market to function while its regulators' understanding of contem-
porary financial innovation's dynamics and consequences matures. 470
Professor Macey views the rise in the production and diffusion of finan-
cial derivatives as another example of the benefits and risks of highly
leveraged transactions. 471 Professor Macey relies on the "functional ap-
proach" to financial innovation to support this conclusion. The functional
approach views contemporary financial innovation as attempts to develop
new products to deal with fundamental problems of corporate finance. 472
However, the functional approach argues that products that provide func-
tionally equivalent financial services should be regulated in the same
way.473 Thus, this approach suggests that derivative instruments should
be analyzed to determine their functions, how they are being used, and
what they seek to achieve as instruments of corporate finance. Professor
Macey has identified four objectives that financial derivatives are
designed to accomplish. Financial derivatives are designed to achieve risk
management, to lower transactions costs, to protect bondholders and
other fixed claimants from shareholder opportunism, and to achieve the
revenue maximization offered by leverage. 474 However, Professor Ma-
cey concluded that the only function that creates any significant risk is
revenue maximization through leverage. Therefore, derivative instru-
ments should be approached and regulated as are other highly leveraged
transactions in non-derivative markets.475
469. See id. at 1496. Professor Hu recognizes that incrementalism need not lead to a
conservative result, but has the potential to yield drastic consequences. See id. at 1496
n.233 (quoting Charles E. Lindblom, Still Meddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 517, 520 (1979)).
470. See id. at 1495-96. See also Hu, Swaps, supra note 1, at 413-16 (Hu calls for an
incremental approach in shifting between competing methods of regulating bank capital
adequacy standards).
471. See Macey, supra note 454, at 82.
472. For example, the conflicts between stockholders and bondholders in the last cen-
tury led to three ostensibly equivalent "innovations:" voting trusts, bond covenants, and
preferred stocks. See Macey, supra note 454, at 72 (quoting Peter Tufano, Securities Inno-
vations: A Historical and Functional Perspective, 7 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 90 (1995)). The
problem with this example and this analysis generally is that it characterizes, as innova-
tions, securities that were already hundreds of years old or that simply repackage well-
known rights and liabilities. See supra text accompanying notes 65-85. Thus, this analysis
tells us little about the causes of the rise of contemporary financial innovation.
473. Thus, portfolio insurance, exchange-traded put options, and explicit guarantees by
insurers are functionally identical because they all seek to achieve risk management and
they all can be used to manage the same types of risks. See Macey, supra note 454, at 72.
474. See id. at 72-79.
475. See id. at 82. Professor Macey specifically rejects Professor Hu's concern with the
risks created by information failure. See id. at 86.
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Viewing financial derivatives transactions as highly leveraged transac-
tions, Professor Macey argues that the transactions create two risks. He
identifies these risks as "localized risk" and "systemic risk." Localized
risk, such as market risk and credit risk, is the "risk that each firm faces
when it makes a derivatives trade. '476 Systemic risk is the "risk that de-
rivatives losses will not be localized, but instead will spread to firms, indi-
viduals, and institutions that are not in a position either to benefit from
profitable, trading activity or to avoid loss."'477 Professor Macey con-
cludes that the existence of localized risk does not justify regulation be-
cause the consequences of this risk will be borne by the individual firm.
Therefore, firms will have great incentives to control such risks.
478
Heterodox thinkers view the use of highly leveraged instruments differ-
ently. They would observe that the tendency to employ high levels of
leverage is an indication of firm fragility or a decision to divert invest-
ment from productive enterprise to speculation. A rise in the level of
speculative activity is suggestive of growing sectoral fragility as well. Pro-
fessor Macey recognizes the difficulty in distinguishing between transac-
tions involving financial derivatives entered into for hedging purposes
and transactions in which such instruments are used to take speculative
positions, and the possibility of undertaking large speculative positions
disguised as hedging transactions. 479 Professor Macey contends that the
difficulty in distinguishing between speculative and hedging positions is a
reason to restrain the impulse towards regulation. He argues that any
effort to regulate the speculative use of financial derivatives would limit
their availability for legitimate hedging purposes as well.480 However,
this argument would result in increasing levels of speculation in the sec-
tor, diverting resources from enterprise and potentially increasing
sectoral fragility.
The heterodox view indicates that risks may prove more difficult to
localize than Professor Macey suggests. Market risk, for example, can
expand into systemic threats if a large number of firms or financial insti-
tutions have taken positions in the market that expose them to the same
market risks.481 The use by savings and loan institutions of "risk con-
trolled arbitrage," for example, spread a firm-specific market risk across
an important segment of the financial sector. This risk materialized into
substantial losses when the market moved in ways unanticipated by this
strategy.482 Although the progress from market risk to loss generated by
this particular financial innovation did not in itself create the savings and
loan crisis, it played a role in the collapse of a number of institutions and
476. Id. at 82.
477. Id. at 84.
478. See id. at 82.
479. See id.
480. See id.
481. See Cornford, supra note 326, at 497.
482. See supra text accompanying note 331.
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in the magnitude of the losses ultimately suffered.483
Credit risks, although localized in Professor Macey's view, also have
the ability to develop into systemic threats. For example, modern portfo-
lio theory provided a theoretical basis for the rise in securitized debt.
This theory encouraged the belief that loan pooling (i.e., diversification)
minimized the need of the ultimate purchaser of a securitized instrument
to have detailed analyses of the default risks presented by the individual
loan components of securitized instruments.484 The lenders who origi-
nate loans and then sell them for pooling and securitization have much
less incentive to fully assess the credit risks presented by loans whose
ultimate benefits and risk will be purchased by others.485 Moreover, in an
environment of euphoric expectations, prudential standards of lending
may relax, resulting in the production and ultimate securitization of risk-
ier loans than would have been originated in periods of more realistic
expectations. 486 Ordinarily, diversification will provide the risk reduction
that pooling should create. However, in times 'of economic downturns,
with increased rates of mortgage and personal loan defaults, the credit
risks contained in securitized instruments also have the ability to generate
systemic threats as anticipated cash flows become unreliable and their
holders begin to experience liquidity shortfalls. 487 Therefore, as hetero-
dox economists have observed, what Professor Macey characterizes as lo-
calized risks nonetheless have the potential to contribute to the
development of systemic threats in which losses are not internalized but
distributed more widely throughout the sector and the economy. 488
As with localized risks, Professor Macey views the development of sys-
temic risks as unlikely. He argues that the potential of market linkage
and the high concentration of financial derivatives activities among a rel-
atively small number of entities developing into systemic risk is over-
stated. Thus, the potential for systemic risk should not require any
additional regulatory response. The low potential for systemic risk means
that these products should be regulated like functionally similar, highly
leveraged transactions. 489 That assessment is not an unreasonable one
when the analysis is limited to neoclassical concepts of market dynamics
483. See id.
484. See Michael J. Carter, Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility, 23 J. ECON.
ISSUES 779, 788-89 (1989). Despite the difficulty ultimate purchasers have in assessing the
true risks presented by securitized instruments, a belief in the effects of diversification and
the guarantees provided by the federal government for many of these securities will en-
courage their purchase. See id. at 789.
485. See id. Although these securitized instruments generally have very high credit rat-
ings, such ratings tend to be more a function of the guarantees provided by federal agen-
cies than of an independent assessment of risk. See id.
486. See id.
487. Liquidity risk is another localized risk with the ability to progress to a systemic
threat, and it could be argued that the 1987 market break is an example of individual
liquidity failures expanding to systemic proportions. See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON
MARKET MECHANISMS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHA-
NISMS (1988) 30-36 [hereinafter Task Force].
488. See Cornford, supra note 326, at 497.
489. See Macey, supra note 454, at 84, 91-92.
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and the unlikely threat of widespread default.490 However, if the risks
presented by concentration and market linkage are examined in an envi-
ronment characterized by existing fragility and potential instability, the
potential for catastrophe remains remote, but appears less implausible.
Heterodox thought maintains that the rise in contemporary financial in-
novation serves to sustain unrealistically high asset values and corre-
spondingly high levels of debt. In an environment in which greater risk-
taking has become the norm, a shift in the consensus view of the funda-
mentals resulting from the failure of a major player in the sector retains
the capacity to evoke a sectoral disturbance. Most scenarios in which
systemic risk develops into a significant crisis appear somewhat fanciful.
However, an appreciation of all of the processes that might produce such
events is constrained by uncertainty, as are the most sophisticated models
of the development of such an occurrence. 491 Professor Macey recog-
nizes that "It]here are unintended consequences in the financial markets
just as there are unexpected events and unintended consequences from
regulation," but he argues that such problems cannot be addressed pro-
spectively.492 Regulation will always be too late.493 If, as heterodox
thought suggests, Professor Macey has underappreciated the nature and
the magnitude of the risks presented, then the need for prospective regu-
latory intervention appears advised.
A. THE LIMITS OF ORTHODOXY
The views of Professors Hu and Macey are illustrative of the approach
of most legal scholars and commentators writing from the perspective of
economic orthodoxy on the policy implications of the process and prod-
ucts of contemporary financial innovation.494 Their focus is on the poten-
tial of this process and its products to precipitate crisis or other
490. See, e.g., Ludger Hentschel & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Risk and Regulation in Deriv-
ative Markets, 7 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 16 (1994) (defining systemic risk as the risk of
"widespread default in any set of financial contracts that can be linked to default in deriva-
tives"). The development of a systemic threat does not require actual default to create
sectoral panic. Shifts in perception concerning the likelihood of default or illiquidity may
play a role in the development of systemic threats such as banking panics and runs.
491. For example,
a run of bad news: the spectacular failure of a widely admired LBO; the
forced merger of a big Wall Street firm "after a poorly supervised trader lost
$500 [million] by failing to hedge a complex position in the newly developed
foreign-mortgage-backed securities market;" a bad wheat harvest; a Stalinist
backlash in Russia; an angry trade dispute with Japan
has been offered as a scenario with the potential to prompt a radical reexamination of the
fundamentals and a downward confidence spiral culminating in a severe recession. Until
the Next Crash, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1992, at 41, 45; see also MARTIN FELDSTEIN, THE
RISK OF ECONOMIC CmsIs (1991).
492. Macey, supra note 454, at 90.
493. See id. at 90-91.
494. Although Professor Hu's analysis demonstrates a recognition of the weaknesses of
the neoclassical perspective, it nonetheless analyzes the process and its products from neo-
classical economics' microeconomic orientation while limiting its reliance on the existence
of an ergodic environment and the operation of the rationality heuristic.
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substantially adverse economic events.495 Therefore, the concern
prompted by the introduction and use of financial derivatives is with the
possible role such instruments may play in triggering defaults by firms or
financial institutions. Of particular concern are those defaults with the
potential to generate systemic disturbances that may impede the ability of
the financial system to perform its basic functions. The orthodox ap-
proach limits its concern to a few environmental factors and firm specific
discrete events.496 Heterodox thinkers are more concerned with process
(i.e., dynamic interactions) than with discrete events. They interpret the
behavior of the sector as more complex than the aggregated behavior of
its participants. Additionally, their analysis of dynamics and welfare is
insulated from the deterministic assumptions of rationality and equilib-
rium. The heterodox view, with its focus on actual markets and actual
events in historic time, presents a more accurate reflection of contempo-
rary financial innovation and other financial and economic processes.
Therefore, heterodox arguments that contemporary financial innova-
tion interacts with ongoing sectoral processes to produce changes in
sectoral dynamics that are potentially more significant than the possible
default of individual firms or institutions should be taken more seriously.
The law and legal scholarship should examine the implications of this
conclusion. For example, legal scholarship has failed to critically examine
the relationship between the processes of traditional and contemporary
financial innovation. But more importantly, it has not thoroughly appre-
ciated the role of regulation and regulatory structure in accelerating fi-
nancial innovation; and it has largely overlooked the propensity of
contemporary financial innovation, and its interactions with changes in
perceptions of sectoral dynamics, to encourage greater risk taking and
increased speculation. In short, the law and legal scholarship's reliance
on orthodox models of financial sector behavior prevents an accurate un-
derstanding of the rise of contemporary financial innovation and the risks
it presents to the financial sector and the economy at large. Therefore,
the policy guidance provided by legal scholarship is suspect.
B. FINANCIAL INNOVATION ACROSS TIME
Legal scholarship views our age as unique and views the process of
contemporary financial innovation as new and different from the histori-
cal processes that resulted in the development of traditional and modern
financial instruments and processes. Much has been made of the role of
technology and finance theory in the rise of contemporary financial inno-
vation; and it has been suggested that modern finance theory, standing
alone, distinguishes the contemporary process from its antecedents. Het-
erodoxy, however, suggests that we focus not on factors and events as
much as on processes and interrelationships. The process of financial in-
novation occurs within financial systems that utilize available resources to
495. See Hu, supra note 452; Macey, supra note 454.
496. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
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meet the system's needs for financial services. As societies become more
complex, their resources change and the need for financial services also
changes to reflect increased societal and financial complexity. Although
the process of contemporary financial innovation is similar to its anteced-
ents, the financial system in which the contemporary process is occurring
is marked by unprecedented complexity, both with respect to its compo-
nents and their interactions. There is simply more of almost everything,
and therefore greater opportunities for both anticipated and unantici-
pated interactions, as well as intended and unintended consequences.
Thus, the heterodox concern with process would suggest that the process
of contemporary financial innovation may be controlled, to the extent
that is deemed desirable, by decreasing the complexity of the financial
system. 497 To a society that is wedded to progress, such a suggestion must
seem somewhat alarming. However, to the extent that contemporary fi-
nancial innovation encourages sectoral tendencies toward fragility and in-
stability, some efforts directed toward minimizing inadvertent sources of
financial complexity may help focus the innovation process towards prod-
ucts and services that encourage enterprise, rather than products and
services that disguise and facilitate speculation. One source of inadver-
tent complexity may be the nature and structure of the regulatory systems
within whose jurisdictions financial innovations fall.
C. REGULATORY STRUCTURE
The example provided by financial derivatives demonstrates the impact
that inadvertent complexity resulting from a specific regulatory structure
can have on the process of financial innovation. Although neoclassical
thought generally credits regulation as a source of financial innovation,
this view does not lead to the conclusion that less regulation would result
in less innovation. Rather, less regulation may permit the character and
direction of innovation to be driven by forces more directly related to
productive enterprise and societal welfare.
The example of financial derivatives suggests that much of the efforts
of contemporary financial innovation have been inordinately influenced
by the structure of the present regulatory system. For example, the
shape-shifting interventions of the money market and mutual fund indus-
tries must be credited with a significant role in banking and thrift dis-
intermediation, increased competition in the deposits markets, and,
therefore, with a significant role in the resulting crisis in the thrift indus-
try. These innovations were made possible by a regulatory structure
based along relatively narrow institutional lines. Additionally, part of the
impetus for the creation of exotic financial innovation in the late 1980s
and early 1990s was the desire to avoid the jurisdiction of product-based
regulators, the CFTC and the SEC. The adverse consequences of the de-
velopment and diffusion of products and services designed with regula-
497. See FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 387, at 27.
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tory avoidance in mind, and the use of such products with incomplete
information resulted in a torrent of significant losses by users of all levels
of sophistication.498 A more coherent regulatory structure in which regu-
latory competition and overlap are minimized would eliminate much of
the financial innovation directed towards regulation avoidance and juris-
diction selection. Additionally, greater regulatory coherence would
lessen the ability of innovators to attempt to profit from the opportunities
created by regulatory inefficiency, expressed, for example, in simultane-
ous regulation along both product and institutional lines.
Regulatory inefficiency and the inadvertent complexity it introduces
into the financial system may be minimized in a number of ways. Two
options that deserve additional study are the consolidation of regulatory
authority over the markets impacted by contemporary financial innova-
tion and the creation of a presumption of regulation, which would attach
to all products and services created by contemporary financial
innovation.
If financial market regulation is predicated on a presumption that all
financial products that perform one or more of the fundamental services
of the financial sector499 are subject to regulation, the tendency of the
process of contemporary financial innovation to be vectored toward the
avoidance of regulation, or towards the capture of gratuitous benefits
from regulatory inefficiency, will be diminished. Moreover, a presump-
tion of regulation may, in fact, change the process of contemporary finan-
cial innovation by encouraging innovators to incorporate prevailing
regulatory considerations into the design and marketing of their products.
A presumption of regulation also would create incentives for the creation
and disclosure of information concerning the operation and risks of new
products specifically for the use of regulators. Innovators could come to
view the education of regulators as part of the process of contemporary
financial innovation, recognizing that investing resources in this effort ul-
timately should lower the cost of regulatory compliance while increasing
regulatory familiarity with the most recent developments in this area. In-
creased regulatory competence will free both regulators and sectoral par-
ticipants from the need for incrementalism and create the possibility of
crafting genuinely forward-looking regulation for this arena. The pre-
sumption of regulation should also decrease the tendency of financial in-
novation to serve as a medium that disguises financial fragility and
thereby encourages sectoral instability as participants seek speculative
rather than enterprise based earnings. Further research should, inter alia,
examine the relationship between such a presumption and the widely
498. See generally Becker & Yoon, supra note 24.
499. Or more precisely, all financial products and services that constitute new and bet-
ter ways of providing the fundamental services of the financial sector, which increase the
opportunity set for sector participants and lower transaction costs; or, those new instru-
mentalities and processes that facilitate the provision of the fundamental services of the
financial sector. See supra text accompanying notes 254-72.
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held belief in the value, if not superiority, of the private ordering of finan-
cial transactions.
Of course, the call for regulatory consolidation is not new.500 Despite
the ostensible benefits of a centralized regulatory structure, there are
strong historic and political rationales for the persistence of regulatory
competition and overlap. The recent calls for the elimination of regula-
tory competition in financial markets regulation, as a result of the con-
cerns prompted by large derivatives losses, has been met by well-financed
resistance from some segments of the relevant business community.501
However, additional research is necessary to determine whether the
forces of technology and globalization will render the potential benefits
of regulatory consolidation illusory. It is reasonably clear that the forces
of technological innovation have so integrated the global financial mar-
kets that regulatory consolidation in the United States would, in all
probability, fail to significantly ameliorate the risks presented by contem-
porary financial innovation by the reduction of innovations designed to
either avoid or take advantage of the current regulatory structure.50 2 In-
novators may establish operations in those international jurisdictions that
would permit the creation and marketing of financial innovations that are
geared toward the jurisdictional preferences among international design-
ers and users of financial innovations. U.S. markets may have the advan-
tages offered by relative stability and historic performance, but in an
environment in which it is believed that every risk can be hedged, many
market participants seeking to replace traditional sources of profitability
or to enhance the value of capital assets will continue to seek products
that claim to meet those needs, wherever they are available. The interna-
tional consequences of regulatory consolidation in the U.S. could well
create a more complex global financial marketplace in which the risks
presented by contemporary financial innovation could be amplified.
More research should be devoted to these areas, as it is clear that the
nature and structure of the regulation of financial derivatives has played,
and will continue to play, a role in the direction of contemporary financial
innovation.
500. The call for regulatory consolidation began with the jurisdictional squabbles be-
tween the CFrC and the SEC. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. It continued
after the market break of 1987, after which the Brady Commission recommended the crea-
tion of a single regulatory agency to regulate the capital and risk-mediation markets. See
Task Force, supra note 488, at 59-63. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange proposed the
merger of the CFTC, the SEC, the banking agencies, and banking and securities industries
insurance funds, among other entities, into one agency that could then create a level play-
ing field for all market participants. See CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, MODEL FOR
FEDERAL REGULATION (1993). Bills have also been introduced in Congress to achieve
some form of regulatory consolidation in the financial markets. See supra note 24.
501. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Or-
ganizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAW. 447, 473-81
(1995).
502. See id. at 481.
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D. PERCEPTIONS AND SECTORAL DYNAMICS
Perhaps the greatest insight provided by heterodoxy is the role that
perceptions of sectoral dynamics play in the rise and development of the
process of contemporary financial innovation. Perceptions concerning
sectoral dynamics have both influenced and been influenced by the pro-
cess of contemporary financial innovation. However, legal scholarship is
only beginning to appreciate the inadequacies of the neoclassical synthe-
sis and to fully explain the interaction between psychological factors and
market dynamics. In contrast, heterodoxy places significance on the in-
teractions between market processes and the perceptions of market par-
ticipants without limiting its understanding of human decision-making by
poorly fitting decisional heuristics. For example, changes in perceptions
of sectoral dynamics accompanied the introduction of financial futures
and options contracts. These products provided market participants with
false assurances of liquidity, as well as reason to believe that these prod-
ucts' ability to hedge certain market and credit risks made greater risk-
taking a safer proposition than it had previously been. This view was
encouraged by the characterization of financial derivatives as the prod-
ucts of financial science. The impact of the asymmetrical reward struc-
ture on managerial decision-making and the role of conventional
decision-making under uncertainty helped this changed view of sectoral
dynamics permeate the financial sector. Therefore, managers' decision-
making biased them toward the belief that the products of financial inno-
vation could be used to counter the impact of increased competition and
decreased earnings.
Although these processes are observable, the question becomes how to
incorporate the teachings of heterodox thought-concerning the role that
changes in perceptions of market dynamics-into policy. Additional
study of the role played by changes in perceptions of sectoral dynamics
should provide greater clarity on the interaction of decisional heuristics,
real world market processes, and insight into the ability of the current
regulatory structure to counteract sectoral tendencies toward fragility as a
result of changed perceptions.
Ultimately, the teachings of heterodoxy may sufficiently expand our
knowledge and comprehension base enabling changes to the financial sys-
tem that encourage productive welfare and enterprise enhancing financial
innovation, while minimizing the ability of financial innovation to in-
crease sectoral difficulties. Although heterodoxy offers much in the way
of sophisticated models and analysis, all legal scholarship examining fi-
nancial innovation should be mindful of its basic teachings. First, we live
in a complex financial system in which financial institutions are present
and money is important. Therefore, contemporary financial innovation
cannot be reduced to a reaction to changes in regulation or regulatory
policy. Although the current regulatory structure, in conjunction with the
regulatory dialectic will increase the tendency toward financial innova-
tion, those factors only explain part of the process, and, in particular, do
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not fully explain the impact of regulatory structure in influencing the di-
rection of financial innovation. Second, our examination of financial in-
novation across time corroborates the heterodox conclusion that the
process of contemporary financial innovation differs from its antecedents
only in degree, and then only because it occurs in a much more complex
financial environment. However, over the last half century, increasingly
large numbers of highly specialized products of contemporary financial
innovation have begun interacting in a financial sector of unprecedented
size, scope and sophistication. It seems reasonable to conclude that these
products may interact with sectoral dynamics and historical trends (cor-
porate earnings trends for example), potentially amplifying financial fra-
gility and instability. These products achieve this result by providing a
rationale for the absorption of increased risk, while disguising the move
from productive enterprise to speculative investment. However, it seems
as reasonable to conclude that this melange may produce dynamic
processes for which there are no presently existing models. Finally, our
reliance on economic orthodoxy as an adequate basis upon which to con-
struct research, policy and law may not be justified. Legal scholarship is
expanding beyond the confines of economic orthodoxy, although primar-
ily with a reformist attitude. More is needed. The world of economics
necessarily provides a much wider variety of tools for research and analy-
sis than any one region of that world could provide. We should be more
willing to take advantage of this bounty.
VI. CONCLUSION
Orthodox and heterodox explanations of the rise of contemporary fi-
nancial innovation focus on the same essential factors, but assign them
different weights and different roles in their respective interpretations of
the processes that produced contemporary financial innovation.
Although recognizing that increased competition is an ingredient in the
creation of contemporary financial innovation, neoclassical theory places
primary significance on regulation and finance theory. Orthodoxy looks
for its explanation in changes to the regulatory environment. These
changes created opportunities to apply advances in financial theory to
create new instruments or processes in the effort to escape regulatory
inefficiency and increase profitability.
Heterodox theory acknowledges that regulation and finance theory
have played an important role in the development of contemporary fi-
nancial innovation, but places its focus on the role those factors play in
generating increased competition and financial fragility. Regulatory
changes, or the responses of economic actors to regulatory structures,
have resulted in significant changes in market dynamics and in increased
market contestability. They have induced innovation on the part of some
firms to mimic highly regulated products and services while remaining
outside the domain of regulatory authorities. They also have promoted
financial innovation as a way to regain reliable sources of profitability.
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Finance theory also precipitated change in perceptions of sectoral dynam-
ics and changes in perceptions concerning the fundamentals, in particular,
the willingness of economic actors to acquire increasingly high levels of
debt.
It is through an examination of the policy implications of these two
approaches that their distinctions are drawn into sharper contrast. Neo-
classical thought teaches that policy intervention, in. the form of regula-
tory or self-regulatory responses in the financial markets, should be based
on the desire to improve the efficiency of market processes by correcting
perceived market imperfections that, for example, raise cost, lower trans-
acting freedom, or otherwise produce socially undesirable results. 50 3 At
the least, policy intervention by regulation or self-regulation also should
address the heterodox concern that sectoral processes have the ability to
unfavorably impact the entire economy. 50 4 However, the heterodox per-
spective further suggests that policy intervention should not limit its focus
to improving the efficiency of market functions. Although contemporary
financial innovation in heterodox thought is associated with increased
speculation and rising instability, it also recognizes that innovation has
the potential to achieve significant increases in welfare. 50 5 Economic the-
ory is concerned with the production and distribution of resources, goods
and services.506 Innovation, including financial innovation, has the poten-
tial to increase the size of the pot consisting of resources, goods, and serv-
ices, thereby increasing total welfare.50 7 Thus, heterodox thinkers are
concerned that the welfare enhancements resulting from productive fi-
nancial innovation be distributed between wages and profits not only to
promote efficiency,508 but equity as well.50 9 If heterodox theory, as fur-
ther scholarship in this area may indicate, has the ability to promote a
more equitable economy, then it is in the interest of legal scholarship to
explore these ideas as a part of its basic commitment to justice.
503. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ECONOMIC REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1
(1994).
504. See Kuprianov at 2 (on file with author).
505. See Silber, supra note 49, at 1.
506. See id.
507. See id.
508. The heterodox notion of efficiency includes both allocative efficiency and stability
efficiency, recognizing that systems that promote efficient resource distribution may pro-
mote instability as well. See MINSKY, supra note 215, at 296.
509. See id.
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